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Foreword
European Integration’s Extended Gestation: Forever half-pregnant
Giles Merritt
Does Europe have a collective future, or will the coming years be marked by 
increasingly incoherent developments within the heterogeneous EU? There is no 
denying that the second decade of this century has seen a strong mood shift away 
from the inter-dependence and concerted actions that guided Europe’s national 
governments since the end of World War II, and then since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
What connections, if any, are there between the paroxysms of Brexit in the UK and 
the varying shades of populism in continental Europe? The common denominator 
may simply be the painful economic pressures resulting from waning global 
competitiveness.
It is clear that the high ideals of the European project no longer exert the same 
political pull. The EU’s dreams of progressing almost seamlessly from a trading zone 
to a shared political economy are not being realised. Where are the convergence 
policies that would exert centripetal rather than centrifugal forces? Where is the 
appetite for reforms leading to political union, and whatever happened to the idea of 
Europeans speaking with one voice?
If the EU continues along its present path, the verdict of history may well be that 
it achieved little more than the welter of regulations needed to ensure trade flows. In 
geopolitical terms, Europe as a major player on the world stage may have been an 
illusion largely created by aggregating national statistics.
* * *
It is not inappropriate to start a disquisition on the problems clouding Europe’s 
future by putting Malta under the microscope, even though it accounts for only 0.1 
per cent of the European Union’s population. The Maltese microcosm tells us at a 
glance much of what awaits the whole of Europe in the 21st century’s increasingly 
difficult global environment.
We Europeans were some 15 per cent of the world’s people forty years ago, and 
now only around seven per cent. We may speak dismissively of emerging economic 
giants like China, India and Brazil, suggesting they are copy-cats who use underhand 
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methods to invade our markets, but the reality is that as well as being younger they 
are more vibrant.
Alerting Europe’s electorates to the consequences of demographic change has 
been frustratingly hard. Voters do not want to hear about it, least of all about the 
implications of ageing, so few politicians have had the courage to tell them.
Malta’s demographic roller-coaster is a useful example of the way that ageing and 
a low birth rate can radically reshape a society over a comparatively short space of 
time. Its population profile looks like an alpine peak; having risen steeply, it will also 
fall precipitously.
In 1950 there were fewer than 320,000 Maltese, and since then the population has 
increased at about fifteen times the overall rate of the EU. But it is peaking, so by 2025 
it is due to have shrunk from its present high point of 475,000 back down to 425,000. 
By the end of this century, Malta’s population will – at 340,000 – be almost back to 
the level of 150 years before.
Naturally, demographers’ projections do not always work out with total accuracy, 
but usually they beat those of economists into a cocked hat. So through the lens of 
tiny Malta we can discern the much larger picture of a radically changing European 
society and its workforce. Maltese may complain of being too crowded, yet mostly 
they accept the Government of Malta’s pronouncement that to fuel economic growth 
they need more migrant workers.
This is the situation of the European Union in a nutshell. Observers of the EU 
scene may highlight the intricacies of its institutional developments, its successive 
enlargements and its regulatory outreach, but these are of far less consequence than 
the societal shifts within the member states. The focus of the EU – the ‘Eurocrats’ of 
the commission and the MEPs – is correctly on detail, but it is nevertheless time to 
readjust that focus and bring the big picture into sharper definition.
Europe is shrinking in absolute terms as well as proportionately in a world headed 
for 10 billion people by mid-century. A head count of all Europeans, not just the EU’s 
citizens, reveals a total population of 740 million that is due to fall dramatically to 
707 million by 2050.
More than half a century of plummeting birth rates has taken its toll, leading to 
downward spirals of manpower in most parts of Europe. The next 30 years will see 
the EU’s working age population drop from the present 240 million to 207 million. 
That figure assumes that the current rate of economic migrants will be maintained; 
if not, the EU’s workforce will number only 169 million by mid-century.
The average fertility rate in Europe is now 1.6 children per couple – slightly above 
Malta’s 1.53 but far too low to reverse both the shrinkage and ageing trends now 
exerting an iron grip on the European political economy. The growth in the numbers 
of older people is not only a seemingly insoluble fiscal problem but also one that will 
challenge our basic concepts of democracy.
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How EU governments will fund the steep increases in pensioners is an open 
question. In some countries, Italy for example, the proportion of retired over-65s 
to the total population will rise from 2.7 per cent today to 18.8 per cent in 2050. For 
Europe as a whole, the ‘dependency ratio’ of working age people to pensioners will, 
over the 40 years to mid-century, have halved from 4:1 to 2:1.
State-funded pension systems are already creaking, and it is hard to see how they 
can survive in their present form. The OECD foresees crippling burdens on national 
economies, reckoning that by 2060 the gap between pension costs and contributions 
will average some 10 per cent of an OECD member country’s GDP.
That looks unsustainable, and yet it is only half of the equation. The other half 
is the political implications of the coming ‘generations war’. How willing will 
today’s ‘millennials’ be to pay for Europe’s ageing when they are themselves under-
privileged? And what will be the response of the under-50s to finding themselves 
electoral minorities in most EU countries?
The temptation is to use EU-wide statistics when discussing Europe’s demographic 
difficulties, but these cloak a greater problem. The nations of Europe are being 
divided by population shifts, with the winners and losers from the free movement of 
people widening the wealth gaps the EU had set out to narrow.
Southern Europe’s outlook is far from sunny. Portugal may, by 2060, see its 
population dwindle by 40 per cent, reducing from 10.5 million in 2010 to 6.3 million. 
Spain’s present 47 million will by mid-century drop 11 per cent, or 5.3 million fewer 
people; while Italy’s population of 62 million will decline to 55 million.
These future decreases are comparatively modest when set against the hemorrhaging 
of people from the EU’s newcomer states. The eleven formerly communist countries 
have seen their combined populations drop to 103 million from 111 million, while the 
Baltic states have suffered an overall 25 per cent reduction. Romania’s outlook is even 
worse: it faces a population cut of one third by 2060.
European public opinion has so far reacted to such projections with massive 
indifference, but that may be about to change. What will certainly stir protest and 
demands for new policies and more effective actions is the looming healthcare crisis 
threatening most parts of Europe. By the end of 2019, approaching a quarter of a 
million medical doctors will have stopped practising, reducing their numbers from 
1.8 million to 1.57 million.
A combination of early retirements, inadequate medical training arrangements, 
and an increasingly ailing population of older people is creating a perfect storm. In 
Austria, 40 per cent of doctors will have taken retirement by 2025, and the pattern is 
similar across Europe. Ageing is hitting the healthcare sector too, with almost four 
doctors in ten now over 55 years old.
The writing has been on the wall for some time. The WHO’s analysts rang their 
alarm bells almost 15 years ago, and the European Commission followed up with 
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a Green Paper and an ‘Action Plan’. These were generally ignored, most probably 
because the health services of the richer western European countries were able to tap 
the new resource of healthcare workers from the new member states.
In its way, the coming healthcare crisis illustrates the impotence and even 
irrelevance of the EU and its institutions. Critics accuse Brussels of wanting to 
create a European super-state, but in truth its powers have been steadily sapped by 
its member governments. EU leaders meet more frequently than ever to confer as 
the European Council, but they do so because they have to wrestle with problems 
stemming from reduced rather than greater intra-EU cohesion.
What, then, does the future hold for the great political experiment of European 
integration? Is the basis of sixty years of peace and enlargement strong enough 
to relaunch the project? Will external pressures ranging from security dangers to 
failing technological supremacy awaken national politicians to the merits of EU 
cooperation?
The auguries are discouraging. Just as the Great War of 1914–18 is widely seen as 
the point at which the 20th century began, the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 
seems to have characterised this century of rising Asia. Yet rather than respond to 
the new international conditions that redefine even the largest and most influential 
EU states as small countries, Europe’s governments have reduced their collaboration, 
preferring to go their separate ways.
When Jean-Claude Juncker took over as President of the European Commission 
in autumn 2014, he labelled his five-year mandate a “last chance” for Europe, and 
promised bold new policies to stimulate investment and light red tape bonfires. 
The consensus amongst commentators, however, is that the EU has failed to kick-
start investment and faster growth and has not delivered on goals that ranged from 
banking reforms to ambitious energy and digital market initiatives.
The EU’s member states must bear much of the blame, with unforeseeable 
factors like the 2015–16 ‘migrant crisis’ also playing a part. Now, the talk in national 
chancelleries is of a fresh start, with four areas to have top priority up to 2024.
The thinking is that Europe must, above all, recover its global leadership on 
environmental disciplines to combat climate change. On top of that it must tackle 
eurozone reform, the twin problems of ageing and migration and, not least, the 
many challenges of the Digital Age.
These are the preoccupations of policymakers and business leaders, but what of 
Europeans who increasingly are voting for populist and often anti-EU parties? What 
do citizens want, and how much support are they prepared to give to a mechanism 
many see as distant, unelected and unresponsive?
Complex cross-currents were revealed in a survey conducted for my own Brussels-
based think-tank ‘Friends of Europe’. When the pollsters questioned 11,000 people 
across all EU member states, they received some surprising answers. Four-fifths 
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oppose “less Europe” and moves to hand some of the EU’s powers back to national 
governments, while an overwhelming nine-tenths would not want to see any return 
to a mere trade zone.
At the same time, almost half questioned the EU’s relevance to their own lives, 
and two-thirds thought that they would not be much worse off if the EU were to 
somehow disappear overnight. Yet 40 per cent would like an internet-enabled vote 
on EU-level issues, 25 per cent would like to directly elect EU commission presidents, 
and 20 per cent would welcome a voice in how EU money is spent.
These are not ideas that get much play in the EU’s attempts to gauge public opinion, 
notably its Eurobarometer polling. But they reflect the way Europeans’ attitudes and 
expectations are becoming more complicated and fragmented.
A further complication, making discussion of Europe’s future akin to a game of 
three-dimensional chess, is the growing debate among member states over whether 
there should be a two-speed EU. Advocates of an inner core of ‘progressive’ countries 
and an outer ring of ‘conservative’ argue that it is the only realistic solution.
Set against concerns that a two-speed Europe entailing first-class and second-class 
citizens would spell the end of the EU, there is the reminder that this is already the 
case. Thirty years ago, the discussions leading up to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
clearly set out the fact that creating the euro as a common currency would mean that 
countries with a derogation from eurozone membership would be in an outer ring.
It was also an integral element of the EU enlargement negotiations that the mostly 
ex-communist countries could not, or should not, adopt the euro. That is more or 
less where we still are, with roughly three-fifths of EU countries in the inner core 
of the eurozone. What was not understood at that time, though, was that the single 
currency would create economic divergences between countries rather than the 
convergence promised by its creators.
The upshot is that Europe is now riven by deep divisions, some of them inherent in 
the problems created by one-size-fits-all policies, others aggravated by the decade of 
austerity measures introduced in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.
The north-south split between the ‘Club Med’ countries and the richer northern 
and Scandinavian countries has been further widened by the sharp differences that 
now exist between Paris and Berlin on reforming the eurozone. Germany, backed 
by the Netherlands, staunchly opposes new collective debt ideas. As the euro’s chief 
beneficiary, it may be signing its eventual death warrant.
There is also the east-west schism. The six founding member states together 
with those other richer countries that made up western Europe’s EU-15 treated 
the newcomers of the 2004 ‘Big Bang’ enlargement in a somewhat cavalier and 
condescending manner. They are now reaping the whirlwind of the seeds sown 
then, with the Visegrad states not alone in warning they will use the veto powers of 
membership to avoid the EU’s “interference” in matters they consider “sovereign”.
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There seem two possible outcomes: either the EU’s inertia and inability to grasp 
political nettles leads to an unsatisfactory business-as-usual approach, or there 
is disruptive reform. The former means the present frictions will persist and will 
probably be accentuated by widely projected stagnant economic growth.
The latter course of reform might lance many boils of discontent, but would open 
up bitter re-negotiations over what it means to be European. The outer ring of 
countries no longer to be bound by the most unyielding of EU disciplines would be 
relegated to a different legal framework and all that this implies.
These possibilities have not so far impinged greatly on public opinion. If and when 
they do so they will certainly stoke doubts over the value of the European ‘project’. 
The background for many Europeans is security, and a sense that the EU is not 
delivering the stability and sense of foreign policy coherence they had been led to 
expect.
The migration issue has been throwing into stark relief the volatilities of the 
Middle East, the Gulf region and northern Africa. It has shown how far from reality 
are Europe’s foreign affairs ambitions. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
in spite of its creation of a ‘foreign ministry’ in the shape of its EEAS action service, 
clearly remains much more a trade and economic arm than a diplomatic one.
Successive opinion polls have shown that there is much support for a more muscular 
EU, with respondents apparently yearning for “a European army”. As with so much 
of the Great Debate over Europe’s future, such simple solutions would raise hugely 
complicated new questions over the political mechanisms that would be needed.
In other words, Europe remains in the place its policymakers have always feared 
and denied: it is half-pregnant.
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Introduction
Europe’s Lifelong Companion? The Debate on the Future of Europe
Roderick Pace, Mark Harwood, and Stefano Moncada
The discussion of the “future of Europe” has become the European Union’s lifelong 
companion. It has evolved in successive phases. The current one has been shaped by 
the 2008 financial crisis and the “great recession” which it had provoked, as well as a 
number of more recent developments such as those created by USA policies. The great 
recession caused havoc everywhere, and brought to the surface several issues which 
had been simmering for many years. No member state was immune to its effects, but 
some suffered more than others. The southern EU countries, particularly Greece, saw 
their financial systems shaken to the foundations: economies contracting; public debt 
soaring; unemployment, especially among the young, rising to historic proportions; 
poverty and hardships becoming the new norm for sections of their societies. The 
fundamental financial support provided by the European Union during the financial 
crises came with strings, which some saw as being too stringent, not fairly applied 
to all countries, and restraining the room for manoeuvring to support the most 
vulnerable. This led to public anger, governments were dethroned and newer, often 
fringe parties, came to the fore. Populism grew rapidly and Euroscepticism increased.
In 2015, as the European economy began to grow slowly and better times appeared 
on the horizon, a crisis erupted among the EU member states on who should take 
responsibility for under a million Syrian refugees who moved westwards through 
Turkey in search of safety and a better life. Just when it seemed that spring was 
finally about to displace the long winter of economic gloom that hung over the EU 
since 2008 and which had almost capsized the monetary union, a major political 
crisis erupted once more in Europe. Internal disagreement on the management 
of migration predate 2015, but the events of that year gave it a fresh impetus. The 
situation has changed very little since then and the reform of Dublin 3 has not been 
completed. The legacy of the agreement struck with Turkey was questioned by many, 
as the EU conveniently sidestepped its duty to uphold fundamental human rights so 
as not to address internal discord on migration. The handling of migration is one of 
the most enduring problems which the EU has had to face.
Political upheavals are part of the tissue of any polity, not least the EU. Crises have 
a way of shaping and moulding institutions, though not always in a positive way. 
In the midst of the changes just summarised, the EU experienced a few positives as 
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well. BREXIT did not provoke the predicted rush to the exit; Eurosceptic parties did 
not make substantive gains in the 2019 European Parliamentary elections, and voter 
turnout increased. Several new initiatives such as the launching of a Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the proposal to establish a European Defence 
Fund (EDF) signalled a new vitality in the development of European defence. They 
are the first steps toward the emergence of a European defence identity, which for the 
time being remains vague. Furthermore, the process of EU enlargement continues, 
with some expected delays and perhaps politically naïve postponements, however 
there are little doubts that the trajectory converges toward new member states joining 
the EU; it is rather a question of whether it happens in the middle or long run.
However, a new global recession has appeared on Europe’s radar which could herald 
a period in which public sentiment will turn against the EU making reform more 
difficult. The new Commission led by Ursula von der Leyen wants to make Europe 
the first green continent by 2050 and fit for the digital age. The new Commission 
leader has reasserted Europe’s unwavering faith in multilateralism. The EU does not 
seem to be discouraged by the negative turns in trans-Atlantic relations, the slow 
pace of negotiations in Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
nor by the Trump Administration’s behaviour in the Middle East, the Gulf and his 
(and only his) tariff wars which are mostly responsible for the bad turn in the global 
economy. It offers responsible leadership in world politics in coalition with other 
states. Ambition is the kind of enhancer which the EU needs in this hour though we 
should be wary not to fall victims to our own rhetoric.
Public support for the EU is buoyant, and this has both positive and negative 
aspects. Public support is needed to carry out reforms; but the level of support also 
shows the strength of public expectations. If Europe disappoints its citizens, the 
backlash is likely to be swift and severe. We need to understand what Europeans 
fear most in order to know what they want most. The survey results of a Special 
Eurobarometer (2018) show that 61% of Europeans are optimistic about the future 
of the EU but more than a third (34%) remain pessimistic. Seven EU member states 
show levels of optimism below the EU average. These are Britain (which is leaving), 
the Czech Republic and Hungary, as well as four southern EU member states namely 
Italy, Cyprus, France and Greece. Without doubt these states constitute the front-
line where the battle for the future of Europe has to be fought and won. However, 
it is myopic to think that the future of Europe concerns only them. EU reforms 
need to lead to substantive improvements for all European citizens because that is 
what Europeans expect. The EU cannot wriggle out of this without risking a lethal 
backlash. Hence the next five years are critical, during which the EU needs to achieve 
a fundamental change in the lives of people or risk the return of its opponents with 
greater vigour and purpose.
The 2018 Special Eurobarometer indicates what kind of changes Europeans want. 
They are not preoccupied with institutional reform, important as these are, but with 
the key problems of daily life, the way they live, their existence. The survey asked 
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respondents to name three preferences from a list of policies that would best describe 
their ideal future for the EU. Equal wages for the same job across the EU came first 
cited by 38 percent of respondents, followed by a high level of security and a minimum 
guaranteed healthcare which came joint second with 32 percent. Next came fair 
and equal access to education, a guaranteed minimum pension, gender equality, 
renewable energy and reduction in food waste. “A real government for the whole 
union” came last with just 16 percent. It appears as if the key areas where Europeans 
would like Europe to focus its attention on, are domains where the member states 
still have retained the power to legislate, and where the process of Europeanisation 
has been slower. Furthermore, these are all issues on which, as experience has more 
than once shown, a determined political opposition can make noticeable gains in 
public support. It does not require a lot of effort to convince citizens particularly 
in hard times, that wage inequality, insecurity, inadequate healthcare systems, low 
pensions, gender inequality and food wastage are all the fault of the EU. They have 
been programmed to believe this because “blaming it on the EU” has been a favoured 
tactic used by many governments to cover up their policy failures. Knowledge of this 
predisposition lends urgency to reform.
The reform of the EU institutions remains crucial but should not be pursued at 
the expense of those policies whose improvement will make more Europeans feel 
comfortable in the EU. The EU faces a future in which demographically it will be 
among the oldest and the smallest of the world’s big players. Its relative importance 
in the field of technology is declining as new players such as China and India have 
entered the arena. Notwithstanding, it remains a community of democratic states 
where innovation and learning still provide it with the factors which it needs most 
to remain ahead of the game. This is not a time for individual member states to 
abandon the flock in search of unilateral advantages – which will probably remain as 
elusive as the search for Nessie. It is a time for European collective action.
This book does not cover all the issues on the future of Europe, but it focuses on 
some of the more important ones. The Institute for European Studies adopted this 
theme for this year’s annual publication because the subject is topical and relevant 
both for the EU and Malta. The authors come from different disciplines, and their 
task was not confined to writing what some would consider to be “dry” academic 
pieces, but chapters which are accessible to all. Hence, they were asked not to shy 
away from treading into the domain of normative perspectives that lie at the basis of 
this discussion or to paint their images of future European scenarios. These chapters 
can be grouped under four broad headings:
1. Remodelling the European Union
2. Europe in the World
3. Security Challenges
4. Europe and migration.
22
When the Institute issued the call for expressions of interest for contributions to 
this volume, the gamble that was being taken – which is normal in such projects – 
was clear: the call could pass unnoticed or attract proposals which would be difficult 
to sew together into a coherent piece. In the end not only did the worst-case scenario 
fail to materialise, but we received various contributions of very good quality from 
which we selected thirteen.
In the foreword, Giles Merritt makes a strong plea that what Europeans should 
be worrying about most are the societal shifts that are taking place in our societies: 
“Observers of the EU scene may highlight the intricacies of its institutional 
developments, its successive enlargements and its regulatory outreach, but these 
are of far less consequence than the societal shifts within the member states. The 
focus of the EU – the ‘Eurocrats’ of the commission and the MEPs – is correctly on 
detail, but it is nevertheless time to readjust that focus and bring the big picture into 
sharper definition”.
Remodelling the European Union
Sergio Fabbrini refers to the ‘holy’ alliance between populism and nationalism which 
has led to the re-affirmation of the principle of national sovereignty or sovereignism 
in the EU. National governments have gradually assumed more power in EU policy-
making, but this has not led to appreciable improvements. Notwithstanding this, 
“the opinion persists that the divisions between states can be managed through 
ordinary negotiation within the intergovernmental governance regime”. For 
Fabbrini, the solution lies in decoupling or carving out the political union from the 
current institutional framework to create a pluralistic Europe based on a political 
pact – a federation – between the core countries of the Eurozone, which would 
become the fulcrum for managing other crucial core state policies, and an economic 
pact between the latter and the other countries which are part of, or want only to be 
in, the single market.
The chapter by Dimitris N. Chryssochoou then approaches the argument from a 
unique angle. His main aim is to find out whether a conceptual image of the whole 
can be drawn – a portrait of ‘European “politeia”’, which also sketches out some 
potential end states. He discusses the notion of the EU as a ‘Republic of Europeans’ 
as expressed by Kostas A. Lavdas and Chryssochoou himself in 2011; namely a civic-
oriented union of diverse but fellow-Europeans who can be taken as ‘symbiotes’ 
in Althusius’ sense, meaning: ‘participants or partners in a common life’. In sum, 
can there be a union in and through which established liberal polities transform 
themselves into an embracing ‘politeia’?
Jean Claude Cachia analyses the outgoing President Jean-Claude Juncker’s vision 
of the future of Europe by reference to his state of the union speeches between 2015–
18. Juncker’s vision of the future of Europe was underscored by the need to secure the 
European project by bringing it closer to its people, which required the EU to tackle 
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further reforms including establishing one President for both the Council and the 
Commission and transforming the EU into a ‘quasi’ federal state.
Mark Harwood assesses the reaction of the European Parliament (EP) and its 
political groups to the debate on the Future of Europe. The political groups within 
the parliament changed as did the political balance between them, impacting the 
Future of Europe debate in the chamber. Ultimately, the Future of Europe debate 
was propelled by the distinct impression that the EU citizens had lost faith in the 
European Union, and no institution was better placed to discuss this than the EP 
since it is the only directly elected institution and the only EU institution where a 
wide range of European political beliefs are represented. Harwood’s analysis focuses 
upon the EP groups in the 2014–19 legislature.
Harwood shows that the majority of MEPs favoured the concept of ‘more Europe’, 
with greater powers for the European Parliament, a diminished role for the member 
states via restrictions of their veto and the recognition of the Commission as the 
Union’s government with the Council and the EP as the Union’s legislative branches. 
It was clear, he concluded, that in discussing the Future of the Union, the mainstream 
groups were largely in favour of ‘more Europe’ while the peripheral groups were 
heavily opposed; both those on the left and on the right.
EUROPE IN THE WORLD
The first chapter in this section was written by Richard Pomfret and focuses on the 
evolution of EU trade policy, especially since the adoption of the 2015 “Trade for All” 
strategy. This strategy confirmed the abandonment by the EU of using trade policy 
as foreign policy. It also meant that the main objective was to open the EU to trade in 
support of participation in global value chains. Pomfret analyses the hierarchy of the 
EU’s trading arrangements, the ‘pyramid of preferences’ which it gives rise to, as well 
as the evolving trade policy.
As to the future, given that the USA withdrew from its leadership position in 
promoting the liberal multilateral trading system, the EU has acknowledged that 
it has to become more proactive. This may encounter some internal tensions, as 
several member countries have strong illiberal political parties that are explicitly 
critical of globalization. However, there are strong countervailing forces, especially 
in Eastern Europe, in countries such as Poland and Hungary, where concerns over 
political constraints emanating from Brussels coexist with recognition that a positive 
economic development since the end of central planning has been due to their ability 
to participate in global value chains.
Bichara Khader looks at the EU’s relations with the Arab world especially after the 
Arab Spring. His candid assessment is that European policies, towards the Arab and 
Mediterranean countries, since 1957, pursued the same objectives: energy, market, 
security. Other objectives such as conflict resolution, human rights, and democracy 
promotion have often been mentioned in the official EU documents but the 
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discrepancy between rhetoric and deeds has been marked. The European role in the 
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been marginal, declaratory, often hesitant, 
and incoherent. Although all agreements between the EU and Mediterranean and 
Arab countries include a Human Rights clause based on the respect of democratic 
principles, the EU has always pursued good relations with authoritarian Arab regimes, 
which often paid lip service to reform and never engaged in real democratisation.
Khader observes that although the Arab Spring prompted the EU to launch new 
policy initiatives, there is no clear reference in the policy documents to the Arab 
World, Arab Youth or Arab Identity which is not a trivial omission. Instead, reference 
is made to “Southern neighbourhood” or “Southern Mediterranean”, but Yemen 
and Bahrain do not form part of these. He describes the 2016 EU Global Strategy’s 
objectives as a “remarkable exercise in fantasy”. He welcomes the renewal of the 
dialogue between the EU and the League of Arab States.
SECURITY CHALLENGES
Four chapters cover some of the security challenges facing the Union: two focus on 
cyber security and two on defence. The chapter by Valentina Cassar refers to the 
changes that have taken place in the USA since the start of the Trump Administration, 
and its insistence that Europe should take its fair share of the defence burden. The 
recent efforts at strengthening the EU’s “security and defence” dimension are by no 
means new, but Europe has still to define its strategic outlook. She argues that the 
future of European security and defence remains embedded within the framework 
of NATO. The EU knows that it will never achieve complete strategic autonomy and 
so its main objective is to keep the USA committed to the defence of Europe.
The chapter by Roderick Pace looks at the Parliamentary dimension of the EU’s 
evolving defence policy. The writer argues that since the EU is a union of democratic 
states, parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security and Policy 
and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP-CSDP) is necessary. The 
European Parliament cannot achieve scrutiny on its own but needs to cooperate 
strongly with national parliaments (inter-parliamentary cooperation) who are the 
only ones capable of scrutinizing what their national governments are doing and 
agreeing to in Council. Yet not all the national parliaments have shown a similar 
readiness to do this, and some lack the necessary resources.
Pace argues that military power can strengthen the EU’s traditional ‘civilian power’ 
characteristics and its ability to promote democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights. The Union cannot participate in peace-keeping and peace-making missions, 
conflict prevention and conflict management, without its own military assets and 
strategic autonomy. Military force can be used for civilian ends. At the same time, the 
meaning of strategic autonomy and ‘principled pragmatism’ touted in the EU Global 
Strategy are scantly defined and it is not clear how they will be interpreted. A lot is 
happening and is likely to happen in the CFSP-CSDP, and the role of parliaments 
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becomes crucial not only in exercising oversight but also in developing policy while 
ensuring that the Union’s traditional approaches in foreign policy are adapted to our 
times and preserved as guiding stars of the EU in world politics.
The other two chapters in this section, written by Agnes Kasper and Vlad Alex 
Vernygora, focus on cybersecurity; a topic that has reached the top of European 
security agenda in the last decade. In the first chapter dealing with cybersecurity 
governance, Agnes Kasper argues that while the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy focused 
almost exclusively on the importance of cybersecurity for the proper functioning of 
the single market, the 2017 version extended its purview to the analysis of malicious 
cyber activities that threaten the political integrity of member states and the EU as 
a whole. This shift in coverage of the two strategies bears testimony to the changes 
that have taken place in recent years following increasing signs of external cyber 
meddling in the internal affairs of states. Cybersecurity is indicative of the many 
different threats to which the individual citizen is exposed. The EU’s cybersecurity 
strategy has to protect the same core rights and values as in the physical world.
The last article by Agnes Kasper and Vlad Alex Vernygora calls for the establishment 
of a ‘Cyber Maastricht’, a model of which could be constructed on three pillars: 
Resilience, Deterrence, and Defence and International Relations/IR. The most 
important thing is the nature of the elements and interrelations between the 
proposed pillars as foundations for identifying new governance mechanisms and 
institutions.
Cyber-defence is part of the EU’s broader cybersecurity policy, but it is still unclear 
how it fits into the concept of strategic autonomy and security union, whether 
strategic autonomy includes EU level operational capabilities, and if in the affirmative, 
what kind. Currently, there are initiatives to boost operational capabilities of member 
states and foster cyber-defence innovation in the EU (for example in the framework 
of PESCO and the European Defence Fund).
EUROPE AND MIGRATION
Amelia Martha Matera traces developments from the Dublin III to the stalled Dublin 
IV Regulation whose most important provisions stipulate that the country where 
refugees enter the EU to seek international protection is responsible for their asylum 
application. This implies that EU member states, which consistently receive large 
numbers of refugees, are forced to process them and are at a disadvantage compared 
to those which receive none or few. The solution is to find a burden sharing formula 
to which some member states are holding up. Hence the passage to the approval of 
Dublin IV has been blocked. Expert opinion on the effects of Dublin IV is mixed: 
some doubt whether the proposed changes can fix the problem.
The last chapter written, by Nadia Petroni, assesses EU policy on irregular 
migration and its incoherence. One of the major obstacles in formulating a coherent 
policy is the variety of policy preferences across the EU and fragmentation. One of 
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the reasons for this fragmentation is that at the national-level policy approaches are 
deeply rooted in historical legacies as well as political, economic and social factors, 
including issues of religion and cultural identity. Moreover, the asymmetrical impact 
of irregular migration on the EU member states, mainly due to geographic location, 
has significantly influenced their approaches. Following the influx of irregular 
migrants in 2015, the Commission and European Parliament’s stance changed from 
promoting the rights of asylum seekers to satisfying political interest in the Council.
This book represents the second volume in the Institute’s annual publication 
series; a series which began in 2018 with our assessment of the Maltese Presidency 
of the Council of the EU. As a teaching and research Institute within the University 
of Malta, these publications are a means of contributing to our research aims and 
the body of knowledge on Europe, Malta, and the Mediterranean. This volume aims 
to provide an engaging and informed discussion of a topic which has always and 
continues to dominate European studies. We would like to express our thanks to all 
those who contributed to this volume, especially the anonymous reviewers and the 
type editor.
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Part 1: Remodelling the 
European Union
28
Chapter One
Decoupling and Federalizing: Europe after 
the Multiple Crises
Sergio Fabbrini
Abstract
The 2010s multiple crises brought to the surface of European politics a division 
on the very rationale of the integration project. The latter has been challenged by 
nationalistic parties and governments under the banner of sovereignism. In fact, the 
dramatic consequences of secession (from the EU) even for a country such as the 
United Kingdom have led to an interpretation of nationalism as sovereignism within 
the EU rather than secession from the EU. To weaken the sovereignist challenge, 
it is necessary to free the EU from the tyranny of ‘one size fits all’, acknowledging 
the difference between the countries that need or want to move towards an 
‘evercloser union’ and those which wish to participate only in a single market. This 
acknowledgement should lead to negotiations, between national and community 
leaders, for institutionalizing, within the single market, a distinct federal union 
(around the Eurozone member states), governing traditional core state power 
policies through a separation of power system. This would amount to a necessary 
differentiation for undermining the sovereignist challenge. The single market and 
the federal union should have different legal settings, although the member states of 
the latter would participate in the functioning of the former, according to rules that 
would prevent them acting en bloc. Decoupling is a condition for bringing federalism 
back again to the European integration project, although the federal model which 
should serve this purpose needs to be based on the experience of federations formed 
by aggregation and not disaggregation.
Introduction
Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU has come to be structured on a dual 
constitutional or governance regime: supranational in the policies of the single market 
and intergovernmental in the policies concerning traditional core state powers. The 
2009 Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure introduced in Maastricht, but it kept 
the basic distinction between governance regimes. The supranational governance is 
organized around a triangulation between the European Commission (which has the 
monopoly of legislative initiative), the Council of Ministers or Council (representing 
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the functional ministers of national governments) and the European Parliament 
(elected directly by the European citizens since 1979), both having the legislative power 
of approving Commission proposals, with the European Court of Justice playing 
the role of supervising the constitutionality of directives and regulations approved 
by the two legislative chambers. Intergovernmental governance circumscribes the 
decision-making power to the institutions representing national governments, the 
Council, and particularly the European Council of national government leaders), 
thus delimiting the role of supranational institutions (such as the Commission, 
the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice) (Fabbrini, 2015). This 
differentiation in governance has to do with the nature of the policies at stake. When 
the policies concern core state powers (such as security, foreign relations, home 
affairs and asylum policy, migration or the economic policy of the single currency 
area – here defined as Eurozone), then national governments claim to keep control in 
their hands, while this is not the case for the single market policies which are of low 
political salience (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014).
The multiple crises of the 2010s have affected the intergovernmental regime. They 
have shown the institutional inadequacy of the latter in facing existential threats. 
This, however, does not mean that we should assume that the supranational regime 
would have guaranteed a better outcome. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental 
governance of the multiple crises brought to the surface of European politics new 
divisions among EU member states and within each of them. Particularly, it led 
(for the first time) to divisions on the very rationale of the integration project. The 
latter has been challenged by nationalist and populist parties and movements that 
created a ‘holy alliance’ under the banner of sovereignism in order to claim more 
decision-making autonomy for the ‘nation states’ within the EU framework. In fact, 
the dramatic consequences of secession (from the EU), even for a country such as 
the United Kingdom, have led to an interpretation of nationalism as sovereignism 
within the EU rather than secession from the EU. Post-Brexit sovereignists want to 
remain within the EU, although they aim to hollow it out (i.e. bring it back to the 
status of an economic community, forgetting the aim of building an ‘ever closer 
union’). Sovereignist forces not only have a hard time with the interdependencies 
of the EU system, but also with the checks and balances rooted or introduced in the 
national systems. Indeed, when they get full control of national governmental power, 
as in Hungary or Poland (Kelemen, 2015), they have not hesitated from weakening 
the rule of law foundations of their nation state. Sovereignist political forces have 
gained control of several national governments in east and central Europe, and are 
becoming increasingly influential in the political processes of several countries in 
western Europe (as in Italy after the parliamentary elections of March 4, 2018, see 
Jones, 2018).
The ‘holy’ alliance between populism and nationalism has led to the re-affirmation 
of the principle of national sovereignty (sovereignism) because of the institutional 
weakness of the integration process. Certainly, nationalist populism in western 
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Europe has been fed by social inequalities which the governance of the Eurozone has 
been unable to prevent, but it has also been strengthened (Matthijs, 2017) by badly 
managed migration and security policies. On the other hand, the populist nationalism 
of east Europe has been fed mainly by the challenges to identity produced by mass 
immigration of third country nationals which the EU has had difficulty in governing 
through a comprehensive approach. The multiple crises have been due to objective 
factors, such as speculation on financial markets, irresponsible policies in managing 
national budgets, and mass movements of populations to escape hardship or wars; 
but their effects have been amplified by the inadequacy of the intergovernmental 
system designed to govern those factors. This inadequacy is the result of interstate 
compromises which have proven insufficient compared to the challenges to be faced 
(Fabbrini, 2019a); compromises that reflected different state views on the project 
of integration. Those compromises have prevented the EU from acting effectively 
and legitimately, thus feeding the ill-ease which is manipulated by populists and 
nationalists. In addition, those compromises have differentiated the EU internally, 
but without weakening the orthodoxy which has continued to defend the principle 
that the integration process must continue to be unitary and inclusive. However, 
there cannot be one solution for different situations. The idea of one size fits all (well 
criticized by Schmidt, 2016) has produced uncertain policies, which for some are too 
limited and for others too invasive. This is all to the benefit of sovereignists. Here, I 
will proceed as follows. First of all, I will discuss the intergovernmental implications 
on the EU as a unitary organization. Secondly, I will conceptualize the strategies 
for going beyond the crises, arguing on the need to decouple the EU into a political 
union within an economic community. Thirdly, I will elaborate the model of the 
federal union as the institutional form for the political union. Decoupling the EU is 
thus the condition for recovering the federal project in Europe. I will then conclude 
by bringing home my main argument.
The implications of intergovernmentalism
The EU’s uncertainty in dealing with the euro crisis, the arrival in Europe of a massive 
number of political refugees and economic migrants, and terrorist attacks on the 
civilian population in European cities can be considered as being co-responsible for the 
rise of anti-Europeanism across all the EU member states. That uncertainty has been 
due not only to the magnitude of the challenges, but also to the lack of effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the intergovernmental governance regime (through which those 
crises were handled), particularly when it operates under crises conditions. The 
mismatch between intergovernmental decisions and democratic politics could not 
fail to generate a popular reaction, specifically in those member states (in southern 
Europe) which encountered more structural and cultural difficulties in adjusting 
to the political economy’s model consistent with the operation of the Stability and 
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Growth Pact or SGP (Matthijs and Blyth, 2015). It is not simply a matter of justifying 
who has governed badly in the past. Far from it.
However, the model of convergence, if not of uniformity, between national 
policies implicit in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and protected by the series 
of intergovernmental treaties and rules approved in the past decade, ended up 
favouring some countries and penalising others. Hence the popular reaction against 
policies which were perceived as the outcome of decisions taken by supranational 
technocracies (from the Commission to the other independent agencies, such as the 
European Central Bank), but which were in fact taken by national governments who 
entrusted those technocrats to implement them. During the euro crisis, decisions 
were taken through mediation among the national governments belonging to the 
Eurozone, in a political climate of reciprocal distrust. A distrust that asked for more 
integrative rules to keep it under control (Jones, Kelemen, and Meunier, 2016). Of 
course, a system of economic governance based exclusively on administrative 
rules cannot give political answers to the continuously changing conditions of the 
economic context. Necessarily, such a system is politically irresponsible. Indeed, the 
citizens dissatisfied with the Eurozone’s decisions ended up voting down domestic 
incumbent governments, notwithstanding that none of them was singularly 
responsible for the decisions collegially taken.
This is true not only for economic policies, but also for other intergovernmental 
policies considered sensitive by national governments, such as immigration. The 
immigration of millions of people into Europe (a fact of historical nature) was 
addressed, by the various national governments, on the basis of specific electoral 
calculations (a fact of contingent importance). The EU’s inability to manage this 
massive flow of people into European countries (and particularly into some of them) 
has continued to justify populist mobilisation with its clear (but ineffective) request 
to shut down national borders. Nationalist sentiments have found fertile ground in 
fears of threats to the identity of citizens. It has been the inadequacy of a migration 
policy based on agreement among the national governments which has exasperated 
the problem; admittedly of a significant and sometimes dramatic scale (Krastev, 2017). 
After all, how could it have been possible to conceive the building of an area for the 
free circulation of people among member states of the EU (the so-called Schengen 
area), without simultaneously planning a common protection of the borders of that 
area? It is the same logic which is institutionalized in the Eurozone: a single currency 
without a single budget managed by a single authority. National governments have 
strenuously defended the principle that it is their duty to control their own territory, 
even if this principle is empirically contradicted by their inability to ensure such 
control. And yet, despite the repeated waves of immigrant arrivals which have 
occurred since the start of the 2010s (and particularly in the period 2015–16), the 
EU has not managed to come up with a single policy to manage immigration. The 
Dublin Agreements are still in force (albeit revised several times) and according to 
them it is the responsibility of the country of first arrival to handle the registration 
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and management of immigrants, with penalising (economic and organisational) 
effects for some countries but not for others. Only at the end of 2016 was a small 
step taken with the strengthening of FRONTEX, the European border and coastal 
control agency – small, since its duty remains that of supplementing national border 
agencies where necessary, but not of guaranteeing (independently from the national 
agencies) protection from outside the area of free internal circulation.
Migration policy has confirmed the paradox of intergovernmental integration. 
There is no European policy on immigration owing to the resistance of member 
states which want to preserve sovereignty over their national territory. However, 
those countries are not capable of guaranteeing that sovereignty given the size of the 
migratory phenomena. Thus, the absence of a European immigration policy increases 
citizens’ feeling of dissatisfaction towards the EU, which is in turn criticised of being 
insensitive to the fears and insecurity that immigration produces in national societies. 
All in all, a real disaster. The wish to preserve national sovereignty over migration 
policy (territorial sovereignty) as well as over economic policy (fiscal sovereignty), 
and the conflicts between those sovereignties, has engendered reciprocal mistrust 
between these sovereignties and has led either to policy stalemate or to delegation 
of power to the Commission. A lack of responsibility has fostered in the Eurozone, 
the dissatisfaction of citizens in the debtor countries owing to the excessive rigidity 
of the rules, and the dissatisfaction of citizens in the creditor countries who think 
that the rules are not rigid enough. Again, it is against the Commission that the 
anger of the governments of Eastern Europe has been directed for having proposed a 
system of allocating national quotas of political refugees. Similarly, the anger of the 
governments of southern Europe has also been directed against the Commission for 
not having done enough to lighten the burden of handling the refugees that have 
landed on their coasts. The result has been that, while the Commission has sought to 
do its best to make a virtue out of a vice by preserving a European interest in a context 
where national visions and ambitions have held sway, citizens have directed their ill- 
ease towards the EU due to the decision-making system which their governments 
have built in Brussels.
In the context of crises which have distributive effects and identity implications, the 
intergovernmental model has brought to the surface the deep differences of interests 
and views between the EU member states. Because those effects and implications have 
been politicized by the new sovereignist forces, the intergovernmental governance 
could not easily accommodate the differences between national governments. 
Moreover, facing decisions with enormous domestic impacts, the asymmetry 
between national governments which are coordinated in the European Council or 
in the functional Council of Ministers, has created real hierarchies of power. Politics 
as the struggle for the power to decide has crept back in through the window of 
the European Council, contributing to the stalemate of the latter’s decision-making 
process (think, for example, of the stalemate in the third pillar of the banking union). 
This condition might even worsen with the leaders of sovereignist parties taking 
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control of crucial member state governments (such as France and Italy) which 
opens the door for them to participate in intergovernmental governance. Since the 
European Council is considered an institution which is self-centred, in other words 
an institution which does not require checks and balances at the EU level from 
the European Parliament, because it is presumed to be controlled by the distinct 
national parliaments (a fact empirically implausible), the sovereignist leaders could 
undermine the integration process from within. Nevertheless, the opinion persists 
that the divisions between states can be managed through ordinary negotiation 
within the intergovernmental governance regime. It would not be the first time in 
Europe that sleepwalking governments have headed blissfully towards the abyss 
(Clark, 2014).
Strategies beyond the crises
It may be argued that the multiple crises, Brexit, the control of government by 
sovereignist parties in eastern Europe, the growing influence of sovereignist 
movements in western and southern Europe, the divisive pressure generated by both 
Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on the EU, will not produce radical alterations 
in the European geo-political situation. The economic recovery of the Eurozone 
will reduce the sovereignist pressure, Brexit should not be overstated given that it 
is the expression of the idiosyncrasy of an island, the U.S. neo-nationalism cannot 
structurally last for too long and Russia is after all an economic dwarf. If this is the 
case, then, within the unitary legal order of the EU, a strategy may be pursued for 
preserving the current double governance framework. However, the neutralization 
of sovereignist challenges requires much more than business as usual (as well argued 
by Tsoukalis, 2016). In fact, this strategy would contribute to increasing dissatisfaction 
on the part of those who support the EU (because of the ineffectiveness of the policies 
pursued), without winning over the consensus of those who are against the EU 
(because they do not recognize its legitimacy). The diffusion and politicization of 
sovereignist sentiments cannot be addressed by proposing the old combination of 
policies or hiding integration’s aims. Certainly, the force of administrative inertia, 
the resistance of bureaucratic interests and the short-sightedness of politics must 
not be underestimated. The pressure to go on as before is not only substantial, but 
institutionalised. Sovereignism, however, can be defeated by a bold vision of Europe’s 
future, not only by the defence of existing procedures or by a ‘To Do’ List (as argued 
by Merritt, 2016, p. 229).
If one instead accepts the argument that the EU policy differentiation is making 
its functioning inefficient and its legitimacy opaque, and that this has contributed 
to the politicization (by the new political actors) of popular dissatisfaction against 
the European integration project, then a simple strategy of continuity cannot be 
easily justified. If the consequences of the multiple crises are recognised, including 
their politicization by sovereignist movements and parties (Hooghe and Marks, 
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2019), and the emergence of diverse interests and values among the member states, 
then it is necessary to think of a strategy of discontinuity, for the very reason that 
being radically discontinuous (compared to the past) is the condition in which the 
EU already finds itself. This strategy is based on the acknowledgement of the basic 
differences, generated by the identity clash, which has emerged between member 
states on the finalité of the integration project. This acknowledgement justifies the 
decoupling of the current EU into two organizations, an economic community and 
a political union. This strategy requires a double preliminary act to be agreed by 
national and European leaders, a first act for distinguishing the political and the 
economic projects of integration and a second act for defining the nature of the 
political project. In the latter case, a statement of political intent (a political compact) 
should plausibly be signed by the leaders of the core members of the Eurozone, a 
commitment to move towards a political union operating within the single market. 
The organization of the single market would remain open to all European states, 
including the old non-member states such as Norway and the new non-member 
states such as the United Kingdom. The political compact should then lead to a 
redefinition of the institutional bases of an ‘ever closer union’. It is not wise to return 
to the experience of the Constitutional Convention of Brussels of 2002–03, with the 
vetoes and influence-mongering which characterised it. It is a question rather of 
agreeing, between the leaders of both national governments and the EU institutions, 
on the possibility of starting a process of constitutional differentiation for creating 
two organisations based on distinct legal orders, despite living within the same 
economic community. This would be ushered in by a negotiated agreement that 
would benefit both those who want or need to set up the political union, and those 
who desire or need to participate only in the project of an economic community. 
Without that preliminary political act, it is unlikely that this strategy might one day 
lead to a constitutionally defined political union.
Of course, in the current EU, it would be difficult, but not impossible, to distinguish 
the economic and political spheres of the integration process. Moreover, this strategy 
would also face numerous problems, of both a procedural and institutional nature. 
The procedural problem concerns the question of how to separate a core composed of 
Eurozone member states from those interested only in the functioning of the single 
market. If the rhetoric of a united Europe within a single framework is abandoned and 
there is an agreement on the fact that it is possible to answer differently to different 
needs and perspectives, while maintaining a common economic and security 
basis, then these problems can be pragmatically discussed and resolved through 
negotiations between national and community leaders (for example, in the context 
of the Conference on the Future of Europe that the Commission chaired by Ursula 
von der Leyen has committed to promote). The institutional problem concerns how 
to engineer the carving out of the institutional framework of the political union 
from the current institutional framework of the EU. It is not advisable to create 
new institutions because that would unnecessarily increase complexity. It is rather 
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plausible to organize differently the relations between the existing institutions 
for the different purposes that they should pursue. The solution of both problems 
requires the mutual recognition of the legitimate needs of the two groups of member 
states.
The decoupling of the Lisbon Treaty depends on negotiations that should generate 
a positive-sum outcome because it would allow the creation of different institutional 
spaces for different integration aims. A pluralistic Europe should be based on a 
political pact between the core countries of the Eurozone, which would become the 
fulcrum for managing other crucial core state policies, and an economic pact between 
the latter and the other countries which are part of, or only want to be in, the single 
market. The two pacts must be capable of differentiation at the legal level, since they 
aim to meet distinct needs. The countries which sign both pacts must maintain a 
solid link within the supranational framework of the single market. At the same 
time, the political pact should lead to redefinition of the institutional framework, 
moving towards the model of a federal union (not of a federal state). A federal union 
consists of an aggregation of previously independent states (such as the United 
States and Switzerland), whereas a federal state emerges from the disaggregation 
of previously unitary states (as is the case of Germany, Austria, Belgium, in Europe, 
or Australia and to a certain extent Canada, outside Europe). If the political union 
takes the form of a ‘federation of nation states’ (to use Jacques Delors’ words), then 
the latter’s differences and rivalries can be reconciled only by a system of multiple 
separation of powers which is a characteristic of federal unions (Fabbrini, 2019b). 
Indeed, the fusion of power of the central governing institutions (as in parliamentary 
governance) is a characteristic of federal states (on the different federal models, see 
Stepan, 1999; Sbragia, 1992). The federal union requires a preliminary constitutional 
pact or political compact between its constituent members, a pact/compact that 
should be the depositary of the federal union’s sovereignty for the policies allocated 
to the federal centre (while member state sovereignties should be enshrined in 
their national constitutions). The multiple separation of powers would prevent the 
formation of institutionalized hierarchies between constituent members (Fabbrini, 
2010), thus making it possible to keep in the same organisation large and small states, 
states with strong and weak institutional configurations, states with diverse national 
identities.
The European federal union should not come into being by replacing national 
democracies with a supranational democracy, nation states with a supranational 
state, and national peoples with a supranational people. As with other federal 
unions, the European federal union should be a compound polity (Fabbrini, 2010) 
since it accommodates national democracies with the supranational democracy, 
distinguishing the policies which are subject to the control of the former and 
those subject to the governance of the latter. It should be the contrary of what has 
been created in the intergovernmental Eurozone, where it is increasingly difficult 
to distinguish national and European competences, national and European 
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responsibilities, in accordance with a logic which, by fusing the levels of government, 
prevents the distinction of responsibilities proper to each level. A federal union 
should also be different from a parliamentary federation (such as Germany) with its 
fusion of horizontal powers which would increase the influence of the larger states 
on the smaller ones, because of their more numerous representation in the European 
Parliament. Through the separation of policies which would be governed nationally 
and those which would be governed supra-nationally, it would be possible to allow 
voters to have their say at the level that those policies were decided, thus making the 
decision-makers accountable to voters – which is a necessary condition for reducing 
anti-Europeanism. Sovereignism has been in fact fed by the citizens’ frustration with 
an integration process which prevents them from influencing choices taken at the 
European level, choices that nevertheless affect their national situation.
If the European federal union wants to be a union between equals, then it is 
necessary to move towards an institutional system that prevents the formation of 
hierarchies between its member states and encourages decision-making based on 
checks and balances between institutions. These are aims which only the separation 
of powers, mitigated by appropriate mechanisms, can pursue. However, even the 
most effective of those mechanisms can do little, if they are not handled by political 
elites who are aware of the fragilities of a political union and who are thus willing 
to reach compromises between the member states and between the institutions 
grounded in the separation of powers. Democratic unions of states are condemned 
to live the daily miracle of functioning without a people, a government and a state 
(Fabbrini, 2017).
The logic of the federal union
It is true that the EU has become a highly differentiated organization (Leuffen, 
Rittberger and Schimmelfennig (2013), but it is also true that such differentiation 
has led the EU into a constitutional conundrum (Fabbrini, 2016). Moving from policy 
differentiation to constitutional decoupling can free the EU from opacity, hierarchy 
and stalemate. Two organisations can be formed, each engaged in the pursuit of 
different ends, on the bases of differing agreements, while still being linked by what 
unites them, the single market as well as the security alliance (NATO). While the 
economic community can be organised around an interstate treaty which must not 
call into question national sovereignty as regard core state powers (although it should 
equip itself with a basic supranational framework to regulate the single market 
and resolve disputes between different states and competing economic actors), the 
federal union must instead define the reasons for the supranational project because 
it concerns the sharing of traditional core state powers. A single market can function 
without the existence of a single currency, just as participation in such a market does 
not require the merging of control on foreign, military, intelligence policy, asylum or 
the management of home affairs (which should instead become the central powers 
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of the federal union). Of course, the single market also requires the sharing of basic 
values and institutions of the rule of law by its participants. It would be necessary to 
define the role of the federal union within the economic community, by introducing 
institutional expedients that can prevent the formation of a blocking majority by the 
union within the latter.
A federal union is not a federal state, because of its anti-centralizing logic. Federal 
unions are based on the principle of divided sovereignty between the federal centre 
and the federated states. Each of the two levels has sovereignty over the management 
of policies for which it is responsible and distinct democratic institutions are needed 
to implement the divided sovereignty. In a federal union, the levels of national and 
supranational authorities should be clearly separated. A federal union implies the 
definition of the limited competences of the federal centre, leaving all the rest to 
the federated states. A federal union is the opposite of what the EU has become; an 
organization functionally expanding its competences, in an institutional context of 
unclear lines of accountability. A federal union should be based on a preliminary 
definition of competences allocated to the federal centre and those which are 
left to the member states, although social and historical processes will inevitably 
challenge the boundary set in the preliminary definition. Any federal organization 
is intrinsically dynamic. If the policy competences are limited, it would be possible 
at the same time to exclude from the federal union’s competences the possibility of 
opt-outs by one or more member states. The federal union’s jurisdiction, in its policy 
domains, should have a general scope.
A federal union does not imply the existence of a single identity, as it is implied 
historically in unitary nation states but also in federations formed through the 
disaggregation of a previously unitary state (which is the case of federal states, 
with the exception of Canada where there are two distinct cultural identities). The 
existence of an exclusive identity is the pre-requisite of unitary organisations such as 
the nation state, but that identity is existent also in federal states with a homogeneous 
political culture (as in Germany). This has not been the case in federal unions (such 
as the United States and Switzerland). Contrary to neo-functional assumptions 
(Haas, 1958; Schmitter, 2002), in federations by aggregation, the transferring of the 
identity or the loyalty of the citizens from the state/canton level to the supra-state 
level would be unrealistic (although the political development of the federal union 
has increased the strength of the supra-state identity at detriment of the state/canton 
identity, more in the United States than Switzerland because of the international role 
of the former and the lack of it in the latter). In our case, a federal union would not 
aim to create a European identity for replacing the national ones, but it would aim 
to compound national and European identities (Fabbrini, 2019b). The single vision 
of identity, which continues to influence the most ardent supporters of European 
integration, is both the effect and cause of the predominance of the statist paradigm 
in European political culture. This paradigm requires the existence of a single and 
homogenous demos for legitimizing political authority. Between nationalism and 
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Europeanism there is instead a broad area of multiple and diverse identities. In a 
federal union, citizens can cultivate their national identities and, at the same time, 
dialogue with the national identities of the other member state citizens. Only in this 
way they might together construct a new identity at the European level, added to 
(but not substituting) their national identities. One cannot exclude that the process 
of federalization would end in creating a more powerful European identity than 
national ones, but that would be an outcome and not a pre-requisite. The federal 
union, indeed, should function also with many distinct national or regional demoi 
(Nicolaidis, 2013), i.e. with plural citizenships having different national or subnational 
identities, although accepting to share basic European values and norms. Separate 
identities would be congenial to separate institutions of governance.
What unites national and subnational citizens of a federal union must be a political 
pact, the adherence to political values, the respect for the procedures and institutions 
substantiating that pact. Only politics, and its democratic underpinning, can unite 
those diverse national identities. The historic error of Europeanism was that of 
wanting to build a European cultural identity to replace national cultural identities, 
as well as construct a European federal state to replace the various nation states. It 
is no coincidence that every attempt to unite Europeans culturally has produced 
exactly the opposite; it has divided them, since European pluralism can never be 
enclosed in a single cultural identity. The European identity must be political, while 
national identities will continue to be cultural. Then it is only time and history 
which will show us the outcome of the interaction between the two. Every attempt 
to centralize authority in Europe historically led to an increase in conflicts between 
states or groups of them. For this reason, the federal union needs a constitution 
which not only legitimizes it, but also sets the limits to its powers. A federal union 
is necessary for limiting (federal) power, not for expanding it. This would help to 
contain the nationalist urges within its member states and facilitate the taking 
of legitimate decisions on issues of common interest, without at the same time 
undermining national democracies as happens when supranational institutions 
invade policies that pertain to the nation state. Moreover, a federal union, with its 
constitutional culture, is also a bulwark against the diffusion of illiberal sentiments 
that are spreading in Europe.
Conclusion
To weaken the ‘holy’ alliance between populism and nationalism, it is necessary to 
free the EU from the tyranny of ‘one size fits all’, distinguishing legally between the 
countries that need or want to move towards political integration, and those which 
wish to participate only in a single market. Recognising the legitimate right of the 
latter to preserve their national sovereignty, but involving them in the single market, 
would help to keep their nationalism in check. At the same time, institutionalising 
a distinct federal union (around the Eurozone member states), governing traditional 
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core state policies through a separation of power system, would certainly help 
undermine the populism fomented by inefficient and illegitimate intergovernmental 
governance. The single market and the federal union should have different legal 
settings, although the member states of the latter would participate in the functioning 
of the former, according to rules that would prevent them acting en bloc. Decoupling 
is thus a condition (also) for bringing federalism back again to the European 
integration project, although the federal model which should serve this purpose 
needs to be based on the experience of federations formed by aggregation and not 
disaggregation. Certainly, this means that the federal union will be smaller than the 
current EU. It will be smaller, but not small, especially if it corresponds to the core of 
the Eurozone. However, it will also be more united, because it would be held together 
by a political pact of constitutional significance that might also contain centrifugal 
pressures. Such a federal union would be a bulwark against politicized sovereignism, 
showing that it is possible to be part of a federal project without depleting national 
democratic institutions, without losing national cultural identities or without 
giving up legitimate national interests. Its existence would therefore be a factor of 
stabilisation for the whole continent. Theoretically, the model of the federal union 
could accommodate, within the same organization, the perspectives and claims of 
both sovereignist and Europeanist EU member states. That model is in fact based on 
the (negotiated) separation between the policies assigned to national sovereignties 
and those to European sovereignty. A federal union can be defined as a sovereign 
union of sovereign states, since the member states are sovereign on specific policies 
(self-rule) and the centre is sovereign on other policies (shared rule). Of course, the 
boundary between self-rule and shared rule is continuously moving, thus requiring 
a constant renegotiation of the boundary (i.e., of the policies to allocate to one or the 
other sovereignty). However, the adoption of this model in the EU would require 
the sharing of a common fate by the leaders of both sovereignist and Europeanist 
member states, a possibility undermined by the climate of politicization generated 
by the multiple crises of the current decade.
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Chapter Two
Portrait of a Union: Redrawing a Sketch of 
the Whole
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou
Abstract
This chapter looks into the current polity shape of the European Union (EU), and 
how it accommodates the concurrent demands for unity of the whole and diversity 
of the parts. In raising the question of what kind of theorizing can best capture a 
general image of the whole, it revisits the concept of ‘organized synarchy’ and makes 
the case that, despite integration’s currently unfolding crises and uncertainties, the 
EU ‘polity’ has managed to bring about an advanced system of collective ordered 
symbiosis among highly codetermined polities. It also argues that, at this stage of 
EU polity evolution, such a condition is not about the subordination of the parts to a 
superior, let alone federal, or even federalising, political centre, but rather about their 
preservation as distinctive, and at the same time constituent units; as partners in a 
late-modern ‘syspondia’ which retains its essential character as an ordered plurality 
of co-evolving polities.
Prelude
Writing in the late 2010s, Europe’s aspirations for a reformed architectural design 
seem to be in retreat both symbolically and strategically to the extent that current 
divergences in states’ views question whether the European Union (EU) can still be 
regarded and, crucially, sustained as a ‘polity’ which can inspire. In addition comes 
the consolidation of a statecentric rationale in its workings and, at the theory front, 
a variety of ‘intergovernmentalisms’ (Puetter, 2012; Bellamy, 2013), albeit of a more 
refined logic compared to (neo)realist takes or Hoffmann’s (1966) ‘logic of diversity’ 
thesis which, at a period marked by the effects of the ‘Luxemburg Compromise’ 
(Nicoll, 1984; Teasdale, 1993) and for the next twenty or so years, confirmed the state-
controlled nature of integration. Today, with the rise of the far-right, the uncertainties 
caused by the Brexit vote and the roadblocks to a solidary and humanistic response to 
the refugee crisis, the issue raised is not about the union’s prospective constitutional 
evolution, let alone polity transformation, as was the case back in the mid-2000s 
when Europeans debated the fate of the Constitutional Treaty; but whether, and if so, 
how, it can recover from a much troubled decade.
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At this critical state of play –an instance of emergent systemic deficiencies–, 
theorists may ask whether a conceptual image of the whole –a portrait of ‘European 
“politeia”’, to quote Tombeur (2013, p. 117) – can be (re)drawn, also sketching out some 
potential end states. In light of unfolding, but less connected to Europeans as one 
might have hoped, debates on their future, the question raised is whether the union 
can still aspire to a self-identifiable demos; not in the compelling sense of a compact, 
fully integrated or self-standing ‘European public’, but as a ‘Republic of Europeans’ 
(Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2011): a civic-oriented union of diverse but fellow-
Europeans who can be taken as ‘symbiotes’ in Althusius’ (1995 [1603/1614]:19) sense: 
‘participants or partners in a common life’. Carney (1995, p. xv) explains: ‘Symbiotic 
association involves something more than mere existence together. It indicates a 
quality of group life characterized by piety and justice without which, Althusius 
believes, neither individual persons nor society can endure […] Wherever there is 
symbiosis there is also communication, or the sharing of things, services, and right’. 
Keeping in mind Grimm’s (1995, p. 296) point that ‘[t]he European level of politics 
lacks a matching public’, a plural European civic body may still be said to exist along 
the lines of ‘many peoples, one demos’, whose members can direct their democratic 
claims and concerns to, and via, the central institutions and share in the collective 
rewards of their pluralist union. But can it sustain itself? Can Europeans preserve 
and even develop further a sense of ‘demos-hood’ of and out of many? As put by 
Nicolaidis (2004, p. 77): ‘What should a Europe for all, an EU that most of us can like, 
if not love, look like?’ Also: how to navigate the present union, wherever situated in 
the ‘federal/confederal’ (Forsyth, 1981; Burgess, 2005) or ‘polity/organization’ (Pollack, 
2005) axis towards a dynamic but viable equilibrium?
Premises
These preliminary notes provoke the question: can there be a union in and through 
which established liberal polities transform themselves into an embracing ‘politeia’? 
The latter enshrines into our vocabulary a certain normative content, raising some 
‘constitutional’ – in the wider, Roman sense portrayed by Cicero (Atkins, 2018, pp. 
11–13, 24–34) – expectations. More than that, it can be paralleled to a ‘state of mind’, 
to recall Schattschneider (1969, p. 42, quoted in Adamany, 1975, p. xii), impacting 
on citizens’ daily parlance and praxis. Arguably, Plato’s and Aristotle’s ‘theasis’ of 
‘politeia’ has marked for over two millennia its distinctive intellectual imprint upon 
our understanding of what it means (and takes) to be part of a commonly shared life 
within a ‘polis’; on how citizens share among themselves some common concerns, 
how they form a consciousness of their collective existence as ‘members’, ‘fellows’ or 
‘partners’ under conditions of ordered symbiosis which, for all its human and thus 
institutional imperfections, allows them to develop a sense of the ‘common good’. 
Thus ‘politeia’ as the architecture of organized public symbiosis; the very ‘soul’ of 
44
a union made up of nested political lives. At the same time, it signifies a legally 
constituted order that reflects the demos’ concerns: its sense of union and unity.
But how can one grasp Europe’s polycemous and challenging polity qualities? A 
plausible way would be to speak of a civic-minded political association of interactive 
publics which is capable of disentangling, as Lavdas (2001, p. 4) argues, ‘the issue of 
participation in an emerging polity from the cultural and emotional dimensions of 
citizenship as pre-existing affinity and a confirmation of belonging’. As he also notes, 
‘some elements of the real and symbolic res publica, may sustain a degree of political 
motivation vis-à-vis the EU and its relevance for peoples’ lives while also allowing 
for other and more intense forms of motivation and involvement at other levels of 
participation’ (Lavdas, 2001:5). The idea is for an extended but vibrant civic space 
among entwined democratic publics; a structured plurality composed of multiple 
co-evolving affinities and affiliations drawn from an impressive variety of historical, 
cultural, constitutional and soci(et)al sources. The challenge is to institutionalize 
respect for diversity as well as to sustain, in Bellamy’s (1999, p. 190) words, ‘a shared 
sense of the public good’. Such a condition may well emerge through Pettit’s (1997) 
notion of freedom as ‘non-domination’, as it combines, in Lavda’s words (2001, p. 
6), ‘the recognition of the significance of the pluralism of cultural possibilities for 
meaningful choice and a framework based on a minimal set of shared political values’ 
or, as Bowman (2006, p. 113) put it, ‘multiple forms of political membership and 
overlapping sites of pooled sovereignty’. This is more than a projective polity sketch 
for the union as it can assign meaning to a vision of ‘politics’ –which, as Heywood 
(2004, p. 53) reminds us, ‘literary means “what concerns the polis”’– and still be part 
of a great European tradition of political thought. Tsatsos (2009, pp. 48–49) notes: 
‘The demos never constituted a totally homogenous unit of its members. Demos as 
a source of power in democratic regimes rarely nowadays appears as a true political 
unit, but mainly as a complex aggregate with geographical, linguistic, national and 
institutional subgroups, which, however, belong to the same power structure’.
Given current debates on EU ‘polity-hood’, or lack of it, and the kind of balance 
the union should aim at in view of its ascending heterogeneity and, much to the 
detriment of its constitutive values, decreasing solidarity, one is tempted to speak 
of a ‘community of strangers’, as Castiglione (2009) does, or of a ‘community of 
projects’, as in Nicolaidis’ (2004, pp. 76, 84) ‘demoicracy’, ‘founded’, as she argues, 
on the persistent plurality of its component peoples but not reducible to a set of 
complex bargains among sovereign states’ and ‘predicated on the mutual recognition, 
confrontation and ever more demanding sharing of our respective and separate 
identities, not on their merger’; or, as in Taylor’s (1993, p. 114) refined statecentrism, 
a ‘symbiotic consociation’. He explains: ‘Consociationalism fundamentally alters the 
teleology of integration theory by indicating an end situation which has built into it 
pressures for the maintenance of segmental autonomy within a cooperative system, 
i.e., a symbiotic arrangement’, and: ‘The term which captures most accurately the 
dominant character of the relationship between the states and the region is, therefore, 
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symbiosis. Each of the two levels, the separate states and the common system 
depended upon the other’ (Taylor, 1993, pp. 84, 108). Arguably, enhancing the civic 
bonds among the member publics is crucial for the systemic viability and vitality of 
the union, but this does not invite, let alone necessitate, an abrupt restructuring of 
pre-existing, historically constituted, public structures and cultures or a compromise 
of the states’ democratic autonomy. Rather, it requires what might be termed from 
a pluralist-republican prism a politically structured plurality of ‘distinctive’ but 
‘constituent’ democratic polities; distinctive, in retaining their governing qualities as 
discrete constitutional orders and demoi; and constituent, in reaching higher levels 
of collective symbiosis by sharing in the mutual benefits of living together in a larger 
but identifiable political whole.
Almost seven decades of integration have brought about, in Taylor’s (2008, p. 7) 
words, ‘a unique way of managing a system of sovereign states, the like of which 
had not been seen before’, based on an advanced system of codetermination among 
highly interactive (sub)national units; a condition, however, which is not about 
states’ subordination to a superior federal(ising) political ‘centre’ as compared to 
established federal polities (as those composing the union), but rather about their 
preservation as states within a political association which retains its character as a 
plurality of diverse but increasingly co-evolving polities. The aim, as noted above, is 
for a ‘Republic of Europeans’ along the lines of ‘civic unity in polycultural diversity’ 
(Lavdas and Chryssochoou, 2007). Capturing the dialectics of a polity constituted by 
co-evolutionary practices of authority-sharing is not about a federally inspired, state-
like order; it is about an integrative scheme that exceeds, even transcends, previous 
notions of international authority; a pluralist imaging of a union taken at the same 
time as ‘polity’ and as ‘polities’ driven by highly codetermined sovereignties. A sense 
of ‘demos-hood’ may still be needed, but one which accords with Tsatsos’ notion of 
‘sympolity’ (2009), Dobson’s (2000, p. 15) account of ‘multipolity’ or MacCormick’s 
(1997) construct of ‘mixed commonwealth’; at best, given Europe’s celebrated and 
reviving republican tradition, a ‘res publica composita’ as in Elazar’s (1998, p. 25) 
reflection on Hoenonius’ classical distinction of the term from ‘res publica simplex’; 
at least, a legally and politically structured plurality as in a polity made out of many.
Although EU-level systemic growth may release and even increase pressures 
towards (further) centralization, they do not in themselves make for a conventional 
‘federal republic’ or any other superior ‘centre’ aspiring to ‘statehood’. Rather, they 
are an indication of polities adjusting themselves to the collective terms of their 
symbiosis, without negating their domestic governing orders. Both Bellamy and 
Castiglione’s (2000, p. 190) projective assertion that ‘a future multinational European 
polity could be a “Republic, if you can keep it”’ and Honohan’s (2002, p. 280) view 
that, ‘interdependence of fate and future can come to be seen as the basis of political 
community’, accord with the promise of diverse but interactive demoi shaping 
together their collective association. As Preuβ (2015, p. 218) wrote on the novelty of 
it all: ‘This is the first time in human history that sovereign states form a political 
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community which not only established legal channels for their cooperation and the 
peaceful dealing of conflicts – this is, at least on paper, meanwhile the standard on the 
global level as well – but which has created an institutional realm in which different 
peoples form a political “We” without giving up their or pressed to give up their 
differentness as peoples with their respective national histories, cultural traditions 
and particular mentalities […] they share a conjoint law which regulates important 
spheres of their everyday life and thus creates a quite peculiar “We”’.
In support of the above comes the assertion that the decade-old Lisbon reforms 
have not, as yet, affected the essential character of the union as a ‘synarchy of co-
sovereigns’ (Chryssochoou, 2009, p. 139) combining different forms and visions 
of shared rule. This pluralist imaging has considerable implications on how 
sovereignty can be re-conceptualized given the intensity and depth of what binds 
together, both legally and politically, a cluster of co-evolving polities and what being 
part of a larger whole entails for their collective future. It may be seen as part of 
the union’s polity evolution which confirms that states are a constitutive part of a 
general system, while, at the same time, the latter can be taken as a polity, rather than 
merely as an instance of exclusively state-controlled interactions. The view taken 
is that states still determine, albeit collectively, the pace and range of the common 
arrangements, but the latter exemplify a co-evolutionary view of the parts. This is 
key to acknowledging that, for all the profound changes in sovereignty, we have not 
reached the point of its complete transmutation into a kind of post-statist order: for 
all its late-modern connotations, and there have been many and insightful (Walker, 
2003), sovereignty cannot be convincingly detached from the component state parts, 
nor can it be subsumed or submerged into a superior federal authority. Rather, 
the whole is about strengthening the parts through, not despite, a polity-building 
exercise that enhances their collective capacity to combine authority; transcend 
classical self-rule; and bring about a qualitative, even transformative, stage in their 
political and constitutional evolution. Taylor (1996, p. 97) made the point well: ‘The 
states became stronger through strengthening the collectivity’. Or, as he also put it, ‘it 
came to seem persuasive that the survival of the state as completely compatible with 
the strengthening of the common arrangements’ (Taylor, 2008, p. 103).
A general note from the above might then be, that for all their efforts to meet the 
changing realities of institutionalized shared rule, the parts have not lost sight of 
their own and, many a time, hard-won, autonomy (and claims to it). This is premised 
on the idea that their collective capacity to accommodate diversity and subsystem 
autonomy has invited respect for their individual integrities – to which the Lisbon 
Treaty contributes explicitly in Article 4(2) with reference to ‘national identities, 
inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’ and to 
‘essential State functions’ – confirming that states may well continue to codetermine 
issues of mutual interest in ways which make sovereignty still valid but not equated 
to or even reminiscent of older, largely exacerbated or idealized, Westphalian notions 
of territorial self-rule (Krasner, 1999). As to the union’s confederal attributes or, from 
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an evolutionary, polity-prone prism, ‘neo-confederal’ (Burgess, 2005:263) ones, 
states still retain (ultimate) political control over the extension of authority –more 
accurately, of ‘public powers’ (Grimm, 2015, pp. 43–46)– to the European ‘centre’ –the 
institutions of common governance– in light of the oft-raised constitutional principle 
of ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’: in Lock’s (2009, p. 409) words, ‘a state’s competence to 
determine its own competences’. As Grimm (2015, p. 50) asserts: ‘The EU does not 
have a portion of the sovereignty. The EU has but a portion of the public powers’.
Hence the German Constitutional Court’s view of the EU as a ‘Staatenverbund’ in its 
Maastricht and Lisbon rulings (BVerfG, 2BvR 2134/92; BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08). As it stated 
in the latter, ‘Verbund covers a close long-term association of states which remain 
sovereign, an association which exercises public authority on the basis of a treaty, 
whose fundamental order, however, is subject to the disposal of the Member States 
alone and in which the peoples of their Member States, i.e. the citizens of the states, 
remain the subjects of democratic legitimisation’ (BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.6.2009, par. 
229C, quoted in Mayer and Wendel, 2012, p. 143). Or, as Neframi (2015, pp. 69–70) 
put it: ‘The principle of conferral, together with the amendment procedure, mark 
the lack of sovereignty at the EU level and designate the Member States as masters 
of the Teaties. Recourse in this regard to the qualification of Staatenverbund, in 
contrast with Staatenverband, illustrates the preservation of national sovereignty 
embodied in the principle of conferral, notwithstanding the principles of primacy, 
direct effect and effectiveness of EU law’. Grimm (2015, pp. 45–46) summarizes the 
Court’s rationale: ‘Sovereignty in the EU lies with the Member States since they are 
the “Masters of the Treaties” and hold the Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This is indeed 
the difference between a federal state and other types of federations. The EU does 
not have the right to self-determination about its existence, its legal basis, and its 
competences. The decision about these matters is in the hands of the Member States’. 
He goes on to confirm: ‘With regard to its legal foundation it is hetero-determined 
and consequently not sovereign’ (Grimm, 2015, p. 46).
The condition of codetermination, a reflection of intersected, co-evolving, yet self-
standing, constitutional polities, challenges the assumption that the union, for all 
its ‘state-like’ qualities, has gained a locus of sovereignty, whilst confirming that the 
member units can still claim to shape their own political future. The ‘centre’ may 
well retain, in certain domains, a key role in collective management, and there are 
good reasons for states to enhance the centripetal dynamics of the general system 
when they so decide and that consensually: a treaty-based construct, the union still 
rests upon state-controlled rules. As a result, claims to ‘ever closer union’ also, but 
not exclusively, rest upon states’ collective, rather than merely individual, capacity 
to invest in the cumulative rewards, functional or structural, of shared rule. Thus, in 
its current state – political, architectural and, crucially, cultural – integration is not 
driven, let alone determined, by those envisaging a federal end state of the process.
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Projections
Given these conceptual expositions, it is possible to define the union through the lens 
of ‘organized synarchy’ and project a general view of integration or, to use the essay’s 
subtitle, to redraw a sketch of a whole beneficial to its parts. The concept depicts 
a union called upon to organize the collective symbiosis of diverse parts within a 
larger plurality which allows them to preserve themselves as polities in their own 
right and, at the same time, act as co-evolving partners. Although this condition 
does not pose a post-statist threat to constituent sovereignties, it is not in itself void 
of a post-statecentric quality, for it rests beyond the exclusive control of the parts. All 
in all, integration is about the constitution of a plural but collective order; a novel 
form of politically constituted symbiosis among diverse but highly codetermined 
democracies, whose sovereignty can be taken as still being alive, but whose essential 
qualities are attuned to the demands of their common association. It offers the 
possibility to think about a form of ‘politeia’ through the synergies integration 
theory allows in a post-statecentric direction, where states share in the authority of 
a larger system built by them and subject to reform through their expressed consent.
This condition was reflected in an earlier conception of the union as a ‘confederal 
consociation’ (Chryssochoou, 1994; 1998) of constitutional polities which are bound 
together in a consensual form of union, without either losing their sense of forming 
collective national identities or resigning their individual sovereignty to a higher 
central authority. As a post-statecentric quality, ‘organized synarchy’ performs 
collective functions which, far from invalidating the constituent sovereignties by 
creating a single locus of authority, it recomposes them by moving the level of 
collective symbiosis away from classical interstate accounts of joint rule or from 
types of ‘stato’ beyond or to the detriment of the parts and their historic reality or 
pride. Rather, it rests on a cooperative culture which, far from sweeping away the 
member state demoi in the trajectory of (super) imposed homogeneity, embraces 
mutually reinforcing perceptions of organizing their collective life. It allows the 
member collectivities to embrace a culture which is not merely the expression of 
an advanced institutional partnership, but also an enduring legal and political bond 
among co-sovereigns. Thus ‘organized synarchy’, as more than an instrumental 
view of reconceptualizing the nature of governance in cooperative general systems, 
indicates a polity frame aiming at a dynamic equilibrium between whole and parts.
However, in view of various(ly) connected crises in the daily management of the 
union, not to mention the strains caused by Brexit and the all-alarming rise of the 
far-right in domestic and transnational arenas, its polity expectations seem rather 
limited. But its current predicament – its ‘unhappy state’, to recall Tsoukalis (2014) – 
may not be all there is to it. This provokes the question: is ‘organized synarchy’ – the 
ordered symbiosis of codetermined polities – a more permanent condition, if not a 
mirroring of what the end state might look like or is it merely a passing reflection 
of a temporal state of play? An answer confirming the former, and thus the union’s 
co-evolutionary qualities, is that the transition ‘from sovereignty to synarchy’ is in 
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line with states’ disposition to transcending some of their traditional attributes of 
sovereignty; most notably, and crucially, the right to be involved in their partners’ 
domestic affairs. This may well be regarded as integration’s greatest cultural, rather 
than merely legal or institutional, achievement; as yet another instance of ‘organized 
synarchy’ expanding the horizons and thus boundaries of authority-sharing towards 
new forms of unit(y) with a transcendental quality: sovereignty’s emancipation from 
classical self-rule. It is also one out of many possible end states, signalling no less of 
a normative departure from a set of coordinated polities towards an ordered but not 
fully unified polity retaining its pluralism and allowing the parts to sustain their own 
polity ‘soul’ into a viable whole. Taylor (1996, p. 78) asserts: ‘Each [level] had become 
essential to the survival of the other. Put differently: there were arrangements at 
the European level which had become semi-detached from the state, representing a 
distinctive level of political activity, interacting with national affairs, but containing 
its own values and imperatives, including that of survival. In this arrangement states 
retained sovereignty within the transnational system’.
As a union of co-evolving polities, Europe is now an integral part of citizens’ everyday 
life and parlance; it is part of a culture in dealing with common concerns, although 
these may at times shake the level of trust as in the different accounts of solidarity, 
or the limitations to it in view of the ‘flexible solidarity’ scheme proposed by the ‘V4 
group’ in 2016. This is no less of a collective accomplishment; not as ambitious as 
federalists may have hoped for, but still an indication, even conviction, that for all 
their differences in incentives or aspirations, the parts are increasingly conscious of 
the reality that more is to be achieved by joining forces, rather than by acting alone 
or by resorting to more conventional forms of collective action, and that finding 
collective ways of managing diversity through commonly shared values adds to their 
unity. Preuβ (2015, p. 219) captures the larger picture: ‘The vision is, rather, the idea of 
solidarity grounded on the mutual recognition of otherness and the development of 
modes of cooperation and, yes, also of collectively binding decisions taken by “others” 
whose bindingness is rooted in institutional devices which encourage civic solidarity 
and the tolerance for otherness’.
Prescriptions
Those favouring the transcendence of the nation-state criticise the union for a failed 
federal transformation; others, who oppose any federalist direction, criticise it for 
having gone too far, arguing the case for policy repatriation; still others, who favour 
a more cohesive and solidary union, whether or not of a constitutional orientation, 
direct their criticism against any projective scenaria of ‘variable geometry’ schemes 
on the grounds that they produce (intra)systemic fragmentation, rather than serve 
the purpose of ‘ever closer union’; and others, who position themselves in the far-
right, fiercely anti-European currents – which, not without consequential delay, are 
no longer treated merely as a crisis-related passing stage, but as a persisting threat 
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to Europe’s own fundamental values – condemn it for simply existing. So: can 
Europe still inspire? Investing, as Castiglione (2009, p. 51) put it, in ‘citizens’ growing 
perception that the Union contributes to a fundamental (though multilayered) 
institutional and legal order within which they can exercise their liberty’ may serve 
the purpose, provided those at the receiving end navigate their collective life into 
higher levels.
Despite its evident, if not ascending, statecentrism, the union has, by and large, 
been worthy of the term ‘polity’; if by that we mean an architecture of ordered public 
symbiosis constituted through commonly shared values and forms of rule. This 
architectural quality, essential for any political association’s public constitution, has 
invited not only integration theorists, but social and political thinkers from various 
normative strands, to recapture a sense of civic purpose with the view to revisiting 
and, where appropriate, recasting, the union’s uneasy path to ‘polity-hood’ and, more 
demandingly, but crucially for what appears to be the most promising example of 
‘organised synarchy’, ‘demos-hood’. As to sovereignty itself, in a union of advanced 
authority-sharing, where established and novel perceptions of shared rule shape the 
fate of co-evolving political units, it has become essentially codetermined.
Finally, as to fellow-Europeans themselves, Preuβ’s point (2015, p. 220) is in order: 
‘The EU may become the paradigm of a polity without a demos, based on the solidarity 
of citizens who are able and willing to reflect their otherness. It is a polity in a world 
where people have become neighbours and still remain strangers with respect to 
each other and accept mutual responsibilities […] And the Europeans should proudly 
tell each other and their fellow men from other parts of the world that the Europeans 
have learnt from their dark history and can offer innovative ideas for the bettering of 
human conditions in a world torn by serious injustices and conflicts’.
And so is Tsatsos’ (2009, p. 47) evolutionary account of ‘demos’: ‘The claim that 
there is no such thing as a “European demos” presupposes the acceptance of an 
absurd conceptual positivism, which denied the historicity of concepts and assigns 
to the terms “demos” or “public opinion” a definite and perpetual, that is to say, 
a-historical, content, which is not affected by the evolution of the historical spaces 
of their application or by their adaptation to discrete historical terms’. After all, to 
re-quote Tsatsos (2009, p. 91): ‘Concepts do not create history. History either creates 
concepts, or assigns new meaning to existing ones’. As stated by Dobson (2000, p. 
20), ‘the social cement required for the moral solidarity to stabilise itself and its 
product(s) over time and generate self-sustaining mechanisms to underpin a liberal/
social democratic order […] can only be built and then reproduced as a kind of demos 
constituted by the convergence of demoi on a framework of common institutions 
designed to permit them their chosen enterprise of addressing collective action 
problems, collectively, constrained by the circumstances of politics and within a 
social order cognitively apprehended as structurally mutualist in its relations of 
recognition and respect between rights-holding agents’. Or, as Castiglione (2009, p. 
51) put it, ‘the solution may lie more in imagining how an interlocking political space 
51
may need interlocking systems of trust, solidarity, and allegiances –none of which 
may need to be absolute– than in the assumption that we can reproduce the absolute 
demands of national citizenship at a European level’.
It is then possible to develop novel conceptions of engaging in deliberative and 
decisional ways a plurality of citizenries in their larger association. All the more so, 
given the rise of what Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) call ‘national populism’ and the 
need for open democratic dialogues about the future evolution, even finality, of the 
union, bringing transnational social and political action closer to the member publics 
and reactivating civic aspirations for large-scale demos-formation. As debates raise 
fundamental concerns about the political viability of the union, out of many possible, 
perhaps equally plausible, prescriptions, an appropriate path to European unity may 
well lie in diverse publics shaping their political future in common, without equating 
demos-formation with the transfer of loyalties to a higher authority unit. As a shared 
vision, this may ascribe the polity aspirations of a late-modern union with a sense of 
plural ‘demos-hood’ within an identifiable whole, whose publics see the purpose of 
their collective symbiosis; for as Cohen (1971, p. 47) put it, ‘there can be no larger part 
unless the larger part and the smaller parts are indeed parts of one whole’; otherwise, 
fragmentation may prevail in the sense of ‘polycracy’ as meant by Sartori  (1987, p. 22): 
‘a separable multiplicity made up of the unit “each one”’.
The triptych ‘symbiosis–synergy–osmosis’ corresponds to the three stages in the 
making of an EU demos: the first describes the current state of the relationship 
between whole and parts; the second aims at strengthening horizontal links among 
the latter; and the third, a culmination of the two, invests in the civic potential of 
fellow-Europeans. But today’s democratic challenges bring into fore, on the one hand, 
a view claiming that democratic shortcomings are still tied, by and large, to a series of 
(inter)institutional imbalances within a state-controlled union: thus, an appropriate 
reformist path would be to strengthen the institutions of common governance, even 
at the expense of state authorities; and, on the other, an argument suggesting that 
focusing primarily on the institutional front fails to address the question of ‘demos’: 
thus the reformist need to bestow the member publics with a sense of ‘demos-hood’ 
to embrace the concerns shared by Europeans about the union and/as their future.
Finale
Arguably, theorizing integration has impelled many promising departures – portraits 
of projective wholes. But the sketches remain incomplete and thus only drafts; yet, 
they defy both international and statist categories, favouring a dialectic composition 
of intersecting units: taking this as an ensemble of shapes drawn from various angles 
points to a portrait of a union characterized by an incipient but fragmented demos.
The challenge is thus set: to re-invest in what binds Europeans together as fellow-
participants in a purposeful integrative journey. True, they live their lives in multiple 
polities; they may not eventually amount to a federal demos; they may also fail to 
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acquire – or, as van der Walt (2015) has it, ‘give themselves’ – their own constitution; 
but they can and should lead their lives as fellow-citizens. As Lavdas (2012, pp. 13–14) 
put it, ‘discovering republican virtues in a post-national edifice and internalizing 
those in a way that strengthen Ulysses’ constraints is no easy task. Yet it is not 
far-fetched to suggest that the current juncture calls for nothing less: the EU will 
either emerge as a locus of a minimal but shared set of republican commitments or 
disintegrate to states or groups of states. Ulysses’ constraints weaken without a degree 
of republican commitment to the European project: they are in doubt at the domestic 
level and they also appear increasingly untenable as viewed from abroad’. In this 
sense, a libation – ‘spondȇ’ – on ‘Ulysses’ constraints’ may well serve as a libation for a 
commonly shared life even in a late-modern ‘syspondia’. After all, as Strabo tellingly 
noted in his Geography (9, 3.5, 1927, p. 355; quoted in Hudgens, 2013, p. 73), ‘the greater 
the number of the sojourners and the greater the number of the places whence they 
came, the greater was thought to be the use of their coming together’.
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Chapter Three
The Future of the EU in Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
State of the Union Speeches
Jean Claude Cachia
Abstract
The 2014–19 European Parliament legislature faced a number of crises which 
threatened the future of the European project. The discontent within the European 
Union was evident in the 2014 European Parliament Elections, which saw the rise in 
popularity of various Eurosceptic parties across Europe. The aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis and the migration crisis challenged the dynamics within the European 
Union, while politicians across the region struggled to propose long-term solutions. 
In 2016, the European Union faced another threat following the Brexit referendum, 
which saw the majority of the British citizens voting to leave the European Union. 
All these challenges were reflected in the discourse used by the President of the EU 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. As President of the European Commission, he 
had to give the State of the Union speeches between 2015 and 2018 where he sought 
to provide a vision for the future of the EU.
The State of the Union addresses, delivered by the Presidents of the European 
Commission, have been used as tools to bring the European Union (EU) closer to its 
citizens and to strengthen the collaboration between the European Parliament (EP) 
and Commission. Whilst not as popular as their U.S. counterparts, these speeches 
are still met with high expectations and criticism due to the fact that they project 
the potential future trajectory of the European Union. This is the reason why this 
article evaluates the State of the Union speeches given by Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker. It attempts to understand how the Commission’s plans on the 
future of the EU evolved between 2015 and 2018.
Introduction
“On 25 May the voters of Europe spoke to us. They sent us powerful, if 
sometimes contradictory, messages. Today, and in the years to come, we 
have to respond” (Juncker, 2014, p. 16).
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Juncker’s first statement as a candidate for the Presidency of the European 
Commission reflected the turmoil which the EU was experiencing. On the 25 of May 
2014, European voters sent a dire warning to the EU. With a historical low turnout of 
42.61% and far-right and eurosceptic parties across Europe dominating the elections, 
there was a need to reform the ailing European project. This address highlights an 
awareness of this wave of discontent. For the first time, the President of the European 
Commission had to reflect the popular vote of the 2014 EP Elections, with Jean-
Claude Juncker being proposed as the compromise spitzenkandidat of the European 
People’s Party (EPP), the largest group within the European Parliament.
The relatively short speech dealt with a variety of issues including the EP elections, 
the detachment which existed between the EU and its citizens, the financial crisis, 
and European Security. There was one element which linked these topics together, 
that is, the need to move forward with the European Project. Juncker called for the 
institutions and citizens to embrace a ‘new start for Europe’. However, this new start 
would eventually be halted by a series of setbacks including the Syrian Civil War, the 
ensuing migration crisis, and the Brexit referendum.
The scope of this chapter is to use critical discourse analysis (CDA) to evaluate 
the State of the Union speeches made by Juncker as President of the European 
Commission from 2015 to 2018. This study will outline the way Juncker’s vision 
on the future of Europe developed from one address to another, and the impact 
which political developments had on this vision. This chapter is thus divided into 
four main sections. The first provides a brief evaluation of the history of the State 
of the Union speeches. The second focuses on the theoretical framework based on 
Fairclough & Fairclough’s (2013) analysis of critical discourse, while the third provides 
a brief overview of Juncker’s State of the Union addresses. The final section consists 
of a detailed analysis of how Juncker’s vision on the future of the EU developed 
throughout his term as President of the European Commission, and the impact of 
political developments on this vision.
The European Commission and the State of the Union Address
The State of the Union address by the President of the Commission was formally 
established by the Treaty of Lisbon and became part of the 2010 framework agreement 
which shapes the relationship between the EP and European Commission (Pansardi 
& Battegazzorre, 2018). This address is traditionally held in September with the 
President of the Commission reflecting on the past and present while highlighting 
future priorities. The main elements of the Commission’s programme and, therefore, 
its priorities, are sent to the EP in advance. The purpose of the State of the Union 
speech was to provide more clarity of the Commission’s agenda, to bring it closer to 
the citizens, and to enhance the cooperation between the EP and the Commission. 
However, it never reached the status that European technocrats expected. Ryan Heath 
(2017) branded this address as “the U.S. President’s speech without the vision. It’s the 
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Queen’s speech without the Queen”. There are a number of reasons for this including 
the fact that the President of the Commission is not the President of the EU and must 
share power with the heads of the European Council, Parliament and Central Bank 
(Heath 2017). Yet, the State of the Union still has a function. Whilst there are only 
few studies on the State of the Union addresses, they are still scrutinised by national 
governments and the media.
Critical Discourse Analysis
The study of political discourse received widespread attention in the last few decades 
since political scientists are increasingly using language to evaluate political 
behaviour. Fairclough & Fairclough (2013) define discourse as the “use of language 
in a social context” (p. 81), which represents various aspects that characterise the 
socio-politico fields (Trimithiotis, 2018). Discourse analysis relies on the premise that 
assumptions, ideas and judgements can provide researchers with the basic terms for 
discussions on a particular concept or event (Glynos, Howarth, Norval, Speed, 2009). 
From a political science angle, politicians use language to communicate with their 
audience through interviews, reports, debates and speeches (Fairclough, 2013). The 
language used not only reflect their values, strategies and goals but also the choices 
they are required to make as part of the decision-making process (Fairclough, 2008; 
Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013).
In the 1980s, Norman Fairclough provided a new analytical framework to evaluate 
discourse. This analytical tool was chosen due to its characteristics:
“CDA brings the critical tradition in social analysis into language studies, and 
contributes to critical social analysis a particular focus on discourse, and on 
relations between discourse and other social elements (power, ideologies, 
institutions, social identities etc.). Critical social analysis is normative and 
explanatory critique. It is normative critique: it does not simply describe 
existing realities but also evaluates them, assesses the extent to which they 
match up to values that are taken (contentiously) to be fundamental for 
just or decent societies (e.g., certain requisites for human well-being). It 
is explanatory critique: it does not simply describe and evaluate existing 
realities but seeks to explain them” (Fairclough, 2013, p. 178).
The focus of this definition relies on three main elements which are: social contexts 
(situations), knowledge (institutions), and social identities (social structures) 
(Howarth, & Griggs, 2016). Critical discourse analysts focus on the interpretation of 
the language used, context (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000) and the way power and 
ideologies shape this discourse (Wodak, 1999). Isabela and Norman Fairclough’s 
(2013) theory is grounded in the idea that politics is based on decisions taken by 
individuals. These decisions are not only based on ideologies but are also influenced 
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by the institutions and social structures. Discourse is the tool which such politicians 
use to legitimise arguments and decisions while seeking to persuade others to take a 
similar stance (Howarth, & Griggs, 2016).
Isabela and Norman Fairclough (2013) hold that the power of speech is extremely 
important for political communication. Politicians and agents use the power of 
speech to influence their audience on the benefits and harms of particular policies 
and to defend their decisions. Within such a framework, politicians use three genres 
of rhetoric developed by Aristotle which are; deliberative, forensic, and epideictic 
depending on their objectives and audience. Deliberative rhetoric is discourse based 
on the future with politicians trying to influence their audience to take a particular 
course of action; forensic rhetoric is often used to defend or condemn the action 
of others whilst epideictic rhetoric is used in political campaigns to attack others 
(Lawson-Tancred, 1991).
Whilst rhetoric is important, it may not be sufficient to influence audiences since 
several questions linked with speech delivery arise. These include the kind of speech 
that politicians opt for and the way that politicians try to convince their audience 
that their approach is the most suitable one. In order to be successful, politicians 
are required to use arguments to validate their claims (Hambermas, 1984; Johnson, 
1991). These arguments have been summarised in Table 1 adapted from Fairclough 
& Fairclough (2013) outlining a theoretical framework based on critical discourse 
analysis, which is subsequently used in the third and fourth sections to assess 
Juncker’s speeches.
TABLE 1: ELEMENTS WHICH SHAPE DISCOURSE
Claim Politicians provide a course of action and the rationale behind it
Circumstantial 
premises
Politicians are required to explain their agenda and what is 
influencing it.
Goal premises Politicians have to outline their main goals.
Value premises Politicians have to explain how their goals are based on particular 
values or the values of their parties.
Means-goal 
premises
Politicians are required to outline what might be achieved if a 
particular course of action is followed
Addressing 
alternative options
Politicians discuss alternative options and explain why their 
choices are the best ones for their audience.
Adapted from Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013
The decision to choose this framework was taken because public discourse is based 
on six elements (cf. Table 1) outlined by Fairclough & Fairclough (2013), involving 
politicians using evidence to justify their claims. This justification is required for 
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them to explain why they are proposing particular objectives, to link these goals with 
their values and principles, explain the way they will reach their goals, highlight 
the negative consequences of not achieving these goals, and persuade voters that 
the alternative goals provided by others are not suitable for them. In fact, the only 
element which was not used in the fourth section is the alternative options element – 
as in his speeches, Juncker often failed to tackle any other ideas which could have 
been adopted to strengthen the EU.
Political discourse is often dependant on practical reasoning, which is used by 
politicians to defend particular choices and highlight the rationale behind them. At 
every step of the way, politicians are required to deliberate and provide information 
on proposed choices. (Fairclough & Fairclough, 2013). This may contribute towards 
building an effective argument.
However, political scientists are aware of the limitations of deliberation. Whilst 
deliberation is desired, elections are not always decided on information provided to 
voters. Politicians or agents can resort to manipulation to achieve their objectives. 
They have the ability to provide alternative facts and to distort their competitors’ 
message to achieve their goals. Phenomena such as populism, together with other 
extraneous forces, also have the ability to shape and distort the information sent 
to voters. All these elements have contributed to the rise of post-truth politics or 
alternative facts systems which politicians, agents, the media and institutions like the 
European Union are struggling to contain. This is leading to further destabilisation 
of political systems across the globe and might produce unexpected electoral results 
(Ball, 2017). Last but not least, voters simply vote according to their allegiance and not 
on the policies or discourse they are being presented with (Caplan, 2011).
While the influence of discourse has its limitations, it remains a powerful tool 
in the hands of politicians, agents and others, which can be used to promote their 
worldview, goals and ideas. Fairclough & Fairclough (2013) outlined how “discourses 
as a way of representing the world do not describe what social reality is but also 
what it should be” (p. 103). This can be seen in the state of the union speeches of the 
Presidents of the Commission. As this chapter argues, Juncker had to address the 
challenges being faced by the EU and its member states, whilst at the same time 
provide a series of objectives developed by his Commission on how to safeguard the 
future of the European Union.
Critical Discourse Analysis through NVIVO
In order to evaluate the State of the Union address through Fairclough & Fairclough’s 
(2013) theoretical framework, this study uses NVIVO to codify these speeches. The 
speeches were uploaded on NVIVO and a number of nodes based on the discourse 
used were established to categorise the various subjects dealt with. Over 23 Nodes 
were established with one of the main nodes being the future of Europe. As these 
speeches were being analysed and coded, the decision was taken to use a number 
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of aggregate nodes. More than 28 aggregate nodes were created under the future of 
the Europe node to highlight the various issues which were being discussed on the 
future of the EU. The State of the Union speeches were also coded according to the 
issues tackled. When the coding was completed and all four speeches were evaluated, 
a hierarchy chart was generated through NVIVO for every speech. In the case of the 
first speech, since the future of the EU was not the main theme, two hierarchy charts 
were developed: one which looks at the top issues discussed in the speeches, and the 
other which looks at the future of the EU (parent node) and its aggregate nodes to 
evaluate how it was tackled and the language used by Juncker.
State of the Union 2015: The Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity: 9 
September 2015
“It is time to speak frankly about the big issues facing the European Union. 
Because our European Union is not in a good state” (Juncker, 2015, p. 2).
Juncker’s first speech as President called for “honesty, unity and solidarity.” The 
themes explored in his speech reflect the challenges the EU faced during that year. 
The Greek financial crisis was still ongoing, and finding a long-term solution proved 
challenging. The Syrian migration crisis was threatening to tear down an already-
weakened Union. A referendum on whether the UK should remain within the EU 
loomed on the horizon. Prime Minister David Cameron had pledged a referendum 
during an electoral campaign, and talks were underway to renegotiate Britain’s 
position within the EU. The possibility to leave the EU rose following the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty and the inclusion of Article 50 which allows states to formally 
withdraw from the Union.
62
The issues (cf. Diagram 1) tackled by Juncker include the financial crisis (Greece, 
the EU Financial Crisis, and Greece and the European Commission), Climate 
Change, Migration (Migration Reforms, Syria and Libya, Solidarity and the EC 
Recommendations on Migration), the United Kingdom and the Conflict in Ukraine. 
The first speech is more oriented toward the present challenges rather than the 
future of the EU.
Diagram 2 reveals how this speech was used to tackle the immediate problems being 
faced by the EU. The main claim in this speech is that further reforms are required 
to strengthen the EU. Juncker’s vision for a modern EU required a series of reforms. 
These reforms were meant to help the EU overcome its challenges and transform it 
in fields such as security where it lacked the required consensus to develop further.
To safeguard the EU and strengthen its foundations, Juncker outlined how the 
European supranational institutions needed to tackle issues such as Climate Change, 
the status of the United Kingdom, and security in Europe. In each of these areas, there 
is an evident frustration regarding the constant failure of the EU and its member 
states to reach consensus since national interests superseded the European ones.
This speech is especially important since Juncker (2015) provides the goal and 
circumstantial premises of his Commission especially with regards to the financial 
crisis. One of the first priorities and the main goal premise was to try and solve the 
financial crisis which plagued Europe. On this matter, the circumstantial premise is 
based on five domains which the Commission said it was going to focus on to tackle 
the effects of the financial crisis. These included: (1) a Common Deposit System 
Guarantee to protect the savings of the European citizens for up to €100,000, (2) a 
stronger role for the Euro, (3) more efficient economic and fiscal surveillance, (4) the 
establishment of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base to fight tax avoidance, 
63
and (5) the creation of a Euro-Treasury area which would take responsibility during 
periods of economic shock.
In this speech, the future of the European Union is also linked with the development 
of a Digital Single Market. Juncker highlights a series of goals to secure this future. 
He argues that the European project could move forward with further investment, 
stronger copyright rules and the finalisation of the Transatlantic Trade agreement 
with the United States. Reference is also made to the removal of roaming charges in 
2017 and its ensuing benefits for European citizens. The President of the European 
Commission acknowledged the difficulty and lack of consensus which the EU 
institutions faced in finding long-term solutions to the financial crisis. Much of the 
reforms required the consent of both the EP and EU Council, and there was enough 
discontent and disagreement especially on the Common Deposit System Guarantee:
“I am of course fully aware there is no consensus on this yet. But I also know 
that many of you are as convinced as I am of the need to move ahead. I say 
to those who are more sceptical: the Commission is fully aware that there are 
differences in the starting positions of Member States” (Juncker, 2015, p. 9).
Disagreement amongst the member states was not limited to the Greek financial 
crisis. On this matter, Juncker’s speeches provide an insight on the intergovernmental 
tensions within the EU. In fact, Juncker highlights the disappointment for the failure 
in finding a long-term solution for the Greek crisis. He argues that “our collective 
inability to provide a swift and clear answer to the Greek crisis over the last months 
weakened us all” (Juncker, 2015, p. 8). Juncker is especially critical of the EP and its 
failure to give timely approval for the €35 billion package that the Commission (and 
the Council) proposed to promote economic growth in Greece. However, here ”the 
means goal premise” is not clear as the EU Commission President fails to explain 
how this package could help Greece at a time when the EU was imposing further 
austerity measures.
Whilst only 1% of the speech concerns the UK, Juncker takes the opportunity 
to defend its role within the EU; a role which would only be guaranteed if a trade 
agreement is reached and the British citizens vote to remain in the Union. The 
discourse is positive and augurs for a future agreement. However, Juncker fails to 
take into account the circumstantial premises which pushed David Cameron to call 
for a referendum in the first place. He acknowledges that this new challenge was not 
simply a problem within the UK but a consequence of the failure of the EU to adapt 
to the modern world:
“We all agree that the EU must adapt and change in view of the major 
challenges and crisis we are facing at the moment” (Juncker, 2015, p. 10).
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This statement is particularly interesting because Juncker uses the third-person 
“we”. A question arises: was he referring collectively to EU institutions? Taking into 
account the complex decision-making process in the EU, one may deduce that he 
is arguing for collective responsibility amongst EU institutions and member-states. 
To appeal to every institution and member state and strengthen his Commission’s 
course of action, Juncker explains the value premise behind his proposals. In this 
case, the values consisted of the EU four freedoms which had to be safeguarded and 
strengthened as they would help the EU in the challenges it was facing. In addition, 
further economic and political reforms were required to bolster the role of the EU 
within the international system. Whilst for a number of decades the EU has tried to 
adopt a larger security role, the various disagreements amongst the member-states 
and the role of NATO in Europe, hindered these plans. With a new President of the 
Commission, security reforms were again going to be a priority.
Yet, European officials struggled to persuade member-states on the need to 
transform the EU into a security player. Juncker’s claim was that the world was not 
at peace, and that the EU had the responsibility to act to restore peace by taking an 
active role in stabilising Ukraine. He thus links the future of the EU with the need to 
secure Ukraine and protect its citizens. His rationale was that Russia was not only a 
threat to the Ukraine, but also to Europe. This required a united front on economic 
sanctions despite their unpopularity among member-states.
The subject concerning ‘unity’ within the EU was also used in the discourse to 
promote climate change initiatives gaining 4% of coverage. Juncker warned that 
climate change had the potential to be a security issue due to the depletion of natural 
resources which is why more action was required from the EU. He highlighted the 
importance of the Paris Agreement together with the other reforms implemented 
by the EU, including the reduction of emissions by at least 40% by 2030. These 
reforms were certainly aimed towards developing the EU as a leader in Sustainable 
Development through the promotion of renewable energy initiatives to increase 
employment in Europe.
Juncker’s first speech received mixed reviews from the press. Whilst the media 
praised Juncker’s commitments in addressing the EU’s challenges and the initiatives 
promoting sustainable development and renewable energy, the perception was that 
he was not aware of the realities being faced by EU citizens.
Juncker failed to propose concrete solutions or alternatives to the Syrian migration 
crisis. The speech was delivered a few months after the body of Aylan Kurdi, a three-
year-old boy, was found on a Turkish beach. Pictures of his corpse spread globally 
generating widespread indignation and criticism against the EU and border states 
for not doing enough to save lives. Concrete recommendations were also expected 
for the Greek financial crisis which was still creating pressures in Greece due to high 
rates of unemployment (Morgan, 2018). In addition, as Juncker declared, ‘unity’ was 
required to move on with the European project. However, finding ‘Unity’ on issues of 
which member-states had divergent views was no easy task.
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State of the Union 2016: Towards a better Europe – a Europe that protects, 
empowers and defends: 14 September 2016
The next twelve months are the crucial time to deliver a better Europe: 
a Europe that protects; a Europe that preserves the European way of life 
(Juncker, 2016, p. 2).
A year after Juncker was chosen to head the European Commission, the EU still faced 
challenges arising from the financial crisis, high unemployment and migration from 
the war-torn Near East. Yet, 2016 was also the year when the BREXIT referendum 
took place and 51.89% of the British electorate voted to leave the EU. While this news 
dominated the European political scene, there is little reference to it in this address. 
Article 50 was due to be triggered in March 2017, and the European institutions were 
still digesting this result and its implications.
In this speech Juncker defends the policies implemented by the Commission with 
an agenda based on the future (cf. Diagram 3) rather than the present. At the same 
time, as the title suggests, Juncker made a second attempt to prioritise security. With 
regards to promoting security reforms, and using critical discourse analysis, Juncker 
employed the value premise by linking these reforms to “EU values and principles” 
declaring that, as a security player, the EU would strengthen and safeguard its values.
EU values take centre-stage and Juncker reminds his audience that Europeans 
fought hard for such values and, therefore, they are worth preserving. He said that he 
had the impression: “that many seem to have forgotten what being European means.” 
(Juncker, 2016, p. 3). Whilst a number of European officials warned that the EU was 
being taken for granted, the EU failed to convince its citizens of the importance of its 
values and principles. Juncker therefore, proceeded to highlight how the EU led to 
tangible improvements.
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In a similar vein to his first union address, he highlights the number of conflicts 
unfolding across the globe (over 40) and argued that, over the last century, ‘Europe’ 
(the Institutions, member states, and European citizens) managed to resolve conflicts 
through diplomatic means. Yet this was highly questionable given the EU’s failure in 
preventing the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Throughout the speech, there is 
the constant use of the term “we Europeans”. This can be seen as an example of the 
idea that these were not speeches coming from a European technocrat, but rather, 
from a European citizen. In all his speeches, there is an underlying argument calling 
for a collective sense of direction to secure the EU’s future.
The concept of collective responsibility is one of the main issues which Juncker dealt 
with in this address. Collective responsibility is linked with the various challenges 
the EU was facing, and its failure to provide long-term solutions. The President of the 
European Commission declared that the EU needed to do more to protect its citizens, 
even though the European Border and Coast Guard and FRONTEX in Turkey and 
Greece were already providing results. However, he argued that this was not enough. 
Juncker’s solution was to create a European Defence Fund and reinforce Europol. 
Interestingly enough, no reference was made to the need to safeguard the Ukraine 
and its citizens, which was one of the main priorities in the first speech.
Collective responsibility was also required to solve the “existential crisis” engulfing 
the EU. In part this was due to the disagreements which existed on the way forward. 
Juncker argues that only through collective responsibility could the EU solve the 
financial crisis, youth unemployment, and social inequality. Youth unemployment 
was a very critical issue in this address. Juncker declared that “I cannot and will not 
accept that the millennials, Generation Y, might be the first generation in 70 years 
to be poorer than their parents.” (Juncker, 2016, p. 6) Juncker uses the first-person 
singular to underline his disappointment at such a situation. He follows this by 
stating that the course of action required to help these EU citizens required more 
youth programmes and training, and the establishment of the European Solidarity 
Corps with the aim of encouraging youths to volunteer to help those in need. He also 
argues in favour of a reform of the European telecommunications markets coupled 
with investment in 5G technology to be completed by 2025. Juncker believed that, 
through such investment, the EU could provide every city and village in the EU with 
wireless internet creating approximately 1.3 million jobs in a decade.
Juncker argued that solidarity was the overarching priority needed to tackle the 
challenges facing the EU. However, solidarity was difficult to achieve due to the 
various conflicts between European and national interests. These issues were tackled 
in his speech the following year, following the triggering of Article 50 by the United 
Kingdom.
67
State of the Union 2017: Towards a positive Europe: 13 September 20171
1 The 2017 State of the Union Address was the first one without a main theme
2 This White Paper is extremely important as it proposes five scenarios of how the EU could 
evolve by 2025.
“In the last year, we saw all 27 leaders walk up the Capitoline Hill in Rome, 
one by one, to renew their vows to each other and to our Union. All of this 
leads me to believe: that the wind is back in Europe’s sails. We now have a 
window of opportunity but it will not stay open forever. Let us make the 
most of the momentum, catch the wind in our sails” (Juncker, 2017, p. 1).
This 2017 State of the Union address was made after the British Prime Minister, 
Theresa May, triggered Article 50 thereby initiating the process by which the UK 
would leave the EU by 29 March 2019. This coincided with the celebrations marking 
the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. In this speech, there is hardly a reference 
to Brexit. Instead, Juncker uses this speech to promote an EU narrative based on hope, 
cultural heritage, freedom, rule of law and equality.
The future of Europe, rather than Brexit, is the central theme of this speech. 
Reference is made to the White Paper on the Future of Europe (cf. Table 2) which the 
Commission published in March 2017. This is one of the only speeches addressing 
alternative options of how the EU could evolve.2
At a time of great uncertainty for the EU, Juncker’s address is based on the history 
of Europe and its values. From a critical discourse analysis, the value premise takes 
centre stage. The third person plural “we” is again used to encourage EU institutions, 
member-states and citizens to work together to build a united and democratic Europe 
by 2025. As in the previous two speeches, Juncker attributes peace and freedom in 
Europe to the EU.
The future of Europe, rather than Brexit, is the central theme of this speech. 
Reference is made to the White Paper on the Future of Europe (cf. Table 2) which the 
Commission published in March 2017. This White Paper and the different scenarios 
presented by the European Commission were meant to initiate a debate on the future 
of Europe. Within this paper, the European Union presented five scenarios, on how 
the future of the EU would evolve after the UK leaves the European Union.  The 
Commission was proposing five different developments succinctly summed up in five 
categories; “Carrying on”; “Nothing but the Single Market”; “Those who want more 
do more”; “Doing less more efficiently”; and “Doing much more together.”  These 
scenarios, therefore, also included the much-dreaded concept of a “two-tier” Europe, 
and a scaling back of the European integration project. Nonetheless, while the 
language used by the European Union is considered to be neutral, the Commission 
did very little to hide its preference for further integration in areas concerning the 
Single Market and security. Indeed, this is one of the only speeches which directly 
addresses alternative options of how the EU could evolve.
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TABLE 2: THE FIVE SCENARIOS ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE
Scenarios Possibility Meaning
Scenario One Carrying On Based on the ‘New start for Europe’ and 
Bratislava documents. This scenario outlines 
how by 2025, the EU would collaborate for more 
investment in technology which would 
include automated cars. On the other hand, the 
member states should place more security 
measures at the borders which would have an 
impact on EU citizens.
Scenario Two Nothing but 
the Single 
Market
Collaboration within the EU would be restricted 
to some areas due to constant disagreement. By 
2025, the Single Market will be strengthened 
but other areas will fall outside the 
responsibility of the EU.
Scenario Three Those who 
want more do 
more
Cooperation amongst a number of member 
states on particular policies. By 2025, some 
states will agree to harmonise their policies by 
working together on issues such as security and 
telecommunications. This harmonisation 
will not be enforced on the rest of the member 
states.
Scenario Four Doing 
less more 
efficiently
The EU would develop in areas such as security 
and telecommunications whilst others would 
be left within the responsibility of the member 
states.
Scenario Five Doing much 
more together
More powers are shared with the EU which 
means that by 2025 the role of EU agencies will 
be strengthened.
European Commission (2017)
This speech provides a sixth scenario for the future of the EU based on further 
integration and upon the values of freedom, equality and the rule of law. The concept 
of unity amongst the EU institutions and member-states is also given considerable 
importance. One of the central claims is that unity is required for the EU to survive. 
Juncker declared that the 27-member Council of the European Union, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission were working together to renew the 
European project by putting Europe at the heart of it. In reality though, it was 
apparent that there were serious disagreements between the EU institutions on how 
to move forward. In this speech, he makes reference to the question of legitimacy 
which plagues the EU. Juncker claims that Europe needs to be more democratic; he 
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does so notwithstanding the constant criticism levelled against the Commission 
over its democratic credentials. The need for serious reforms is again stressed in 
this address. Juncker proposes that the future of Europe should be discussed during 
Romania’s 2019 Presidency, in a summit due to take place in Sibiu.
Unity is also linked with the future of Europe. Juncker points out that Europe 
consists of only 8% of the world population, and this was going to decrease to 5% 
by 2050. Most of the world powers were shifting their investments towards new and 
emerging markets in the Pacific or Africa. For this reason, the goal premise here is 
that the EU member states had to work together to be able to compete with these 
regions.
In this speech, and as outlined by Diagram 4, Junker looks ahead to the 2019 EP 
elections. EU officials were already worried of the consequences of an increased share 
of the voite for Eurosceptic parties in the 2019 Elections. The dynamics were similar 
to the 2014 elections: the financial crisis, the migration crisis and Brexit fuelled 
discontent. Some of the recommendations proposed by Juncker to fight apathy 
and low turnout were to finance political parties and limit the funds to anti-EU 
parties since they were being used against the EU itself. Yet, this would not solve the 
main issues of apathy and low turnout3. Juncker acknowledges that the EU is often 
criticised for having a democratic deficit. At the same time, he fails to realise that 
the proposal to block funding for anti-EU parties could be used as an indictment 
by anti-EU parties who question the democratic legitimacy of the EU. During the 
speech, Juncker also announced the introduction of a new Code of Conduct for the 
Commission and praised the spitzenkandidaten system as a vehicle to provide further 
legitimacy to the EU. In addition, the creation of a European Pillar of Social Rights 
was proposed on the premise that it was required to reach citizens who were not able 
3 Turnout barely reached 43% in 2014
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to reach the standard of living expected in the EU. Despite all these proposals and the 
establishment of the Citizens’ Dialogue, he failed to show how these initiatives could 
improve election turnout.
The European Monetary Union was also given priority in this address with the 
circumstantial premise being that of promoting more efficiency within the Single 
Market. In addition, Juncker declared that the EU had to decrease bureaucracy to 
allow more states to adopt the Euro. To achieve this, the premise was for the EU to 
appoint a Finance Minister – undoubtedly a federalist measure – during a time when 
there were serious objections against further strengthening the EU institutions. 
In addition, for the sake of efficiency, Juncker argues that the appropriate course 
of action would be to embrace the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system. This 
speech uncovers the paradox at the heart of the EU decision-making process. On one 
hand, Juncker was encouraging states to strengthen the EU while, on the other, he 
indirectly highlights that not everyone will agree on the reforms required which is 
why QMV is required.
The sixth scenario proposed by Juncker in this address would only be achieved 
with further reforms. Even though Juncker still campaigned for a European Defence 
Fund, this element did not feature in this speech. Juncker, instead, projected his 
vision for a Federal Europe, with a common Finance Minister, one single president 
for the Council of the EU and Commission which would be able to shape and provide 
faster solutions to the ongoing problems which the organisation faced.
State of the Union 2018: The Hour of European Sovereignty – 12 
September 2018
“Living up to Europe’s rallying cry – never again war – is our 
eternal duty, our perpetual responsibility. We must all remain 
vigilant” (Juncker, 2018, p. 1).
In his last State of the Union speech, Juncker had to defend the work of his 
Commission. Under his watch, Britain voted to leave the EU, the financial crisis was 
still putting pressure on the EMU and, while refugees from Syria declined, this crisis 
left a long-lasting impact on European states and their citizens.
In this speech, Juncker spoke about his vision of a modern EU. This vision is linked 
with a stronger economic union, a stronger currency, and the rejection of nationalism 
which was fuelling the rise of far-right parties. Unlike previous speeches, Junker 
adopts a more personal tone and uses the first-person singular
“A few years ago, standing in this very same spot, I told you that Europe 
was the love of my life. I love Europe still and shall do so forever more” 
(Juncker, 2018, p. 12).
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Juncker’s vision of the EU envisages a proactive role in Africa with a need for further 
investment in this continent. When making this point, he uses the first-person 
singular suggesting that this is his own position, rather than that of the Commission. 
He stresses that over €44 billion is being invested in Africa, and 36% of Africa’s 
trade is with Europe. Therefore, he argues, the EU should do more to secure a trade 
agreement which could create further employment in both continents.
Another sector which influenced this speech was youth unemployment. The 
circumstantial premise here is that youth unemployment in Europe needs to be 
reduced. He rhetorically asked whether the EU could have a future if its youth were 
not taken care of. Juncker answers this question by switching to the third person 
to highlight the need for the EU institutions to spend more on this generation. 
This is especially important because, indirectly, he is putting the burden on all EU 
institutions to act and reverse this trend.
Juncker also argues that a stronger EU requires a stronger single currency. He 
expresses frustration that 80% of the energy bills are paid in Dollars rather than 
Euros. He explains that the Commission wanted to transform the Euro into one of 
the most powerful currencies in the world, and the first step towards achieving this 
was by strengthening the EMU.
The pressing question revolved around how to achieve this when serious 
disagreements on the way forward persisted. Juncker had been consistent in his 
speeches by arguing that QMV was the only method by which decisions could be 
taken in a more efficient manner which is why it had to be used in the EU’s external 
relations and certain tax matters. He acknowledges that in order to achieve this, 
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unanimity was required. However, unanimity was difficult to achieve especially 
when small states feared that QMV would minimise their influence within the EU. 
In addition, Juncker fails to provide a rationale on why QMV is the most suitable 
voting system in the institutions.
Another important element from a critical discourse analysis concerns the value 
premise element, and whether EU values were truly at the centre of reforms. In this 
instance, Juncker questions whether the EU could move forward if its main values 
were constantly being ignored by the member-states. The tensions between the 
media and national governments could not be ignored. The numerous attacks on 
journalists across the EU had an impact on his views. With three journalists killed 
in Europe between 2016 and 2018, Juncker appealed for the upholding press freedom.
Due to the marked divisions between Western and Eastern Europe on the future of 
Europe, the concept of unity featured in this address. He claimed that the West-East 
divisions enable other powers to shape events in the region. This statement can be 
regarded as an indirect reference to Russia.
Unity was also problematic within EU institutions. Juncker points out that 
while 50% of the Commission’s recommendations were approved and another 20% 
implemented, there were still disagreements on the remaining 30%. Through his 
discourse, he indirectly challenges other institutions to act on the required reforms. 
He called for unity to strengthen the European Asylum Agency and for security 
reforms in view of the fact that the Commission wanted to extend the powers of 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office and turn the EU into a security player. Although 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was introduced in 2017, there were still 
vast disagreements on whether the EU should become a security player.
In this address, Brexit is also linked to the concept of unity. Juncker declared that 
the ongoing talks between the EU and the UK, should ensure that there is no hard 
border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland to safeguard the Good 
Friday Agreement. From another perspective, Juncker declared that the EU should 
seek a partnership based on trade as outlined by Prime Minister Theresa May:
“This is why I welcome Prime Minister May’s proposal to 
develop an ambitious new partnership for the future, after 
Brexit” (Juncker, 2018, p. 9).
In this statement, one can notice the use of the first person singular to highlight 
Juncker’s personal opinion rather than that of his Commission or the EU. Since 
this was his last speech as President, Juncker wanted to defend the legacy of his 
Commission, while at the same time, provide a vision of a European Union as a 
competitive security and economic player which could be pursued further by the 
next EU Commission.
He defended his legacy at the helm of the Commission, although he failed to meet 
the expectations of those who wanted a greater sense of leadership. Herszenhorn 
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(2018) called considered the speech to be “disjointed” and “disorganized”. He argued 
that Juncker should have defended his legacy and provided a broader vision for the 
EU which does not necessarily equate to federalism. However, from the Commission’s 
perspective, one could not have expected anything different when there were such 
diverging arguments over the European project.
The Future of Europe in Juncker’s State of the Union Addresses
The discourse used by Juncker in the State of the Union and the themes tackled, 
represent the realities and the challenges that the EU faced during his tenure as 
President of the European Commission. These speeches, while not as popular as the 
U.S. or UK counterparts, provide an insight of how the Commission works and the 
relationship which it has with other EU institutions as well as the member-states.
From a critical discourse analysis, Juncker’s speeches are based on both deliberative 
rhetoric and policy recommendations. Rhetoric (cf. table 3) is used to remind citizens 
of the purpose of the European Union, its history, values and principles including the 
four freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. These were required to push through 
reforms to strengthen and safeguard the EU for future generations. This was the 
main goal which Juncker had as President of the European Commission; one which 
was ultimately jeopardized by Brexit
While these speeches were addressed to the European Parliament, Juncker 
attempted to expand his audience by targeting other EU institutions, member-states 
and citizens. Since the objective of strengthening the EU went beyond institutions, 
this action was both timely and commendable. In fact, the call for ‘Unity’ was 
apparent in all the above-mentioned speeches. However, ’Unity’ is more of a political 
rhetorical flourish than a possible policy outcome.
Juncker also tried to portray the Commission as being humane and understanding 
of the hardships that citizens were facing due to austerity and unemployment.
Table 3 highlights how Juncker’s goals to strengthen the European Union developed 
from one speech to another. The majority of these speeches tackled the main issues 
in the EU including the financial crisis, the Syrian migration crisis, and Brexit with 
Juncker proposing various courses of action to resolve them. This is the reason, why 
throughout his term as President of the Commission, the main goals remained 
the same: to guarantee a future for the EU by strengthening the economic sector, 
reduce unemployment, and invest in the security and the digital single markets. 
Nonetheless, with the financial crisis, Brexit and migration still on the agenda and 
with rising nationalism, he proposed further reforms.
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TABLE 3: ELEMENTS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WHICH 
JUNCKER’S SPEECHES
Elements 2015 2016 2017 2018
Cl
ai
m
The European 
Union needs 
economic 
and political 
reforms to 
survive.
EU should 
invest in its 
youth and 
protect its 
borders.
EU requires 
more reforms 
to reduce 
unemployment 
and poverty. 
QMV should 
be used for the 
single market.
The EU needs 
Unity to 
move forward 
and QMV to 
pass required 
legislation.
Ci
rc
um
st
an
ti
al
 
pr
em
is
es
Agenda 
influenced by 
the challenges 
being faced by 
the EU and its 
member-states
Agenda 
influenced 
by high 
unemployment 
and the ongoing 
financial crisis.
Agenda 
influenced by 
the financial 
crisis, rising 
unemployment 
and the 
international 
system.
Agenda 
influenced 
by the work 
done by the 
Commission 
between 2014 
and 2018.
G
oa
l p
re
m
is
es
To stabilise 
Greece, and to 
promote further 
economic 
investment, 
promote 
climate change 
and transform 
the EU into a 
security player.
Provide youth 
with more 
opportunities 
to secure their 
future, and 
transform 
the EU into a 
security player.
To establish a 
Defence Union, 
strengthen 
the European 
Monetary 
Union, and 
solve the 
migration 
problem.
To provide 
a future for 
European 
youths, and 
strengthen EU 
institutions to 
ensure that they 
can withstand 
challenges.
Va
lu
e 
pr
em
is
es
Reforms have 
to be enacted 
to strengthen 
EU values and 
principles 
which include 
the four 
freedoms, 
democracy, 
and respect for 
human rights.
Freedom, 
Democracy 
and rule of law 
should be the 
foundation of 
EU reforms.
The EU values 
should cover 
all EU citizens. 
The EU cannot 
have second-
class citizens.
EU values 
should be at the 
foundation of 
these reforms. 
EU values 
should be 
embraced by 
individual states 
with respect 
to all citizens 
and other 
institutions 
such as the press.
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TABLE 3: ELEMENTS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE WHICH 
JUNCKER’S SPEECHES
Elements 2015 2016 2017 2018
M
ea
ns
 g
oa
l 
pr
em
is
es
If reforms are 
enacted, EU will 
be safeguarded 
for future 
generations.
Reforms are 
needed to 
reduce youth 
unemployment.
Reforms are 
needed to 
strengthen 
the economic 
institutions of 
the EU.
Reforms should 
be enacted to 
turn the EU into 
a global power.
The main vision was underscored by the need to secure the European project by 
bringing it closer to its people. This can be considered as the sixth scenario for 
the future of Europe, which requires the EU to tackle further reforms including 
the appointment of one President for both the Council and the Commission and 
transforming the EU into a ‘quasi’ federal state. While federalism was never discussed 
in the speech, the proposed reforms point to that line of thinking.
Whilst the speeches might not have convinced audiences, they did provide the 
EP and member-states with an agenda which they could work upon. However, as 
Juncker rightly pointed out, the biggest weakness within the EU lies in its failure to 
portray a unified approach. The organisation struggles to find short-and long-term 
solutions in the face of the rising challenges which are threatening ts future stability.
Future of the EU: The way ahead
At the start of his presidency, Mr Juncker had announced that he would only be a one-
term President of the Commission, and indeed a new President of the Commission 
was elected in 2019. However, this president was not one of the spitzenkandidaten 
proposed by the main political blocs. The 2019 EP Election results weakened 
the main political blocks and led to the rise of the Renew Europe group (RE), the 
European/Greens Free Alliance and Identity and Democracy (ID). The European 
Council ignored the spitzenkandidaten process, and proposed Ursula von der Leyen 
as candidate for the Commission presidency. Whilst she was ultimately approved 
by the EP, the whole process has certainly increased the tensions between the EU 
institutions.
As President-elect of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen (2019) used her 
first speech to call for a stronger Europe based on the need to safeguard the future 
of the EU by proposing various reforms, including the strengthening of the EP. It 
remains to be seen how far she will succeed, given the current divisions on how to 
move forward with the project.
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Chapter Four
The Future of Europe: The View from 
Strasbourg during the ‘Future of Europe’ 
Debate
Mark Harwood
Abstract
The chapter analyses the views expressed by the EP political groups on the future of 
Europe, taken specifically in the context of the Juncker Commission’s White Paper, 
as well as in the wider sense of their ideological views on the type of ‘Europe’ they 
envisage. The chapter focuses on the EP groups to be found in the 2014–19 legislature 
due to the fact that the principal debate on the future of Europe happened during this 
period. The chapter focuses on three resolutions adopted in 2017 as well as the EP’s 
reaction to the white paper, and outlines the support for and against ‘more’ Europe. 
The chapter concludes by affirming that the largest EP groups remain largely in 
favour of ‘more’ Europe but that the EP elections of 2019 may result in a parliament 
less united on the call for greater integration.
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the reaction of the European Parliament (EP) and 
its political groups to the debate on the Future of Europe. The article analyses the 
political groups in the EP since they reflect the various political orientations which 
shaped the debate following a tumultuous decade which saw a crisis with the Euro 
currency, widespread unemployment, an influx of irregular migrants, a surge in 
Euroscepticism, growing support for populist parties, and the UK voting to leave the 
EU; with the latter being both an indication and an addition to that ongoing turmoil.
Against the backdrop of this troubled decade, the political groups within the 
parliament changed as did the political balance between them, impacting the Future 
of Europe debate in the EP. Ultimately, the Future of Europe debate was propelled by 
the distinct impression that the EU citizen had lost faith in the European Union and 
no institution was better placed to discuss this than the EP since it is the only directly 
elected institution and the only EU institution where a wide range of European 
political beliefs are represented. Since much of Parliament’s feedback on this issue 
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took place during the period 2016–18, this article focuses upon the EP groups to be 
found in the 2014–19 legislature.
EP Political Groups
Prior to discussing the EP’s reaction to the Future of Europe debate, this chapter will 
first outline the nature of the political groups within the EP. Political parties are 
ubiquitous actors within a functioning democracy. They emerge due to divisions in 
society and contest elections as a means to represent the interests of the electorate. 
While considered simplistic, it is common to view the parties on a left/right 
spectrum; with Communists on the extreme left, Greens extreme to moderate left, 
Socialists towards the centre-left with Liberals in the middle. On the right we then 
find the Christian Democrats and further along, the Conservatives with Nationalists 
considered extreme right. Alternative typologies exist to differentiate parties, as 
with the Nolan chart, and European political parties can be differentiated further 
in terms of their position on a pro/anti-integration axis (Hix and Hoyland, 2011). It 
is not the scope of this article to discuss in detail the political orientation of groups, 
but to analyse their position on the Future of Europe debate. In order to do so, we 
will adopt the left/right typology which will be complemented, at times, by the pro/
anti-integration spectrum, as this chapter debates the groups’ position on future 
European integration. It should be stressed that national parties normally emerge 
in a defined context, rooted in a clear ideology with a cohesive group identity. These 
parties are the constituent units of the EP political groups, but the latter are very 
distinct from the former.
EP Political Groups are the consequence of the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community which included a Common Assembly composed of delegates from 
national parliaments. When the Assembly convened in 1952, it was decided that the 
members (78 in total) would not sit in national groups but as party families, and in 
1953 a resolution was passed which recognised these groups with three party groups 
occupying the first Assembly; namely the Socialists, the Liberals and the Christian 
Democrats. The EP groups are therefore structured groupings of like-minded parties 
which comply with the criteria of the EP to be recognised as a group; in the 2014–19 
legislature these rules stipulated that a party group must have 25 MEPs from seven 
member states. Recognised party groups are then eligible for certain privileges 
including funds, access to committees and speaking time within the plenary (Salm 
2019). This has meant that some groups are formed which unite two distinct party 
families, but which then enables them to benefit from official status as a party group, 
as with the alliance between the Greens and the Regionalists. Parties must negotiate 
to join groups and can be asked to leave, as has happened throughout the EP’s history, 
while groups also differ on their level of internal coherence and organisational 
structure. The main parties, especially the Social Democrats, Liberals and Christian 
Democrats, are relatively cohesive groups with a strong organisational structure and 
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a relatively tight ideological coherency amongst members (Cicchi 2017). The other 
party groups within the EP are less ideologically cohesive and less structured with a 
tendency for members to disagree on issues. Therefore, on the Future of Europe, not 
all groups provided the same coherency or depth of feedback, as will be seen in this 
chapter (Cicchi, 2017).
During the 2014–19 legislature, there were eight groups recognised within the 
European Parliament. These groups had themselves changed over the last 15 years, 
and were a reflection of an enlarged Union as well as the turmoil seen in Europe 
over the last 10 years. With this in mind, it is interesting to analyse how the groups 
have evolved since the 2004 EU enlargement which also saw a major shift in the 
distribution of seats within the EP. In 2004 the EP seat number increased from 626 
MEPs to 732 with nearly all the ‘old’ member states (15) seeing a reduction in their 
seats to accommodate the new member states which joined from central and eastern 
Europe, as well as Malta and Cyprus. In the 2004–09 parliament there were seven 
groups, namely (ordered in terms of size, from the largest to the smallest):
1. The European People’s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED)
2. Party of European Socialists (PES)
3. Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
4. The Greens/European Free Alliance (G-EFA)
5. European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL-NGL)
6. Group for Independence and Democracy (IND/DEM)
7. Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN)
8. Unattached members (non inscrits – NI)
In 2007 the Union expanded to include Bulgaria and Romania, and a key 
development from this enlargement was the creation of a new political group – the 
Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty group (ITS) – which enabled several far-right 
parties such as the French National Front to join with the intake of Bulgarian and 
Romanian far-right MEPs and meet the criteria to be recognised as a group (Salm, 
2019). However, when one of its members, the Italian MEP Alessandra Mussolini 
(granddaughter of the Italian dictator) made disparaging remarks about Romanians, 
the Romanian members resigned, and the group no longer met the criteria to be 
recognized as a group and was dissolved. The ITS group symbolised the uneasy 
balance that EP groups often represent, namely the need to gather into groups so as 
to be recognised by the EP but then needing to maintain consensus amongst political 
parties which may differ significantly in ideology and goals.
The 2009–14 legislature saw some changes to the EP groups with the EPP-ED 
becoming the EPP after many of the European Democrats left while the PES was 
renamed the Socialist and Democrats (S&D) to accommodate an influx of Italian 
Democrats who did not identify as socialists. 2009 saw the creation of a new group, 
the European Conservative and Reformists, which were primarily formed after the 
British Conservatives decided to leave the EPP-ED while the EUL-NGL became the 
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Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) and the UEN was disbanded. In the 2014–
19 legislature the balance of seats shifted again, but the groups remained largely 
consistent with the EPP, S&D, ECR, ALDE, GUE-NGL, G-EFA and the Europe of 
Freedom and Direct Democracy (a continuation of the EFD but having lost several 
members to the ECR and after admitting the Five Star Movement). Chart 1 shows the 
party groups within the EP during the 2009–14 legislature, including their relative 
size and position on the left/right political spectrum.
(Source: Author’s own, compiled from data available at https:// europarl.europa.eu/
meps/en/full-list)
Therefore, the 2014–19 legislature comprised eight groups and it was these groups 
which engaged with the debate on the Future of Europe. By far the largest was the EPP, 
the European Peoples’ Party which comprised Christian Democrats and Conservatives 
from 27 member states (all MSs except for the UK). The constituent members 
represented Christian democracy, conservative and liberal-conservative politics, 
placing them on the right of the political spectrum (Corbett et al., 2016). In recent 
years, the group’s coherency was challenged on the pro/anti-integration spectrum 
and the group retains member parties which can be classified as Eurosceptic, such 
as Viktor Orban’s FIDESZ. The EPP is a highly organised party group with strong 
structures for managing party cohesion and provides strong leadership within the 
EP, often occupying the role of President. In the future of Europe debate, the EPP was 
one of the most coherent actors in contributing to the debate.
The S&D, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, was the second 
largest group during the 2014–19 legislature and the only group to have members from 
all 28 MSs. Centre-left in orientation, the group is constituted of social democrats and, 
unlike the EPP, the group is relatively cohesive on the pro/anti-integration debate 
(Cicchi, 2017). As with the EPP, the S&D has a strong and cohesive structure which 
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ensures party group coherency and the group was one of the principle contributors 
to the debate on the Future of Europe.
The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) emerged in 2009 after the 
British Conservatives left the EPP-ED. It represented parties from 18 EU countries 
in the 2014–19 legislature, and was primarily a northern European group with some 
isolated members from the Balkans (Corbett et al., 2016). Primarily on the centre-
right, the group is considered anti-integration based on the concept of eurorealism 
and the need to reform the EU. Its largest members were the British conservatives 
and the Polish Law and Justice Party.
The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) is one of the oldest 
groups and had membership from 20 EU countries in the 2014–19 legislature. This 
liberal-centrist group is consistently pro-integration with strong support for the 
single market (Corbett et al., 2016). As with the EPP and S&D, the group has a strong 
infrastructure for ensuring group cohesion, and is often a key player in EP politics as 
its votes can swing left or right which enables it to cooperate with both the EPP and 
S&D on determining voting outcomes in the Parliament (Cicchi, 2017).
The European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) represents the 
amalgamation of former communists with Nordic Green parties. Fourteen countries 
were represented in this group from 2014–19. Primarily socialist and communist 
in orientation, with a strong opposition to the political structure of the Union, it is 
not considered primarily anti-integration but more opposed to the Union’s political 
system (Corbett et al., 2016). For this reason and the fact that the group is confederal, 
the constituent members are guided by their national parties and this can lead to 
members voting differently on issues though the group meets regularly to prepare 
for parliamentary business (Cicchi, 2017).
The G-EFA (Greens-European Free Alliance) had members from 18 MSs in the 
2014–19 legislature and comprised three distinct parties, namely the European Green 
party, the European Free Alliance and the European Pirate Party (Corbett et al., 2016). 
Primarily constituted of parties representing stateless nations, regionalists and 
minority political interests, the group is situated on the left of the spectrum. Due to 
the diversity of its members, party cohesion is more challenging, and members are 
not expected to vote consistently as a group but tend to vote in the context of their 
party families.
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) had parties from seven countries 
with its largest constituent members being UKIP. The group was a loose alliance 
of hard Eurosceptics and there was little group coherence in the 2014–19 legislature. 
From 2014 the group was beset with defections, in particular a failed attempt by the 
Five Star Movement to join ALDE. As with most right-wing, Eurosceptic parties in 
the EP, there is little that unites the constituent members other than their dislike of 
the EU as seen by the Five Star Movement which is anti-EU but which is difficult 
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to place on the political spectrum having right-wing policies (such as being anti-
migrant) coupled with left wing, green policies.
The final group in the EP during the 2014–19 legislature, the Europe of Nations 
and Freedom (ENF) had parties from eight countries and was the smallest EP group 
in the 2014–19 legislature with its largest constituent member being the French 
National Rally (formerly known as the National Front) but the group also included 
the Austrian Freedom Party and Italy’s Northern League. Right-wing, anti-EU and 
largely anti-migrant, the group was a loose party group with little coherency amongst 
members (Corbett et al., 2016).
Finally, the EP has always included members who do not wish to be affiliated with 
a group or who are not welcome in the established groups. These members are non-
attached or non-inscrits (NI) and represent a range of political beliefs, though the 
2014–19 legislature batch of NIs were largely far-right politicians. They have always 
had limited ability to influence the EP and play an insignificant role in EU politics.
As can be seen from this discussion, the groups range from left to right on the 
political spectrum, in addition to differing in terms of their strength, organisational 
structures and group cohesion. In this way, the willingness and ability of groups to 
engage with the Future of Europe debate was not uniform as we will see in the next 
section. It should also be stated that the debate took place in a specific context with the 
Parliament providing leadership but many looking to the Commission to structure 
the way forward with specific proposals. The Commission and the Parliament do not 
always have a smooth relationship (Ross, 2011). The former is beholden to the latter 
as it is the EP’s job to ensure accountability while the Commission can at times baulk 
at the Parliament’s interference. That said, the two institutions share a common, 
political bond; the Commission is composed of politicians from the mainstream 
parties and the political groups that dominate the Parliament (S&D, ALDE and 
EPP) are still the same parties that dominate the College of Commissioners. In fact, 
during its 60-year history, the presidency of the Commission has switched between 
the socialists, liberals and Christian Democrats; reflective of their dominance of the 
political landscape of most EU Member States. In this way, the dynamics between 
the College of Commissioners and the main party groups within the EP, especially 
the link between the then President of the Commission (Jean-Claude Juncker) and 
the EPP group within the EP, also implied that there would be a greater willingness 
for the S&D, ALDE and EPP to engage with the Commission’s debate on the Future 
of Europe. Therefore, it was to be expected that the mainstream parties within the EP 
would play the principle role in the debate on the Future of Europe, and that it would 
be these parties, in conjunction with their fellow politicians within the College of 
Commissioners, who would establish the way forward.
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The Future of Europe debate in Bratislava, Brussels and Strasbourg
The Union has periodically discussed the future of Europe in the last three decades 
as it reacted to unfavourable developments including declining turnout for EP 
elections right up to 2014, the rise of Eurosceptic politics in the 1990s, and the 
rejection of various EU treaties by the electorate in Denmark, Ireland and France, as 
well as in reaction to more favourable developments such as the Union’s impending 
enlargement in 2004. However, much of these discussions remained open-ended, 
and where substantive action was taken, as with the Adonnino Committee in 1985 or 
the Convention on the Future of Europe from 2001–03, the guiding principle seemed 
to be the precept of ‘more Europe’. It was the decision of the British people to vote 
against EU membership in June 2016 that brought the urgency for a discussion to a 
head with the EU-27 issuing the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap in September 
2016. Focused on a commitment to the Union and a wish to ensure that the EU 
works for all its citizens, the declaration clearly stated that ‘although one country has 
decided to leave, the EU remains indispensable for the rest of us… We are determined 
to make a success of the EU with 27 member states’ (European Council 2016). While 
the declaration was an opportunity to show a united front, some noted that the EP 
was conspicuous in its omission from the declaration; the Visegrad Four issued their 
own statement wanting greater involvement for national parliaments in EU affairs 
while the then Italian PM, Matteo Renzi, declared that the summit was a waste of 
time (Zalan, 2016). Subsequently, the 27 re-affirmed their commitment to the Union 
on the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, and laid out a union integrating at 
different speeds while still moving in the same direction. Then, in March 2017, the 
European Commission issued its White Paper on the future of Europe and outlined 
five scenarios which have been summarised as:
1. Continuing on the same path
2. Focusing on the Single Market
3. Variable integration with some moving forward quicker than others
4. Doing less but working more effectively in those areas
5. More Europe
The White Paper has been complemented by a series of Citizens’ Dialogues across 
the Union as well as periodic updates through the Commission President’s State of 
the Union addresses to Parliament.
In terms of the European Parliament, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote the EP had 
approved a resolution in June 2016, which re-affirmed the MEPs’ commitment to the 
Union but calling for the need to relaunch the European project and to reflect on the 
future of Europe. At the core of that resolution was the need to make the Union more 
democratic while recognising that MSs would need to integrate at different speeds 
and that this would need the revision of the treaties. Ultimately, the EP called for a 
road map for a better union, based on exploiting the Lisbon Treaty to the full. The 
EP’s contribution to the debate can be differentiated into three principal initiatives, 
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the first being a series of resolutions issued in February 2017 in reaction to the debate 
instigated by the Brexit vote, the second being the plenary discussion following the 
publication of the Commission’s White Paper with the third being a series of debates 
on the Future of Europe held in the Parliament’s plenary where Heads of State or 
Government were invited to give their vision of the future, stretching from January 
2018 to the EP elections of 2019 and involving 18 leaders.
Resolutions on the Future of Europe
In the context of the Brexit vote as well as the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, 
the EP adopted three resolutions in February 2017 outlining how they thought the EU 
could be reformed to increase people’s trust, thus representing the most substantive 
contribution by the EP to the debate. The first report, compiled by Mercedes Bresso 
(S&D, Italy) and Elmar Brok (EPP, German), outlined what improvements could be 
made to the existing system (European Parliament, 2017a). The recommendations 
(some of which were to be repeated in the other resolutions) included:
1. Ending Europe a la carte: in particular by reaffirming the use of the Union method 
(formerly referred to as the Community method) over intergovernmental 
decision making in the Council; making enhanced cooperation less restrictive; 
and reducing the practice of opt-outs.
2. New economic governance for economic growth, social cohesion and financial 
stability: including the adoption of a convergence code (in addition to the 
Stability and Growth Pact) which would set converging targets for taxation, 
labour market, investment, productivity, social cohesion, public administration 
and good governance capacities; equal ranking for social rights and economic 
freedom for a comprehensive EMU; incorporation of the fiscal compact into 
the EU legal framework; a fiscal capacity for the euro area based on genuine 
own resources and a European treasury equipped with the ability to borrow; 
the creation of an EU Finance Minister (responsible for the operation of the 
EMS); the enabling of the EMS to act as first lender of last resort for financial 
institutions under the ECB’s supervision; ensuring the European Central Bank 
enjoys the full powers of a federal reserve; completion of the banking union 
and the capital markets union; as well as the lifting of the requirement of 
unanimity for decision-making on certain tax practices.
3. New Challenges: recognising the need for a genuine European energy union; an 
EU migration system synergised with foreign aid and the EU’s foreign policy; 
the upgrade of the EU’s capacity to fight terrorism and international organised 
crime; as well as action to ensure that security become a shared competence 
and not an exclusive competence of the member states.
4. Strengthening EU foreign policy: the High Representative to be named EU 
Foreign Minister and to become the main external representative of the Union 
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in international fora, as well as being able to appoint deputies; creating a 
European Intelligence Office to support the CFSP.
5. Safeguarding fundamental rights: in particular by giving the Commission 
the power to take ‘systematic infringement action’ against member states that 
violate fundamental values; converting the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
into a Bill of Rights of the Union, and extending the right of legal persons to 
bring cases before the ECJ for alleged violations of the Charter; the introduction 
of provisions for referenda at the EU level on matters relevant to the Union’s 
actions and policies.
6. More democracy, transparency and accountability: including the transformation 
of the Commission into the principle executive authority or government of the 
Union; reducing the size of the College and having only two vice-presidents 
(namely the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister); allowing citizens to 
be able to vote in all elections of the country where they are living; establishing 
a single seat for the EP; transforming the Council configurations and the 
European Council into a Council of States; removing the rotating six-month 
presidencies in the Council of the EU and replacing them with permanent 
chairs; having a single legislative council and turning specialised councils 
into just preparatory bodies; creating an additional council for the eurogroup 
with legislative and control functions; removing the consultation procedure 
and applying the OLP to all matters (where feasible) while also removing 
unanimity from voting in the Council in areas such as defence and social 
policy; introducing a green card procedure in the national parliaments’ early 
warning mechanism whereby national parliaments could submit legislative 
proposals to the Council; giving Council and the EP the right of legislative 
initiative; reinforcing the EP’s right of inquiry powers and; introducing QMV 
in terms of the budget and own resources as well as in the decision-making 
procedure of the Multiannual Financial Framework. Finally, the resolution 
called for the extension of the EP’s scrutiny powers to the whole EU budget as 
well as making treaty ratification less rigid by allowing amendments to enter 
into force if approved by an EU referendum or by 4/5 of the member states. 
(European Parliament, 2017a)
The resolution was approved by 329 votes to 223 with 83 MEPs abstaining (European 
Parliament 2017b). An analysis of the roll call shows that a significant number of 
MEPs from EPP, S&D, ALDE and G/EFA voted in favour. A small number of EPP, 
S&D, ALDE and G/EFA voted against with a significant number of ECR, GUE/NGL, 
ENF and NI opposing as well as a number of EFDD members. There were a number 
of EPP, S&D, ALDE and G/EFA who abstained, as did isolated members of the ECR, 
GUE/NGL and EFDD (European Parliament 2017b).
In terms of the second resolution by Guy Verhofstadt (ALDE, Belgium) the remit 
was more ambitious and geared toward treaty reforms (European Parliament, 2017c). 
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Many of the recommendations were identical to those listed in the first resolution 
but others necessitated treaty change and included
1. The consolidation of parliamentary scrutiny of national governments and the 
exchange of best practice; the reduction of the Council configurations with a 
single legislative council meeting in public; equality between the EP and Council 
on the appointment of members of the Court of Auditors; greater parliamentary 
involvement in the management of EU agencies; the reduction in the duration 
of the MFF so as to be in alignment with the EP and Commission’s term; 
completion of the banking union based on a single supervision mechanism 
as well as a single resolution mechanism and a European deposit insurance 
scheme; establishment of a true capital markets union; the establishment of 
a social Europe and a new social pact; establishment of an EU white book on 
security and defence on the basis of the EU global strategy; the creation of a 
permanent civilian and military headquarters; as well as the appointment of a 
European Public Prosecutor. (European Parliament 2017c).
The resolution was approved by 283 votes in favour, 269 votes against and 83 
abstentions (European Parliament 2017b). An analysis of the roll call shows that a 
large majority of S&D, ALDE and G/EFA voted in favour as well as a majority of the 
EPP. Votes against included the majority of the ECR, GUE/NGL, EFDD and ENF with 
some ALDE members also voting against, a large number of NI, some S&D, some G/
EFA and a large minority of the EPP members. Abstaining we had a large number of 
EPP and S&D members and isolated members of ECR, ALDE, GUE/NGL and G/FRA 
(European Parliament, 2017b).
The final resolution was compiled by Reimer Boge (EPP, Germany) and Pervenche 
Beres (S&D) and focused on the lack of convergence in the Euro area and called for 
further integration (European Parliament, 2017d). The resolution reiterated many of 
the recommendations made in the first resolution in terms of the Euro, and called 
for a fiscal capacity consisting of the EMS and additional and specific budgetary 
capacity for the Eurozone which would be funded by its members as part of the 
EU budget. The resolution also called for the development of the EMS to become a 
European Monetary Fund with a mandate to absorb economic shocks, a convergence 
code which would include taxation, as well as a greater role for the EP and national 
parliaments in governance of the Eurozone (European Parliament, 2017d). The report 
was approved by 304 votes in favour, 255 votes against and 68 abstentions (European 
Parliament, 2017b). Of the votes in favour, a significant number of S&D, ALDE and G/
EFA MEPs voted in favour as well as a large number of EPP MEPs. While there were 
some isolated members of S&D, ALDE and G/EFA voting against, a large number of 
the EPP rejected the resolution while a significant number of the ECR, GUE/NGL, 
EFDD, ENF and the NI voted against. Of those abstaining, a large number were from 
the EPP with some members of S&D, ECR and ALDE (European Parliament, 2017b).
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It is clear from the three resolutions that the majority of MEPs were in favour of the 
concept of ‘more Europe’; more in terms of designating new areas for EU competence, 
such as defence and taxation, more power for those areas where the EU already had 
competence, as with the single currency, a simplified institutional structure with 
a distinct federal slant which saw greater powers for the European Parliament, a 
diminished role for the MSs by restricting their veto power (as well as the creation 
of the concept of European referendums) while also pushing for the Commission’s 
recognition as the Union’s government with the Council and the EP as the Union’s 
legislative branch. Not surprisingly, this distinct federal orientation gained the 
principal support from the left-wing groups within parliament, in particular the 
S&D and G/EFA while ALDE and the EPP showed marked support. Not surprisingly, 
nearly all the other groups heavily opposed the resolutions which called for more 
Europe but also a large number of EPP members were unhappy with them and voted 
against, in particular the second resolution which was drafted by one of the EP’s most 
ardent federalists, ALDE’s Guy Verhofstadt. Ultimately the EPP is less cohesive on the 
pro/anti-integration question, and several constituent parties, such as FIDESZ, are 
against further integration and opposed all three resolutions as did the all Maltese 
MEPs who all voted against, irrespective of political orientation. It was clear therefore 
that, in discussing the Future of the Union, that the mainstream groups were largely 
in favour of ‘more Europe’ while the peripheral groups were heavily opposed, both 
left and right.
Plenary Debate on the Commission’s White Paper
The Commission published its White Paper on the Future of Europe on 1 March 2017, 
with Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker addressing the EP plenary on the 
same day. From the initial reaction within the EP, a clear division was seen with some 
welcoming the five scenarios outlined by the Commission while others preferred 
one clear plan and bemoaned the lack of concrete examples: ‘you are playing into 
the hands of all those who want to weaken the European Union or even get rid of it’ 
(S&D Leader Gianni Pittella) (European Parliament, 2017e). Further afield there were 
calls for the Union to do less but do things more efficiently (Ulrike Trebesius of the 
ECR) while Patrick Le Hyaric (GUE) advocated a new scenario, a bottom-up political 
system where the people could be represented better (European Parliament, 2017e). 
More negatively, Vicky Maeijie (ENF) noted ‘we in the Netherlands said no to the 
European constitution, no to the trade agreement with Ukraine, and it is time we 
said no to Europe’ (European Parliament, 2017e).
In statements issued during and after the plenary, the EPP was the most positive: 
‘President Juncker’s White Paper on the Future of Europe also comes at the right 
moment for the European centre-right. The EPP stands committed to participate 
in this reflection process, ready with its own initiatives to make Europe better for its 
people… Separating banks from states to ensure that never again taxpayers’ money 
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be used to rescue banks, as we proposed in our paper on the future of the Economic 
and Monetary Union; or creating a true European defence force to maintain peace, 
not to make war’ (European People’s Party, 2017a). The S&D reiterated the need for 
a strong social pillar, a European fiscal capacity, a completed monetary union and a 
sustainable Europe which would be able to fight climate change and create jobs and 
growth. They also highlighted the need for efforts to combat tax fraud and the need 
for a European army, a clear call for ‘more Europe’ (Socialists and Democrats, 2017). A 
similar message came from ALDE with the group leader, Guy Verhofstadt, calling for 
EU MSs not to use unanimity voting to block vital efforts to move the Union forward.
From the other groups the tone was less welcoming. The ECR spoke about the need 
for the Union to focus on fewer policies and to become more efficient in those areas 
with greater focus on fighting terrorism and ensuring border security (European 
Parliament, 2017e). Further afield, the EFDD MEP Gerard Batten placed the blame 
of the EU’s problems on the EU. As with the resolutions issued in February 2017, the 
core group of the EPP, S&D and ALDE were in favour of the need for more Europe 
while the other parties were against or, at most, in favour of a Europe doing less 
(ECR) or a reconfigured Europe with more decentralised decision-making (GUE/
NGL) (European Parliament, 2017e).
In September the Commission President delivered his annual State of the Union 
address to Parliament where the five scenarios were to be solidified into a single 
proposal. The speech culminated in Juncker’s sixth proposal, a Union of Values 
(European Commission, 2017). At the core of this proposal was the concept of three 
fundamentals: namely freedom (of expression), equality (of countries, of workers, of 
consumers) and rule of law (and upholding the decisions of European and national 
courts). Based on this, Juncker called for a more united, stronger and democratic 
Union, for all members to join Schengen and adopt the Euro, to enter the banking 
union and for all members to agree on the European pillar of social rights. Juncker 
also called for more use of QMV in the Council, for unanimity to be stripped for 
several sensitive areas like taxation and the creation of a European Minister of 
Economy and Finance. Ultimately, Juncker’s final proposal argued for more Europe, 
more integration with more centralised power. As had always been the case, the EU 
reacted to declining support for the Union amongst its population by calling for 
more power, not less, with the ultimate recommendation being the amalgamation 
of Commission and European Council presidencies; ‘Europe would be easier to 
understand if one captain was steering the ship’ (European Commission, 2017). Many 
of these proposals had already been part of the EP’s initial response to the debate and, 
if anything, the Commission’s proposal was a less ambitious version of the EP groups’ 
own recommendations as laid down in February 2017.
As with the initial response to the original White Paper, feedback to the State 
of the Union address could be differentiated into the feedback provided by the 
mainstream party groups which largely backed the concept of more Europe and 
the peripheral party groups which opposed. The EPP applauded Juncker for placing 
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European citizens at the heart of Europe’s future, called for a European defence and 
security union as well as a Common European Asylum System, the strengthening 
of the social dimension of the Union, and reaffirmed its support for the EP’s role 
in the selection of the Commission President (European People’s Party, 2017b). 
Gianni Pittella (S&D) dismissed the scenarios, called for Juncker to be courageous 
but also attacked the European Council which ‘undermines the decisions taken by 
the European Commission and Parliament’ (Socialists and Democrats, 2017). Further 
afield, ECR co-chair, Ryszard Legutko, stated that his group ‘rejected the federalist 
ambitions contained throughout the speech’ and that ‘Mr Juncker has suggested 
there has been a debate on the Future of Europe… but we already know it. It will be 
the same old, ‘more Europe, more Europe’’ (European Conservatives and Reformists, 
2017). These sentiments were echoed by Nigel Farage of the EFDD who went on to 
state ‘the way you’re treating Hungary and Poland already must remind them of 
living under the Soviet communists when you attempt to tell them how they should 
run their own countries. All I can say is thank god we’re leaving’ (Europe of Freedom 
and Direct Democracy, 2017). Later that year the ENF, in reaction to the Commission’s 
plans for the Eurozone, stated that it ‘rejects this plan which is a way to increase the 
Commission’s influence… whereas citizens of many EU countries have increasingly 
been voting for parties calling for a modest EU and a greater subsidiarity, M Juncker 
follows the opposite path and initiates a new step towards a federal European 
government’ (Europe of Nations and Freedom, 2017).
Heads of State or Government Debates
Finally, within the context of the debate on the Future of Europe, the EP took the 
decision to host a series of high-profile debates on the Future of Europe running 
through 2018 until the 2019 European elections. On the invitation of the EP President, 
European Heads of State or Government addressed the EP’s plenary on the future 
of Europe. In sequence, the leaders of Ireland, Croatia, Portugal, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Poland addressed the EP in 2018 followed by 
Greece, Estonia, Romania, Germany, Denmark, Cyprus, Spain, Finland, Italy and 
Slovakia in 2019. It is not the aim of this article to go into detail on this initiative, 
the stated positions not being of direct correlation with the position of the political 
groups within the EP. However, in terms of the reaction of the plenary to the speeches 
given, it was not surprising to see a general division based on the mainstream parties 
and those on the periphery, as highlighted in the previous section. Throughout the 
session, speeches made by the EPP, S&D and ALDE were consistently pro-integration, 
often lauding the success achieved by countries such as Ireland, calling for greater 
leadership from countries like The Netherlands, and effectively calling for more 
Europe. Outside these groups the message was less supportive from the ECR, while 
the EFDD and ENF on the right and the GUE/NGL on the left were overwhelmingly 
critical of the EU and the pro-EU stance taken by many leaders.
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Against the backdrop of the speeches by the Heads of State or Government and 
a year after the publication of the original resolutions, the EP adopted a resolution 
on the state of the debate (European Parliament, 2019). The resolution reiterated 
differentiated integration as a way forward, bemoaned the imbalance between the 
main institutions which had benefited the European Council, and called for the 
right of legislative initiative to be given to the Parliament. In terms of policy, the 
principal concern was for more to be done on migration, defence and respect for the 
Union’s values (European Parliament, 2019). The resolution was passed by 407 votes 
to 196 with 41 abstentions.
Conclusion: The View from Strasbourg on the Future of Europe
After three years of debate, it is clear that the groups in parliament during the 2014–
19 legislature could be differentiated on the future of Europe between those groups 
advocating for more Europe, primarily the mainstream parties (EPP, S&D, ALDE and 
the G/EFA) and those groups calling for less Europe (ECR) or a new political system 
for Europe (GUE/NGL) or wanting to halt the integration process completely (EFDD 
and ENF as well as a large number of NI). On the left side of the political spectrum, 
the call for more Europe included a call for more bottom-up decision making, more 
inclusive policy making, and a more social and environmentally friendly Europe (G/
EFA). On the centre-left, centre and centre-right, the call was stronger for a Europe 
doing more on defence, asylum and to guarantee the single currency while creating 
a stronger social pillar to the Union. Unsurprisingly, the mainstream parties called 
for a more federal Europe, and one where the parliament was placed on equal 
footing with the member states in Council. Many of the recommendations made 
in 2017 were incorporated into the Commission’s vision for the Future of the Union. 
Unsurprisingly, considering that the College of Commissioners is constituted of EPP, 
S&D and ALDE politicians, both the Commission and the EP were often singing 
from the same hymn sheet. From Strasbourg to Brussels, the message was clear, at 
least amongst the mainstream parties, namely more Europe and a more federal 
Europe. Beyond these mainstream parties, the message was less supportive with the 
left wing GUE/NGL questioning the logic behind the idea of ‘more Europe’ with 
Altierio Spinelli’s daughter, MEP Barbara Spinelli, saying ‘the proposals lack any 
critical analysis of the responsibilities of the EU and of the inadequate policies that 
have been adopted so far. Hence, the proposed solutions follow the same line: a mere 
institutional reshaping of the status quo’ (European United Left – Nordic Green Left, 
2017).
Therefore, the view from Strasbourg during the 2014–19 legislature was largely of 
an institution calling for more Europe and a more federal Europe. In May 2019, EU 
citizens went to the polls to elect a new European Parliament. The election was of 
note for reversing years of decline in turnout with over 50% of the eligible voters 
participating. The outcome will have important consequences for legislative politics 
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within the EP but may have less of an impact on the future of Europe debate. Both 
the EPP and S&D saw a decline in their seats with a significant increase for ALDE 
(renamed ‘Renew Europe’) and the Greens/EFA. Identity and Democracy (ID) (the 
successor party group to the Europe of Nations and Freedom group) jumped the ECR 
to become the fifth biggest group while GUE/NGL became the smallest group. Many 
of the former members of Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy are now listed as 
NIs, including the Five Star Movement and the Brexit party, the largest party in the 
EP. Much has been said about the legislative balance between the EPP, S&D, Renew 
Europe and the G/EFA; the shift in balance between these parties will impact the 
chamber’s voting on key issues as the left/right balance has become more nuanced. 
However, the overall balance between the pro-and anti-integration parties within 
the EP remains relatively unaltered. While there has been an increase in MEPs on 
the right/far-right (ECR, ID, NI) and a decline on the far-left (the GUE/NGL), that 
increase has been marginal, it does not threaten the ability of the mainstream parties 
to control the chamber and many of the anti-integrationists now sit as NIs, and are 
therefore denied many of the advantages of being recognised as a party group. If 
anything can be predicted in terms of the EP’s support for the future of Europe debate 
as it enters its ninth legislature is that it was often G/EFA, S&D and ALDE supporting 
more Europe with the EPP showing a majority of its members in favour. With an 
increase in ALDE (Renew Europe) and G/EFA and a decline in the EPP, it does not 
seem that the balance in favour of ‘more Europe’ has been dented and we can expect 
much of the same rhetoric heard during 2014–19 to be repeated in Strasbourg during 
the ninth legislature.
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Chapter Five
The EU’s Role in the World Trading System
Richard W.T. Pomfret
Abstract
4 Although the name European Union was only formally adopted in the 1993 Maastricht 
Treaty, I will use EU for predecessor organizations.
This chapter focuses on the evolution of the EU’s external trade policy, especially 
since the adoption of the Trade for All strategy in 2015, and in the context of long-
term trends (GVCs, new technologies in trade) and significant internal (Brexit) and 
external (Trump) shocks.
Introduction
The founding documents of the European Union, the 1957 Rome Treaties, envisaged 
a simple customs union with internal free trade and a common commercial policy 
towards non-members. The external trade policy was soon adjusted to favour 
preferred trading partners as Association Agreements (AA) were signed with Greece 
in 1961 and with Turkey in 1963, and preferential treatment was granted to former 
colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). By the 1970s, the Community 
had a complex pyramid of trade preferences that left only seven countries facing the 
most-favoured nation tariff that was supposed to apply equally to all partners who 
had signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Before 1990 EU trade policy was used for foreign policy purposes (to favour preferred 
partners) and in response to domestic policy pressures (to support farmers and other 
producers facing import competition).4 A crucial turning point was the 1990 meeting 
of trade ministers in Montréal, where the Uruguay Round of GATT multilateral trade 
negotiations was in danger of collapse. The grand rescue bargain between the major 
trading nations included agreement by the Europeans to drastically reform the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and to phase out one-way preferential treatment 
of trade partners. Successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round was followed by 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, strengthening the 
liberal international trading system.
In the twenty-first century, the EU has been in search of a new approach to trade 
policy. The Trade for All strategy published in 2015 confirmed abandonment of using 
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trade policy as foreign policy and that the goal is to open the EU to trade in support 
of participation in global value chains. Given the difficulty of progressing reform of 
world trade law through the WTO to address new issues, the EU has embarked on a 
series of deep trade agreements with like-minded countries – South Korea, Canada, 
Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The list could have included the USA, but after the 
2016 election President Trump terminated negotiations.
As the USA withdrew from its leadership position in promoting the liberal 
multilateral trading system, the EU acknowledged that it has to become more 
proactive. This may be not without internal tensions, as several member countries 
have strong illiberal political parties. However, especially in Eastern Europe, there is 
recognition that a positive economic development since the end of central planning 
has been the ability to participate in global value chains; this is especially true of 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, and most obviously in the car 
industry.
5 The GATT was signed in 1947 and subsumed by the WTO in 1995. Steel and cars were 
also frequent exceptions from GATT rules, e.g. Italy signed an agreement with Japan to 
limit each country’s annual automobile imports from the other to a few thousand units 
(Pomfret, 2001, 119n).
The Pyramid of Preferences
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established a customs union among the six signatories. 
The project was supported by the USA, primarily on political grounds in the Cold 
War context of constructing a stronger western European economy bolstered by 
economic cooperation. Potential U.S. opposition to a protected European market 
was pre-empted by EU participation in the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations leading to substantial cuts to the common external tariff as the 
customs union was being implemented. Major exclusions from the external tariff 
reductions were agriculture and textiles and clothing, both of which were outside 
the multilateral trade liberalization during the GATT era.5 A second problem for the 
global system was the treatment of former colonies; pre-existing imperial preferences 
were grandfathered in the GATT as an exception to the general requirement for non-
discriminatory treatment of trade partners (Pomfret, 2001).
Two years after the Rome Treaty, seven countries (Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK) formed the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) with an alternative vision of a free trade area without supranational 
institutions or a common external trade policy. In this setting of bloc competition, 
the Six customs union countries signed association agreements with Greece (1961) 
and Turkey (1963), while Finland became an associate member of EFTA in 1961. The 
bloc competition ended quickly in favour of the customs union as the UK applied 
for membership in the EU, unsuccessfully in 1961 and 1967 and successfully in 1972. 
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When the UK, Denmark and Ireland joined the EU in 1973, the remaining EFTA 
members became part of a free trade area in manufactures with the EU.
The EU of the 1960s and 1970s had no instruments for a common foreign policy and 
used trade policy to strengthen external ties. Apart from free trade in manufactures 
with the EFTA countries, and the Yaoundé (and later Lomé) Convention providing 
special treatment to ex-colonies in ACP countries, preferential relations were 
extended to all Mediterranean countries, not just Greece and Turkey, and these were 
consolidated into a Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972 (Pomfret, 1986). After 1971 
developing countries benefitted from preferential tariff rates under the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) scheme, although these were not as generous as the 
Yaoundé terms. The consequence was that the most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff, 
which supposedly applied to imports from all GATT signatories, only applied to 
seven trading partners in the 1970s (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South 
Korea, Taiwan and the USA). The Communist non-market economies had worse 
than MFN treatment.
The operation of preferential treatment caused problems as partners worried 
more about being treated worse than their competitors than being grateful for 
receiving better than MFN treatment (Pomfret, 2001, 129–35). Moreover, the value of 
preferential tariffs was eroded by reductions in the common external tariff agreed by 
the European Communities in successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations; 
when the preference margin became small, it might not be worth the bureaucratic 
hassle of claiming preferential treatment.
A second source of tension with non-member countries was the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) which was created in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the 
aim of maintaining both farmers’ incomes and the principle of free trade within 
the common market. The CAP took longer to complete than the customs union in 
manufactures, which had been established by 1968, and the CAP required annual 
bargaining over the common price for every farm product. The mechanism of 
price support varied from product to product (e.g. because of different degrees 
of perishability) but the general procedure was for EC Ministers to agree on an 
intervention price at which the product would be purchased from farmers; imports 
were subject to a variable levy to cover the gap between the world price and the 
intervention price, so that domestic farmers could never be undersold by imports. Due 
to the political influence of farmers and ministries of agriculture, the intervention 
price tended to favour farmers’ interests over consumers’ interests and became 
associated with excess supply leading to increasing stocks (popularly given names 
such as the butter mountain or the wine lake). In order to dispose of the surplus, the 
EU offered export subsidies to be paid from the Community budget.
When world prices of agricultural goods were high (as in early and mid-1970s), the 
CAP was relatively inexpensive. When world prices fell but CAP intervention prices 
did not, the cost of price support and stock maintenance increased. The end of the 
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Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in 1973 caused added complications as 
relative national prices changed daily. To smooth out fluctuations in consumer prices 
and farm incomes, CAP prices were modified by a system of green exchange rates; 
differences between green and market exchange rates were funded by monetary 
compensation amounts paid from the Community budget. By the late 1970s, the 
CAP was eating up three quarters of the Community budget, but farmers’ opposition 
stymied effective reform.
The period from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s were difficult for the EU amidst 
global recession and stagflation, and the failure of a first attempt at monetary union. 
The EU faced budget crises, largely due to the domination of expenditure by the CAP; 
in the early 1980s, the UK demanded a rebate because it was paying in less than it was 
receiving, a situation that reflected the UK’s relatively small agricultural sector. In 
the face of competition from Japan and newly industrializing Asian economies, EU 
members introduced national protection measures (e.g. sales of Japanese cars were 
limited to 3% of the market in France) which required border controls within the 
customs union to prevent trade deflection via less restricted markets (e.g. importing 
Japanese cars into Denmark for sale to French customers).
After the end of military dictatorships in 1974–5, Greece, Portugal and Spain applied 
for membership. Greece joined in 1981 – more or less on schedule twenty years after 
the Association Agreement – and Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. The countries 
remaining in the “Global” Mediterranean Policy now faced restrictions on their farm 
exports as competing countries were inside the CAP. For Turkey, the demotion in the 
hierarchy was clearest as Greece moved from Associate status roughly similar to that 
of Turkey to full membership, and five years later Spain and Portugal moved from 
lower in the Pyramid of Preferences to unrestricted participation in the internal 
market.
The EU’s response to the challenges of the early 1980s was influenced by an 
important case in 1979, when the European Court ruled that a German ban on sales of 
a French liqueur (Cassis de Dijon) was illegal. In Germany the liqueur was too strong 
to qualify as a wine and too weak to be sold as a spirit, but the Court ruled that such 
regulations were invalid; if a good could be legally sold in one part of the common 
market, then it could be legally sold throughout the market. This case highlighted 
that removal of tariffs was only an initial step in creating a single market; either the 
mutual recognition principle had to be accepted or regulations had to be harmonized.
The European Commission embarked on a program to complete the single market 
by 1992. This was to be achieved by reducing non-tariff barriers to trade through 
mutual recognition and harmonization, by promoting free movement of goods, 
people, capital and services, and by institutional reform (qualified majority voting in 
most areas). Although a separate initiative by a subset of members, the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement further facilitated trade by creating a border-free area; in the 1990s it 
100
would become part of the acquis communautaire required of new members.6 The 
1992 program would be codified in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, when the European 
Communities would be renamed the European Union.
6 The original Schengen Agreement was separate from the EU due to lack of consensus over 
whether the EU had the jurisdiction to abolish border controls. In 1990, the Agreement 
was supplemented by the Schengen Convention which proposed the abolition of internal 
border controls and common rules on visas, and police and judicial cooperation. In the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty the Schengen arrangements were incorporated into EU law, with 
opt outs only for Ireland and the UK.
1990
Before 1990 trade policy was used for foreign policy purposes and in response to 
domestic policy pressures. The EU participated in GATT negotiations to reduce tariffs, 
that incidentally led to erosion of preferential treatment, and individual EU members 
introduced new trade barriers, especially against Japan and newly industrializing 
Asian exporters. The 1986 Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations aimed 
to further global trade liberalization in the face of these and other challenges. By 1990, 
however, the negotiations were in danger of collapse as no major trading nation was 
willing to move first in dismantling protectionist or discriminatory trade barriers.
A crucial turning point was the 1990 GATT ministerial meeting in Montréal where 
the “Quad” of major trading nations (the USA, the European Communities, Japan 
and Canada) agreed on a deal to complete the Uruguay Round of negotiations and 
create the WTO. The bargain included commitments by the EU to drastically reform 
the common agricultural policy and to phase out one-way preferential treatment of 
trade partners. Both commitments have been met, although it took several years into 
the 2000s before they were essentially fulfilled.
Since 1995, the EU has aimed at pre-emptive reforms to make the common 
agricultural policy WTO-compatible. Twenty-first century European agricultural 
policy aims for a competitive agricultural sector, that is “greener, more trade-friendly, 
and more consumer-oriented”. CAP spending in euros continued to increase until 
2013, but CAP spending as a share of EU GDP has fallen since 1993 (Figure 1). The 
CAP link with production has been largely broken since 2006; spending on export 
subsidies, other market support and subsidies coupled to output levels has fallen to 
0.1% of EU GDP, and export subsidies have been abolished since 2010. Since 2010 CAP 
spending has been overwhelmingly for rural development or as income support to 
farmers that is decoupled from output levels.
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FIGURE 1: CAP Spending 1990 to 2020
Source: European Commission (2016)
The 1990s were a decade of deeper European integration amidst economic challenges. 
The EC92 program was successful, with completion of the integrated internal 
market and an end to national trade policies. The commitment to shift the CAP 
from price support to non-trade-distortionary direct payments was begun with the 
1992 MacSharry Reforms and essentially completed by 2005. Restrictions on capital 
and labour mobility were eliminated, although mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications was incomplete. German reunification led to incorporation of the 
former German Democratic Republic into the EU, and financing of reunification 
triggered an exchange rate crisis in 1992 that cleared the way for monetary union as 
most members agreed to adopt the euro.7 The collapse of the USSR in December 1991 
opened up the prospect of “neutral” Austria, Sweden and Finland joining the EU in 
1995, and of further eastern expansion.
7 The UK, Denmark and Sweden opted out from the euro when it was introduced between 
1998 and 2002. All future EU members would be required to adopt the euro, although the 
transition period is turning out to be long for Hungary, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.
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The EU Global Strategy
In the twenty-first century the EU has been in search of a new approach to trade 
policy. The Trade for All strategy published in 2015 confirmed abandonment of 
using trade policy as foreign policy and affirmed the goal of opening the EU to trade 
in support of participation in global value chains (Box 2.1). Given the difficulty of 
progressing reform of world trade law through the WTO to address new issues, the 
EU has embarked on a series of deep trade agreements with like-minded countries – 
South Korea, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The list could have included 
the USA, but after the 2016 U.S. election President Trump terminated negotiation of 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
Source: European Commission (2015).
Global value chains (GVCs) have become a major feature of the global economy 
as specialization is broken down into tasks (Baldwin, 2017). The process started by 
offshoring labour-intensive activities such as sewing (e.g. Wrangler jeans in Malta 
in the 1970s and 1980s) and in the 1970s the Ford Fiesta was assembled in Spain. 
By the late 1990s, GVCs became recognized as a global phenomenon, especially in 
electronics, cars and apparel. In practice, most GVCs were regional, centred on East 
Asia, Europe and North America. European GVCs were boosted by deep integration 
that reduced the costs of trading across borders within the EU and by enlargement in 
2000s to include countries with lower wages and a different range of skills.
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The EU car industry is a prime example of GVCs. The most rapid growth since the 
1990s has been in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, to the extent 
that in the 2010s Slovakia has the highest per capita car output in the world. All major 
producers in the EU have integrated GVCs within Europe and increasingly across 
Eurasia; the Duisburg-Chongqing rail service developed since 2011 was initially 
driven by German carmakers supplying components to factories in China and today 
the trains run daily (Pomfret, forthcoming). Similar stories exist in many other 
industries: to compete globally requires combining global-best inputs effectively, 
which requires low trade costs in terms of money, time and certainty.8
Since 1995 the WTO has been important in establishing trade law and settling 
disputes but poor at updating world trade law to take account of new developments, 
including the fragmentation of production along GVCs and the rise of the internet. 
At the first WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore in 1996, trade ministers identified 
four areas in which trade law needed to be advanced: trade facilitation, trade-related 
investment measures, transparency in government procurement and competition 
policy. However, the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations that started in 2001 has 
made little progress due to the principle of consensus; the only Doha achievement, 
the 2017 Trade Facilitation Agreement, is a statement of principles rather than a body 
of law on trade facilitation. Lack of consensus among the 165 WTO members has 
stymied attempts to revise the WTO Charter to adapt to new institutional relations 
such as GVCs, or to technological change such as the influence of the Internet on 
production and on international trade.9
The response of the EU, and other major trading nations involved in GVCs, has 
been to conclude WTO+ agreements with like-minded trade partners. The new 
generation agreements cover goods, services, intellectual property rights, investment, 
government procurement, access to energy, trade facilitation, competition and 
regulatory cooperation. The highest profile agreement has been the TransPacific 
Partnership (TPP) whose origins lay in a 2000 agreement among Singapore, Chile 
and New Zealand and whose importance grew after the USA joined in 2008. Twelve 
countries agreed to a TPP text in 2016, but the USA declined to ratify the agreement 
in January 2017. Strikingly, after minor revisions, the remaining eleven countries 
ratified the agreement which came into effect in December 2018 as the Comprehensive 
8 Although the emphasis in GVCs is often on identifying the least-cost input source, 
financial cost needs to be balanced against quality requirements, reliability of supply and 
other input-specific considerations.
9 Ironically, the economic impact of the Internet dates precisely from the years immediately 
after establishment of the WTO. Freund and Weinhold (2004) show that use of the 
Internet had no statistically significant impact on a country’s level of trade until 1995, and 
a strongly significant impact starting from 1997.
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and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).10 A second mega-
regional trade agreement under negotiation is the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) between the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and six partners (Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and 
South Korea).
For its part, the EU has negotiated bilateral agreements. It can be difficult to keep 
track of these agreements, because of differences between the dates when negotiations 
are completed, ratified, and implemented. The agreement with Korea was signed 
in 2010 and came into force in 2015. The EU-Canada agreement was signed 2014; 
ratification was delayed, but it has been applied since September 2017. Negotiations 
for the EU-Japan agreement were concluded in December 2017 and the agreement 
was signed in July 2018. With Mexico, an agreement in principle was reached in 
April 2018. As for Singapore negotiations have been completed but the agreement is 
“awaiting signature” due to within-EU jurisdictional disputes over investment rules. 
Negotiations with the USA began in July 2013 but were paused in January 2017, while 
negotiations with Australia and New Zealand were both launched in June 2018.
Why does negotiation of these trade agreements take so long? They cover many 
things (e.g. the EU-Australia framework has 64 Articles), although not all partners are 
willing to include all issues; whaling was controversial in the EU-Japan agreement, 
and Australia refuses to link human rights to its trade negotiations. Domestic 
interests can be obstructive. Agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues 
and on technical barriers to trade is difficult because of different ideas of food safety, 
desirable product specifications or environmental requirements, etc. Nevertheless, 
the EU is keen to show that it is committed to a global economy open to trade in 
goods and services (a desire shared by Japan and Canada as major partners, i.e. six of 
the G7 countries).
Trade agreements signed in the twenty-first century mostly focus on trade 
facilitation and other WTO+ issues. The CPTPP and RCEP have similar coverage to the 
EU-Canada and EU-Japan agreements, reflecting recognition of “like-mindedness” 
since 2015, and especially in response to U.S. positions since 2017.
The similarity is especially striking when it concerns standards. This is due to the 
network effect: the more countries that accept a standard the more useful it is, while 
competing standards are an obstacle to international trade. WTO+ agreements could 
be standard-setters if they include major trading nations but global standards are 
hard to agree at the WTO due to the principle of consensus. Until recently, the USA 
10 The eleven CPTPP countries are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. The CPTPP is an open agreement in the 
sense that any country agreeing to its content can join. Interested countries include South 
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, as well as the UK post-Brexit (https://consultations.trade.
gov.uk/policy/consultation-on-uk-accession-to-the-cptpp/).
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usually set standards, but it has stepped aside since the 2016 election.11 Open access 
mega-regional agreements such as CPTPP are important because they allow other 
countries to accept the standards. It is unclear whether CPTPP or RCEP or EU+ will 
be the main standard-setter, but it may not matter if they retain consistency, which 
would be the opposite to a noodle bowl.
The clearest example of a new issue in the early twenty-first century has been the 
growth of e-commerce and digitalization, combined with issues related to big data 
and data transfer. None of these was important when the WTO was established.12 The 
TPP included a chapter on e-commerce that remains in the CPTPP, and is reportedly 
very similar in RCEP and in recent EU agreements. There has been pressure from 
the countries included in these agreements to bring e-commerce into WTO law, but 
this has been resisted by large countries such as India or Indonesia and by many 
low-income countries distrustful of loss of control over cybersecurity or over the 
potential to tax e-commerce.13 Hence, the pressure to proceed with agreements 
among like-minded countries.
11 It is unacceptable that global standards are set by rich countries only (as in the OECD’s 
ill-fated multilateral agreement on investment). Bilateral trade agreements in Asia since 
2000 have contributed to Noodle Bowl problems as different FTAs set different standards, 
practices, rules of origin and so forth, adding to the complexity of international trade 
(Pomfret, 2011, 90).
12 The artificiality of the WTO distinction between trade in goods (GATT) and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) can be illustrated by a book which is available 
in hard copy or e-copy; the former trades under GATT rules and the latter under GATS. 
Cross-border transfer of data is not even mentioned in WTO rules.
13 The sceptics are generally countries that do not participate in GVCs and hence see less 
value in common standards and liberalization of rules about e-commerce and cross-border 
data flows. One way around the consensus rule is to form a plurilateral agreement among 
a subset of WTO members, but this is resisted by the sceptics as creating precedents for a 
two-tier WTO. At the December 2018 WTO ministerial meeting in Buenos Aires, seventy-
one members circulated a Joint Statement on E-commerce which could be turned into a 
proposal for a plurilateral agreement at the June 2020 WTO ministerial in Astana.
Conclusions
The EU’s role in the global trading system has passed through a major transformation 
from the introduction of the first common external tariff in the 1960s, and its use 
for foreign policy goals or in response to domestic pressures for protection from 
competing imports. The pyramid of preferences and a “fortress Europe” approach to 
uncompetitive sectors such as agriculture, cars, clothing and steel were unsustainable. 
Apart from facing external opposition, these strategies were increasingly incompatible 
with the needs of Europe’s most dynamic companies which were operating on a 
global scale and wanted both market access for their sales and the ability to source 
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inputs as widely and as easily as possible. The transformation was codified in the 2015 
Trade for All strategy and in the Shared Vision, Common Action strategy enunciated 
by the European External Action Service (2016).
What is the role of the EU in the global economy of the 2020s? As the USA withdrew 
from its leadership position in promoting the liberal multilateral trading system, the 
EU has acknowledged that it has to become more proactive. This may be not without 
internal tensions, as several member countries have strong illiberal political parties 
that are explicitly critical of globalization. However, there are strong countervailing 
forces, especially in Eastern Europe countries such as Poland and Hungary, where 
concerns over political constraints emanating from Brussels coexist with recognition 
that a positive economic development since the end of central planning has been 
their ability to participate in global value chains.14
The leadership role is reflected in the EU position on WTO+ issues. Deep 
agreements with Canada and Japan bring together six of the G7 largest developed 
market economies. By maintaining compatibility with mega-regional agreements 
(CPTPP and RCEP) involving other major trading nations (notably China) the EU 
is playing a responsible role in progressing global trade rules in the face of WTO 
inaction. The need for rules and compatibility will grow stronger as the trend for 
regional value chains to become global value chains becomes more pronounced.
Meanwhile, the situation is less clear on non-trade issues. Globalization appears 
to be associated with the rise of populist parties in several EU countries, in large 
part because sectors of the population feel that they are being passed by. The classic 
response is to arrange a mix of adjustment and compensation measures, e.g. greater 
investment in education and training, and spending on unemployment insurance 
or assistance for economically depressed regions. This needs to draw on the principle 
of subsidiarity, insofar as local governments may be best placed to design such 
programs and assistance. Such devolution may be politically controversial because 
it will reduce the role for national governments (but not their elimination), and 
perhaps fuel demands for autonomy of regions (e.g. Catalonia, Scotland) to address 
the costs of globalization.
14 Italy is also an interestingly paradoxical case, as the anti-globalization coalition 
government of the Five Star Movement and the Northern League sought in 2019 to 
become more closely involved with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, in the hope that 
Italian firms might have an added competitive edge within Eurasian value chains.
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Chapter Six
The Arab Spring and the Post-Arab Spring 
(2011–19): An Assessment of the European 
Response
Bichara Khader
Abstract
European Union policies, towards the Arab and Mediterranean countries, since 1957, 
pursued the same objectives: energy, markets, and security. Other objectives such 
as conflict resolution, human rights and democracy promotion have often been 
mentioned in the official EU documents, but the discrepancy between rhetoric and 
deeds has been marked. The European role in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict has been marginal, declaratory, often hesitant and incoherent. Although 
all agreements between the EU and Mediterranean and Arab countries include 
a Human Rights clause based on the respect of democratic principles, the EU has 
always pursued good relations with authoritarian Arab regimes, which often paid 
lip service to reform and never engaged in real democratisation. The Arab Spring 
prompted the EU to launch new policy initiatives  but there is no clear reference in 
published documents to the Arab World, Arab Youth or Arab Identity – and this is 
not a trivial omission. Instead, reference is made to “Southern neighbourhood” or 
“Southern Mediterranean”, but Yemen and Bahrain do not form part of these. The 
2016 EU Global Strategy’s objectives are perhaps too ambitious, a “remarkable exercise 
in fantasy”. Despite the objectives set out in the strategy, the EU has backtracked 
on Syria, the Iran Nuclear Deal and kept aloof from the troubled Gulf Cooperation 
Council, President Trump’s decision to move the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem and 
the withdrawal of American funding of UNRWA as well as Israel’s annexation of 
the Golan Heights. The only hope for the future of the EU’s relations with the Arab 
world lies in continuing the recently revived dialogue between the Arab League and 
the Union. As the European Parliament has noted, “insufficient EU leadership and 
initiative in working towards the solution of protracted conflicts have weakened the 
EU’s capacity to make a diplomatic impact in the region.”
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Introduction
European policies, towards the Arab and Mediterranean countries, since 1957, pursued 
the same objectives: energy, markets, and security. Other objectives such as conflict 
resolution, human rights and democracy promotion have often been mentioned in 
the official EU documents (Communications of the Commission, Declarations of 
the European Councils, and European Parliament Resolutions). But the discrepancy 
between rhetoric and deeds has been appalling. The European role in the resolution of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict has been marginal, declaratory, often hesitant and incoherent. 
Although all agreements between the EU and Mediterranean and Arab countries 
include a Human Rights clause based on the respect of democratic principles, the EU 
has always pursued good relations with authoritarian Arab regimes, which often paid 
lip service to reform but never engaged in real democratisation.
By side-lining civil society, and with the gradual prioritization of security over 
reform, the EU, as one author puts it: “did not live up to its image of a normative 
power” (Pfeil, 2011), thus indirectly contributing to the political “status-quo”. By 
doing so the EU embarrassed itself and undermined its image in Arab eyes.
This chapter looks at the evolution of EU-Arab States relations to identify the 
underlying patterns of EU policies in order to show where corrective action needs to 
be taken, and how the EU is likely to pursue policies towards the Arab World and the 
Mediterranean in the future.
The “Arab Spring”, starting in 2011, caught the EU off guard and demonstrated 
the vibrancy of Arab civil society. This paper tries to critically assess the European 
response to the changing Arab environment. My hypotheses are threefold:
1. Since 1957, European policies towards the Arab World have been characterized 
by fragmentation, overlap and inconsistency.
2. Since 1957, the Arab population has more than tripled reaching some 400 
million in 2018, but it remains remarkably young with 50 % of the population 
under the age of 25 (against a European average of 30 %). At the same time, 
European policies have contributed little to shoring up Arab youth’s quest for 
freedom and a better life and to shaping the evolving regional order.
3. The new European response (2011–19) to the “Arab Spring” and to the “Post-Arab 
Spring” lacks strategic depth and vision, and carries little hope for significant 
impact on the future dynamics of Euro-Arab relations.
The Arab Spring
The Arab popular revolt, which started in Tunisia and spread to the other Arab 
countries, caught the EU and the vast majority of the academic specialists by 
surprise: the revolt was unexpected and its demonstration effect unforeseen. In less 
than a year, four Arab Presidents, who had survived for decades while democratic 
waves rolled onward throughout the entire world, had been toppled. The Tunisian 
regime, considered as a bulwark of stability, crumbled and President Ben Ali fled 
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his country. Mubarak of Egypt was forced to step down, and later, sentenced and 
jailed. In Yemen, Ali Saleh, had to agree on a transition plan concocted by the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) and was later assassinated. Colonel Qaddafi of Libya was 
lynched by his own people and killed.
It is not this paper’s scope to identify the main drivers of these popular revolts, their 
different outcomes and the particularities of the transition processes, but few quick 
remarks are necessary:
a. All Arab countries, to varying degrees, share similar challenges: alarming 
hikes in educated youth unemployment, increasing external debt, generalized 
corruption, a dysfunctional economy, authoritarian and closed political 
systems. But the starting points, paths and outcomes of the protest movement 
are different.
b. Undoubtedly, Tunisia represents what I called “the paradigm of the happy 
revolution’ (Khader 2012). It combined a wide array of factors and drivers 
of historical significance: small geography; homogenous society; a past 
of militancy; vibrant advocacy by civil society; educated, urbanized and 
connected youth; an emerging (but constrained) middle class; significant 
women activism; spontaneous supra-partisan, supra-class and leaderless mass 
movement; the breaking up of the wall of fear; the fraternisation of a small 
army with the public; the absence of geopolitical and economic stakes; and 
interests of regional and international actors which could act as game-spoilers.
c. Not all Arab counties fit this model. Although grievances may be similar, the 
outcomes of the protests are different (Kienle, 2011). Egyptian society is much 
polarized along religious/secular lines, army/civilian divide, and rural/urban 
cleavages. In Bahrein, regional rivalries (Saudi-Arabia versus Iran, Sunnis versus 
Shi’ites) and Western interests (American Naval base) almost killed the protest 
movement in the bud. In Libya, the violent nature of the regime prompted 
NATO-led military operations. In Jordan, the King succeeded in defusing 
discontent by vague promises to fight bad governance and corruption. The King 
of Morocco did the same by promising reform. In Algeria, the social fabric is not 
homogenous, the army is firmly in control, oil revenues shielded the regime 
from massive protest, but declining oil revenues, harsh living conditions and 
an ailing and aging President Bouteflika seeking a fifth mandate as president 
(in April 2019) triggered fresh protests. Street protests against the Sudanese 
President, Omar al Basheer, have also made the media headlines in 2019.
d. Syria is the counter-paradigm of a happy revolution: the country is a regional 
pivot; the society is heterogeneous and fragmented along social, religious, and 
ethnic lines; the regime is run by the Alawite minority with the complicity 
of some segments of co-opted Christian and Sunni civil servants, officers and 
businessmen; and the Shi’ite-led army remains the backbone of the regime. 
Regional and International actors joined the conflict and acted as spoilers of 
change.
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e. In all Arab countries where presidents have been ousted, the process of 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy proved to be complex, bumpy, 
non-linear and unpredictable. But again, Tunisia offered a model of transition 
through elite negotiation reflecting vibrant civil society pressure and the 
absence of regional or international spoilers. Meanwhile, Syria still sits on the 
opposite side with regional and international competitors waging proxy wars 
that brought the destruction of villages and entire towns, and triggered the 
exodus of almost half of its population.
In other countries, the transition has been blocked, derailed or hijacked. In Egypt, 
the first Moslem Brotherhood-elected President, Mursi, was ousted from power by 
Al Sissi, in July 2013. Since then, the new Egyptian Regime has reproduced the old 
authoritarian system, demonized the Moslem Brotherhood, and silenced protestors 
by mass imprisonment and capital punishment. Secular parties and NGOs are 
not spared. In Libya armed militias are thwarting stabilization efforts. In Yemen, 
centrifugal forces are splintering the country and threatening its unity. Since 2015, it 
has become the theatre of proxy wars and direct intervention by Saudi Arabia and the 
Emirates with catastrophic consequences for the civil population.
Overall, transition from authoritarianism is an uphill endeavour and even a 
reversible one with real risks of youth impatience, military takeover or the return of 
the remnants of the old regime or undemocratic and illiberal forces.
Whether peaceful or violent, the protest wave in the Arab World has already shaken 
many of the myths circulating in the West, especially in Europe. Among these, there 
is the one of the so-called “Arab exception” positing that the Arabs are unprepared 
for democracy. By their peaceful protests, Arab Youth showed the world that they are 
tired of an Arab state-system entrenched in neo-patrimonialism, illiberal practices, 
corruption and predation.
The EU was surprised by the magnitude of the events in the Southern rim of the 
Mediterranean. It had to respond to what an author dubbed “the Arab tsunami” 
(Basbous, 2011). Below I analyse the European response to the Arab Spring, and see 
whether it rises up to the challenges ahead.
European response
After a short period of hesitation, the EU realized that what was happening in the 
Arab world was not just a “bread riot”, but something more significant. The response 
was enshrined in two European Commission communications: the first, published 
in March 2011 and entitled “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” 
(2011a), and the second, published in May entitled “New Response to a Changing 
Neighbourhood” (2011b). A new Civil Society Facility was created together with an 
aid package labelled “Strengthening Partnership and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)” 
and a “European Endowment for Democracy”.
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Partnership for democracy and shared prosperity
The Commission’s Communication (2011a) described events taking place in “our 
Southern neighbourhood”, as “of historical proportions” with lasting consequences 
and urged the EU not to be “a passive spectator”, but “to support the wish of the people 
in our neighbourhood” through a “qualitative step forward”, in “a joint commitment” 
toward “common values: democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance 
and the rule of the law”.
The new approach was to be based on differentiation, conditionality and mutual 
accountability built around three elements: democratic transformation and 
institution-building, stronger partnership with the people and sustainable and 
inclusive growth.
In the immediate term, the EU proposed to increase humanitarian aid, to offer 
food and shelter for refugees pouring out of Libya, to facilitate the evacuation of EU 
citizens through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (MIC) and to deal with “possible 
new inflows of refugees and migrants into European countries” (FRONTEX, 2011).
More generally, the Communication proposed a new incentive-based approach 
based on more differentiation which was called “more for more”, promising rewards 
for faster reform in terms of aid, trade and advanced status. The EU pledged more 
support for civil society, the establishment of a Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility, 
and the conclusion of “mobility partnerships” by improving its visa policy.
Special attention was paid to the promotion of small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) and job creation, more European Investment Bank (EIB) loans, the extension 
of European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) facilities to the 
countries of the Southern Mediterranean region, and the negotiation of  “deep and 
comprehensive free trade areas” (DCFTA). Sectorial cooperation in energy, rural 
support programmes, development of education and communication technologies 
were highlighted. The Communication insisted on “regional cooperation”. It 
identified the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as a good step in the right 
direction, but cautioned that it “did not deliver the result we expected” and that 
it “needs to reform”, in order to be “a catalyst” bringing countries and institutions 
together around “concrete projects”, according to the principle of “variable 
geometry”. The EU promised to increase direct financial assistance to the Southern 
Mediterranean countries (€5.700 billion under the European Neighbourhood 
Partnership instruments for 2011–13) and to leverage loans from the EIB through the 
“Neighbourhood Facility” (NIF).
A review of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
The review of ENP began before the Arab Spring, but subsequent events lent more 
urgency to it. The May 2011 joint Communication (European Commission, 2011b) 
reasserts that “partnership with our neighbours is mutually beneficial”, but needs an 
overhaul. The new approach stressed mutual accountability and a shared commitment 
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to the universal values, a higher degree of differentiation, comprehensive institution-
building and a deeper democracy. At the same time the Communication adds that 
“the EU does not seek to impose a model or a ready-made recipe for political reform”. 
To achieve these objectives, the EU proposed the establishment of a “European 
Endowment for Democracy” and a “Civil Society Facility” (CSF).
On the political front, the Communication emphasized the Union’s intention to 
“enhance its involvement in solving protracted conflicts”.
Economic partnership is the cornerstone of the Communication which reiterates 
the importance of industrial cooperation, rural development, inclusive growth, direct 
investments, trade ties and job creation. The most salient proposal is the creation 
of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) involving the gradual 
dismantling of trade barriers and progressive economic integration. Complementary 
to this it proposed the development of a “common knowledge and innovation space”.
On the thorny issue of human mobility, the Communication insisted that the EU 
shall “pursue the process of visa facilitation, develop existing mobility partnerships 
and encourage people-to-people contacts” – with no details on the operationalization 
of this objective.
Critical comments on the Communications
Curiously, although it was the Arab Spring which prompted the EU’s response there is 
a gaping absence in the two communications of any clear reference to the Arab World, 
Arab Youth or Arab Identity. This is not a trivial omission. Both communications refer 
to “Southern neighbourhood” or “Southern Mediterranean”: but Yemen and Bahrain 
do not form part of these. Only some countries are mentioned, namely Egypt and 
Tunisia. Aside from this, the three main policy goals of these Communications are: 
money, market, mobility (3Ms). A shared feeling among analysts suggests that the 
communication did not constitute a new approach.
The “new approach” has taken the form of “piecemeal initiatives” falling short of 
a comprehensive strategy that is required to constitute a significant and effective 
response to the Arab Region’s huge challenges. Constrained by deep economic crisis 
and a general mood of pessimism about the future of the Arab Spring, the EU did not 
have much to offer. In comparison, the Gulf States have made impressive financial 
pledges totalling billions of dollars to Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. And while Jordan 
and Lebanon, with scarce resources, hosted more than two million Syrian refugees, 
and while Tunisia, a country in transition, bore the brunt of hundreds of thousands 
of refugees pouring out of Libya, European states made a great fuss about 1 million 
Syrian migrants and asylum seekers. It is for all these reasons that the EU missed the 
opportunity to play a significant role during the democracy upheavals in the Arab 
countries.
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Money was the easiest to deliver: an extra €1.2 billion on top of the budgeted €5.7 
billion for 2011–13. The European Investment Bank (EIB) had promised to increase 
lending. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) promised 
to change its mandate in order to lend to the Mediterranean neighbours a planned 
€2.5 billion.
As for Market access, lifting all the European barriers on Mediterranean agricultural 
products was met with resistance by some Member States and increased imports of 
agricultural products remain constrained by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
In December 2011, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) mandated the Commission to 
open trade negotiations to achieve DCFTAs with Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco 
by upgrading existing ENP association agreements to include more preferential 
market access and eventually the liberalisation of services.
On mobility partnerships, the EU committed itself to open regular channels for 
migration and mobility, but it soon found itself stuck in a dilemma: the market 
requires new flows of migrants, but European leaders are “incapable of selling this 
truth to their public opinion” (Kodmani, 2011). The EU promised visa facilitation 
for students, researchers and businessmen, but subjected them to the conditionality 
of “partner countries’ commitments to tackle illegal cross-Mediterranean migration” 
(Stroetges, 2011).
The “more for more” principle is meant to be a “carrot” or “incentive”, better 
than the “stick policy” associated with negative conditionality. Any country which 
engaged in “deep and sustainable democracy” was to be rewarded with an “advanced 
status”, increased aid and enhanced political dialogue. Implicit in this principle are 
the elements of compliance, differentiation, reward and positive conditionality. But 
it remains an ambiguous notion. Several questions persist: who sets the benchmarks 
of “deep reform”? Who assesses the performance? Are the Southern neighbours 
ready or willing to accept and fully implement external prescriptions in exchange 
for rewards?
Doubts also arise on the implications of “mutual accountability”. Can the Southern 
neighbours hold the EU accountable for its shortcomings on, say, mobility, the rise 
of Islamophobia, lack of consensus on foreign policy, such as the membership of 
Palestine in the United Nations? Serious doubts exist as to whether the Mediterranean 
partners can confront the EU on double standards in its dealings with Hamas 
and Israel, or why the European Council bypasses the European Parliament’s (EP) 
resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The “more for more” and “mutual accountability” have become the new icons in the 
European lexicon, but they have not been discussed with the stake-holders themselves. 
A paradigmatic European Response to the challenges of the new environment was 
thus adopted without an intellectual input of those concerned. Arab social networks 
thus labelled it a “non-consensus response”. The European policy prescriptions thus 
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suffer from a lack of local ownership: i.e. the absence of Arab intellectual input. As an 
Oxfam Report (2011) stated: “the shift to carrots from sticks is… not altogether new”.
Similarly, the DCFTA encounters several problems. Without a shred of doubt, free 
trade has many merits: but in authoritarian states, it often leads to the concentration 
of economic power in the hands of a minority which stops the benefits of growth 
from trickling down to the vast majority of the population. This has happened in 
the Arab countries since the imposition by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
of the structural adjustment programmes. Privatization hastily imposed has simply 
transformed planned economies into clan economies.
The line endorsed by the Arab NGO’s network is that “support for economic growth 
should be rooted in support of peoples’ choices of a revised economic model” (Oxfam, 
2011). In short, the people should decide what economic model they want, and what 
kind of liberalization is the most suitable, its speed and in which sectors. Liberalization 
is not a panacea per se, particularly in countries where the private sector is still in 
limbo15. Moreover, many Arab countries are facing huge economic challenges. Their 
first priority is to create jobs, alleviate poverty and tackle the budgetary imbalances. 
DCFTA is for them a remote objective and not an immediate goal.
The EU should not rush and apply the “same tool box” in the Mediterranean and 
Arab regions as it did in Eastern Europe. Michael Leigh (2011) argued: “The transition 
process in Central and Eastern Europe took place at the end of the Cold War among 
people seeking to “return to Europe”. This is not the case of the Arab World which has 
no membership incentive. The emphasis should instead be on poverty alleviation, 
women empowerment, gender equality, youth participation, job creation, sustainable 
development, liberalization of agricultural trade, and easing conditions for mobility. 
The search for more equitable economic relations seems to be more urgent than 
mere liberalization. The EU’s multi-year assistance programmes should be directed 
toward bolstering competitiveness, innovation and knowledge technology.
The EU should encourage Arab countries to engage in comprehensive and deep 
integration among themselves; otherwise they will remain “captive markets” for 
external players. The Arab countries’ priority should be precisely to create a level 
economic playing field by promoting regional integration which could potentially 
increase the volume of trade between the EU and the Arab states.
The instruments of the New European approach
In its attempt to engage with peoples and not only with governments, the EU 
proposed two major instruments: Civil Society Facility (CSF) and the European 
Endowment for Democracy (EED).
15 Letter of Arab NGOs (ANND) to the EU: ‘More for more as the EU’s response to the Arab 
Spring”, October 18, 2011. Quote fn.10 in Oxfam, Briefing Note, “Power to the People: 
Reactions to the EU’s Response to the Arab Spring”, 15 November 2011.
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Civil Society Facility (CSF)
The CSF aims to “support civil society organisations, to develop their advocacy 
capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their implementing and evaluating 
EU programmes” (Oxfam, 2011). This support is essential to enable civil society to 
contribute to policy-making, by voicing their concerns and holding governments 
accountable to ensure that economic growth is geared towards poverty alleviation 
and inclusiveness.
Although praiseworthy, this proposal is met with scepticism by Arab civil 
society. Similar proposals in the past had little impact: allocated financial support 
was insufficient, there were several bureaucratic hurdles and slow disbursement. 
The selection of civil society organisations for funding was often inadequate and 
sometimes arbitrary: the EU engaged more with organisations perceived to be 
“palatable” and shunned others with a real social base. In many cases, European aid 
was diverted to paying staff salaries, and many organisations would simply disappear 
without European assistance.
In the Arab countries, the EU should avoid taking the driving seat and thereby 
delegitimizing a transition led by the people. It should be clever enough not to 
antagonize countries which have regained pride, and which ask for more transparency 
in the relations between external donors and local actors. But at the same time, it 
ought to show no leniency toward countries reverting to authoritarianism.
The European Endowment for Democracy (EED)
The EED differs from the CSF because it seeks to promote the creation of Civil Society 
organisations, to provide assistance to trade Unions and other social actors, such as 
non-registered NGOs.
The EED offers new opportunities to support democracy through its relative 
independence: it is established as a private foundation under Belgian law “to keep 
it at arms’ length from EU bureaucracy and grant some leeway in its behaviour 
towards authoritarian governments” (Richter and Leininger, 2012). Potentially, the 
EED provides an opportunity to restore some of the lost credibility of the EU as a 
democracy-promoter. Some analysts question its added-value when compared to the 
“European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights” (EIDHR) set up in 2007.
The EU as peace-promoter
It is a vital interest for the EU to have a neighbourhood living in peace. That is 
why the Joint Communication of May 25, 2011 insists on the necessity for the EU to 
intensify political and security cooperation with neighbours. With many unresolved 
conflicts at its doorsteps in the East and in the South (Cyprus and the Arab–Israeli 
conflict), the situation in Syria, and endemic instability in Libya, the EU faces 
serious security issues which require decisive leadership. The Joint Communication 
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had affirmed that “business as usual is, no longer an option if we want to make our 
neighbourhood a safer place and protect our interests”, adding that “the EU is already 
active in seeking to resolve several of the conflicts”. But if we take the Middle East, as 
litmus test of European involvement, there is little reason to rejoice. The European 
role has often been incoherent, inconsistent and ambiguous. Without trying to be 
exhaustive, let us pick some examples.
The EU has been the single largest donor to the Palestinian Authority, and the 
Palestinians are grateful for such financial aid. But in a certain way, as Rosemary 
Hollis (2010, p. 32) puts it bluntly, this aid “shouldered the cost of continued 
occupation and containment of violence in the absence of conflict resolution”. In 
other words, the EU is helping the Palestinians to remain quiet, thus ensuring the 
security of the occupying force and the Jewish settlements, and which shores up a 
spineless Palestinian Authority. This view is not shared by European officials, but it 
is widely held by Arab opinion.
Real political clout is not gauged by the amount of money spent, but by the quality 
of results achieved. Leadership requires a sense of purpose, economic and military 
resources, an attractive image, a long-term vision, a strong decision-making process, 
qualified diplomatic personnel, and above all a unified actor. Although the EU does 
not lack qualified people, resources and image, it is not a unified actor. When the 28 
member states agree, most of the time it is at the “lowest common denominator”. 
Germany, for example, remains constrained by past memories and does not openly 
criticize Israeli policies in the Occupied Arab land. Britain usually sides with the 
United States whose alliance with Israel remains unshakable. France has been 
diplomatically active, but with scarce concrete results. Overall, the EU prides itself of 
being a staunch advocate of the two-state solution, “without a strategy for making it 
happen” (Hollis, 2010, p. 39).
Israel is an important EU trading partner with trade totalling €36 billion in 2017.16 
Already at the 1994 Essen European Council, EU leaders agreed that “Israel should 
enjoy… a special status in relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity and 
common interests”17 when Israel had been occupying Arab territories for 27 years. In 
Arab eyes, this looked like rewarding occupation with “special status”.
In 2012, with the peace process on the wane and the settlement policy being pursued 
without respite, the EU decided on 2 June, to deepen and reinforce its relations with 
Israel in more than 60 concrete fields. Since then, practical steps have been taken 
in spite of a tough resolution adopted by the European Parliament (5 July 2012) in 
which it severely condemned Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories.
16 European Commission web-page at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/israel/
17 Presidency Conclusions: available https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21198/essen-
european-council.pdf
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If we add to these incoherent initiatives, the non-recognition of Hamas’ victory in 
the Palestinian elections in 2006, the failure of the Quartet to achieve anything, we 
can better grasp the depth of Arab mistrust in the capacity of Europe to chart a new 
course in its Middle East Foreign Policy.
The bitter harvest of the Arab Spring
In the light of the Arab Spring, the EU spelled out its “new partnership” in 2011 on 
the basis of guiding principles such as “more for more”, “mutual accountability” 
and “deep and comprehensive free trade area”. It also announced the creation of a 
“Civil Society facility” and a “European endowment for democracy”. But our careful 
reading of the two communications (2011a & 2011b), does not suggest that the old 
paradigms have changed: the “more and more” is very similar to the previous rhetoric 
of “tailor-made approaches” (Soller and Viillup) and the EU continues to over-rely on 
neo-liberal capitalist market-economy recipes based on an “almost sacred belief in 
liberalization and privatisation” (Schumacher, 2011).
The EU as peace-promoter has not been at all successful. On the “mother of conflicts”, 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU on various occasions condemned Israeli policies in 
the occupied territories, without matching such declarations with concrete actions, 
beyond the financial assistance given to the Palestinians and which, in reality, covers 
part of the cost of occupation.
Recent EU initiatives do not testify to an EU policy change: it reinforces its ties 
with Israel while this is tightening its grip on the occupied territories through the 
confiscation of land, a rampant settlement policy, and collective punishment. The 
EU does not speak with one voice, and remains constrained by the difficulty of 
forging a common foreign policy. In spite of constantly repeating, at nauseam, that 
its Mediterranean policies have the merit of putting Arabs and Israelis around the 
same table, it prefers to put Arabs and Israelis on the same footing and to treat them 
equally.
The Arab Spring offered the EU a rare opportunity to show leadership, to 
“strategically reassess its policy” (Calleya, 2012) and to assert itself as a coherent, 
consistent and credible actor. Unfortunately, as the Arab Spring approaches its tenth 
anniversary, the harvest is bitter. I agree with Christian-P. Hanelt when he writes: 
“There is more freedom today but less security. There are more opportunities but 
fewer jobs. And there is a patchwork of conflicts” (Hanelt, 2014). The protracted 
tragedy in Syria, the situation in Egypt, the instability in Libya and Yemen, and the 
internal strife in Iraq constitute the darkest side of the picture. The brighter side is 
constituted by the consensus achieved in Tunisia, the limited reforms in Jordan and 
Morocco. Even Algeria and Sudan, that remained, for a while, shielded from massive 
protests, have witnessed, in 2019, mass protests, that may usher in a new Arab Spring.
In countries that are going through a transitional reform process, the economy is 
at a standstill if not on a downward spiral with declining economic activity and tax 
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revenues, rising unemployment as the tourist sector declines, and widening social 
and regional disparities. This disheartening development will take its toll unless 
stability is restored, and the democratisation process is pursued without further 
setbacks. Against this backdrop, phobia has replaced the euphoria of the initial stages 
of the revolutionary movements with certain segments of the societies beginning to 
yearn for a “strong leader” capable of restoring security and order. Egypt is a good 
example.
The frustration of Arab societies with the “transitional elites” is matched by a similar 
frustration with the European Union. Arab Civil Societies are not convinced that EU 
measures can match the seismic developments in the Arab World. The resources 
made available are modest. EU member states’ foreign policies remain unclear and 
lack consensus. For example, there is no European consensus on whether the ousting 
of President Mursi, on 3 July 2013, by the Egyptian Army, should be treated as a 
military coup d’état or simply the continuation of the revolutionary process. On Libya, 
Germany abstained from any participation in the 2011 NATO-led military operations 
while France and UK adopted a higher profile. France now follows a different course 
on the stabilization of Libya than the rest of the key EU member states. As for Syria, 
French Presidents appeared more offensive than their European peers.
Civil society remains dubious on whether the EU programmes can succeed in 
jump-starting the Arab economies. On top of this, should the EU impose strict 
conditionality, it runs the risk of alienating incumbent regimes; but if it does nothing, 
it triggers fierce opposition from civil society both at home and abroad. In the Arab 
World, the EU has not forged one policy but various policies and frameworks. This 
segmentation is understandable from a European perspective since the challenges 
and stakes in each country differ. From an Arab perspective, a general framework is 
more desirable since all states share similar challenges.
The EU response to the Post-Arab Spring (2015–19)
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the EU has been engulfed in existential anxiety. 
The flows of irregular refugees and asylum seekers from Syria and elsewhere 
(particularly in 2015) have raised questions on its ability to adequately respond to the 
humanitarian tragedy of millions of displaced families. The Brexit referendum has 
increased uncertainties. Populist and anti-EU sceptics threaten the European project.
Developments have worsened in its immediate neighbourhood. Three weeks before 
the 23 June 2016 Brexit referendum, the EEAS (European External Action Service) 
released the Global Strategy (EUGS) (European External Action Service, 2016). The 
document projects what the EU should undertake to play a major role as a global 
security provider, including in its neighbourhood, the Arab and Mediterranean 
regions.
In the EUGS, the EU recognizes that its neighbourhood is in turmoil, facing huge 
challenges such as terrorism, climate change, demography, and protracted conflicts. 
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It pledges that it “will foster dialogue and negotiation over regional conflicts such as 
those of Syria and Libya”, and “will work closely with key stakeholders to preserve 
the prospect of a viable two state solution” in Israel and Palestine. The EUGS affirms 
that the EU encourages “functional cooperation formats” in Africa and the Middle 
East, to help “bridge divides” and “existing cleavages”. More specifically, the EU 
intends to “pursue balanced engagement in the Gulf”, and deepen “dialogue with 
Iran and the Gulf on regional conflicts, human rights and counter-terrorism”.
In the light of events following the publication of the EUGS, it appears that the 
“Global Strategy” is a remarkable exercise in fantasy. Indeed, the EU backtracked on 
Syria leaving the USA and Russia in the driver’s seat. On the Iranian issue, the EU 
distanced itself from Trump’s decision to withdraw its support to the 2015 nuclear deal, 
but bowed to American pressure on sanctions which negatively impact European 
economic interests. On the rift wrecking the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 
EU did not take sides, but it did nothing to bridge the differences. On the Palestinian 
issue, the EU opposed Trump’s decision to transfer the American Embassy from Tel-
Aviv to Jerusalem, criticised the cessation of the American financial contribution to 
UNRWA and the American recognition of Israeli sovereignty of the Golan Heights 
(Council of the EU, 2019). But European policy remained largely rhetorical as Israel 
turned a deaf ear to European reactions and pursed its policies undeterred and 
emboldened by unshakable American support.
While Libya is descending into more chaos with fresh fighting (2019) between 
Haftar’s forces and those of the UN-recognized government of Tripoli, EU countries 
again exhibited their incoherence with France refraining from criticising Haftar, 
while Germany, Italy and Great Britain side with the government of Tripoli, thus 
exacerbating the Libyan divide.
In the pursuit of regional integration, the expectation-performance gap remains 
appalling. Regional integration in the Maghreb is deadlocked by Moroccan-Algerian 
rivalry, the GCC is collapsing. Only the Agadir Agreement subsists, but its member 
states share no common borders. Obviously, these failures are not all imputable to 
European inability: local players failed to deliver. But the EU did almost nothing to 
act flexibly, to “bridge regional divides” as the EUGS states.
This critical assessment is largely shared by a new report, released in 2019, by the 
European Parliament “On the Post-Arab Spring: Way forward for the MENA Region” 
(European Parliament, 2019). The Report depicts a gloomy assessment of the situation 
in the MENA region, and is broadly critical of the EU’s performance. It “considers 
that insufficient EU leadership and initiative in working towards the solution of 
protracted conflicts have weakened the EU’s capacity to make a diplomatic impact 
in the region”, adding that “the EU has not been able to gain substantive political 
and economic leverage”, and therefore it “is not perceived as a game changer”. The 
Report calls on the EU to become a “central player” by fostering “real change in 
the areas of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms”. 
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It refers to EU member states’ divisions on various issues from migration, border 
security to regional conflicts, and calls for “a unified European stance towards the 
region”. The Report welcomes the concept of co-ownership re-proposed in the 2015 
revised European Neighbourhood Policy, but warns that authoritarian regimes seek 
to “cherry-pick priorities according to their national agenda, instead of advancing 
along the path towards democratisation…” (European Parliament, 2019).
On economic issues, the report regrets that the EU did not really deliver on its 
promise of the DCFTA by granting insufficient access to trade and investment. On 
migration it urged that “more assistance should be provided to the MENA countries 
(help them tackle) the influx of immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa” but warned of 
the risk that some countries may use the externalisation of migration management 
to “advance their own objectives, to blackmail the EU or even to mistreat immigrants” 
(European Parliament, 2019).
The last part of the Report consists of a catalogue of recommendations ranging 
from arms sales, human rights, civil society involvement, women empowerment, 
strengthening of local authorities, transparency of EU assistance, the fight against 
religious radicalisation, climate change, desertification and water shortages, the 
promotion of the private sector and parliamentary diplomacy. The report is the 
most comprehensive critical assessment of EU’s response to the post-Arab Spring. 
The recommendations may remain unheeded as the EU struggles with new internal 
and external challenges which deflect its attention from its neighbourhood. In that 
case, the return to “realpolitik” may remain the only game in town with a European 
Foreign Policy markedly “securitized”, and therefore, void of the often-proclaimed 
normative imperatives.
EU-League of Arab States (LAS) renewed relations
The EU-LAS relationship is a positive initiative in the midst of this gloomy picture. 
Since the collapse of the first Euro-Arab Dialogue (1974–90), the LAS has been side-
lined by the EU. The Euro-Arab format was replaced by the Euro-Mediterranean 
format. The Arab Spring has prompted the EU to return to a dialogue with LAS. Indeed, 
the Arab Spring served as a wake-up call: not only did it reveal the aspirations of Arab 
Youth to freedom, democracy and justice, but also illustrated that the notion of “Arab 
world” is not fantasy, but a “cultural reality.” The LAS, in spite of its shortcomings, 
embodies that reality.
Comparative advantage of an EU-LAS format
Although the UfM, the ENP, the 5+5 format, and the EU-GCC dialogue should be 
continued and eventually reinforced, the EU-LAS dialogue has many advantages: it 
includes countries which are not involved in smaller formats; it serves as an umbrella 
for smaller formats, but it is a supplement not a substitute for them; it enhances 
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the Arab identity versus geographically-constructed identities; it encourages Arab 
States to define their common objectives, and eventually it may help reduce tensions 
among them and even trigger better cooperation; it spurs the EU to organise EU-
LAS Summits on similar lines as the EU-Africa or EU-Latin America summits, and 
indeed a first EU-LAS summit met in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, at the end of February 
2019; together, the EU and LAS constitute a significant critical demographic mass of 
900 million people (2019) that potentially can compete with other global economic 
actors, such as China, India, the USA; EU-LAS format excludes Israel as its presence 
in MED initiatives has been often a bone of contention in the absence of an Arab-
Israeli peace, without however, stopping the EU-Israel dialogue.
Priorities converging and diverging
The EU-LAS partnership confronts priorities that both sides consider to be urgent 
and important.
The two sides want to work together to solve the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
continuation of the occupation of Arab Lands since 1967 “would have far-reaching 
negative consequences”, as a group of 37 former EU foreign ministers wrote in a letter 
to Frederica Mogherini, the High Representative on the 14 April 2019. It makes peace 
in the region impossible, feeds feelings of humiliation and revenge, strains relations 
between the Arab World and the West, and tests the credibility and coherence of 
European policies. Joint EU-LAS pressure on Israel, the USA and the international 
community may help to resolve the conflict.
The EU-LAS accept that countering radicalization and populism cannot be done 
by security measures alone. The root causes need to be addressed. These are linked to 
economic regression, narrower horizons, the lack of freedom and fractured identities. 
The EU is being treated as a scapegoat by the new populist parties. The LAS’s image 
suffers in the Arab world because it often mirrors Arab divisions. By working together, 
the EU and the LAS can enhance each other’s status.
A common EU-LAS Diplomacy can pursue diplomatic solutions to internal and 
intra-regional conflicts. The two can encourage Algeria and Morocco to normalise 
relations. Joint diplomacy can help end the Yemen conflict, stabilize Libya, and solve 
the Egyptian-Sudanese dispute. It is more efficient than solitary manoeuvres.
The cultural dialogue needs to be intensified by the twinning of Universities, 
cities, research centres, and by encouraging youth contacts. It could also include 
the creation of EU study centres in Arab Universities and Arab Research centres in 
European Universities, the involvement of artists and musicians. There is no shortage 
of good practices.
There are divergent outlooks on human rights, women empowerment, the 
involvement of civil societies and the definition of terrorism – which are not 
insurmountable. Such issues can be discussed openly while avoiding patronizing 
attitudes or conditionality.
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Obstacles
The EU-LAS dialogue can learn from past mistakes of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. 
Among these we find the lack of EU autonomy in making decisions, and USA 
opposition to an independent EU Arab diplomacy as epitomised by Henry Kissinger 
(Al-Dajani, 1980; Miller, 2014). Israel fears that an EU-LAS rapprochement happens 
at its expense. Such mistrust was evident in its severe criticism of the EC when it 
approved the Venice Declaration in 1980. The dislocation of the Arab League also 
played a part (Egypt’s forced exit of the Arab League, Lebanese Civil War, Iraq-Iran 
War) in weakening the Arab side.
Similar difficulties persist. The USA and Israel can thwart an EU-LAS partnership. 
Some EU Member States may be less enthusiastic about it. Some Arab countries may 
prefer smaller formats. Obstruction by external actors, internal divisions within EU 
and LAS, and the expectations-performance gap may scuttle the dialogue. Some Arab 
countries may even prefer shifting their interest to China or India or Korea because 
they have lost confidence in the EU’s capacity as a geopolitical actor.
The lack of a common Euro-Arab language raises problems: “resistance” in Palestine 
as perceived by many Arabs is “terrorism” for Europeans. The EU considers Lebanon’s 
Hizbollah and Palestine’s Hamas as terrorist organisations; human rights violations 
are pinpointed when they happen in the Arab World, but ignored when committed 
in Israel. Only a frank dialogue can contribute to forging a common language.
Outstanding Issues
There are four main issues that should be prioritized in the EU-LAS dialogue: 
migration management, regional security, the cultural dialogue, and conflict 
resolution.
The Management of Migration and Refugees is a priority, and Arabs and Europeans 
should seek ways to lessen the toll of this tragedy. But the Arabs should not serve 
merely as “police at a distance”. The root causes of migration need to be addressed. 
The Maghreb countries are transit countries, for now, but eventually they can become 
countries of final destination. In the meantime, the ‘youth bulge’ will force people to 
move in the absence of economic diversification, technological progress and regional 
integration.
Regional Security is threatened by the proliferation of radical groups, internal 
inequalities and protracted conflicts. EU-LAS Security cooperation is necessary, but 
not at the expense of human rights. Countries must not be allowed, under the pretext 
of fighting terrorism, to curb civil liberties or silence all opposition.
The Cultural Dialogue should be more systematic and should not only focus on 
the religious dialogue. It should involve civil society, but also towns, regions, local 
parliaments, universities and the mass media. More severe action is needed against 
hate speech.
124
Conflict resolution is important and co-operation with other actors such as the 
USA is also useful in many cases. But where this is not possible, the EU-LAS should 
be able to pursue an independent course of action.
Concluding Remarks
Regional trends are changing. For several decades, the EU was the main economic 
partner of the Arab World and the main investor. The situation began to change 
rapidly since 2000. Several Asian countries and members of MERCOSUR like Brazil, 
have entered Arab markets. In 2017, the LAS absorbed 10.3 % of all goods (excluding 
services) exported from the EU and  was the origin of 6.5% of all EU imports from 
the rest of the world. The EU had a trade surplus of €72 Billion (Eurostat, 2019). It 
is possible that the EU would be overtaken as the main trading partner by other 
countries in the region.
Regional developments that can put the EU-LAS cooperation in danger include: 
resurgent Arab fundamentalism which is not sympathetic to an Arab-European 
rapprochement; European temptations to privilege security over democracy 
promotion; EU turbulence in the light of Brexit; and the rise of populist movements 
and increasing hate speech.
The first EU-LAS Summit held in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, in February 2019, 
showed that the EU and the Arab World are “bound to cooperate” (Behrendt and 
Hanelt, 2000; Hanelt and Moller, 2008). It could have been the ideal occasion to kick-
start a new strategic partnership (Khader, 2019). Unfortunately, the summit’s timing, 
the absence of many Arab leaders, and the distraction of both European and Arab 
leaders with issues such as Brexit and the European elections, the war in Yemen, the 
Iran-Saudi rivalry and the Arab Gulf rift, seem to have cast their long shadow over 
the event. This should not be allowed to obscure the merits of the dialogue.
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Chapter Seven
The Future of European Security and 
Defence: Keeping the Americans in?
Valentina Cassar
Abstract
Through his remarks deriding the contribution of European states towards their 
individual and collective defence, President Donald Trump has sown seeds of 
doubt into the prospects for the transatlantic relationship. Yet a wider review of this 
relationship, and security and defence efforts within the EU, shows less cause for 
alarm. The EU’s development of its own security and defence identity and strategic 
autonomy independent of the United States is being pursued. It may be argued that 
developing and strengthening its political and strategic identity within a European 
and world order in flux may allow it to maintain a more cohesive political union, and 
strengthen its value as a strategic partner within the transatlantic alliance. Security 
has always been at the heart of European Integration. Identifying and formulating a 
common European strategy has been a challenge, yet considerable progress has been 
made in cultivating a common European strategic outlook. Moreover, the current 
international milieu provides the EU, and its member states, with the opportunity 
to focus on building its strategic autonomy and common outlook, and in the process 
seek to cultivate a common strategic culture that may generate greater cohesion. 
Furthermore, cooperation with the United States and NATO will remain at the heart 
of Europe’s strategic activity, and ultimately, EU strategic culture for the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, the ability to rely on NATO’s (and the U.S.) hard power will allow 
the EU to focus more effectively on civilian security capabilities and its soft power as 
a global actor.
Introduction
Both during his campaign and since his election, U.S. President Donald Trump 
has repeatedly bemoaned the discrepancies that exist in defence spending within 
the Transatlantic Alliance and called for European States to share a greater part of 
the burden. Whilst such sentiments within U.S. policy are by no means new, the 
tone of President Trump’s remarks within the broader context of his domestic and 
foreign policy have triggered debate on the future course of U.S. foreign policy and 
the implications for the transatlantic alliance and European Security and Defence.
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There have been many efforts – and difficulties – in defining a common European 
Strategic Culture, but at the core of a common European strategic outlook is the 
partnership with the United States. Thus, a common reality, if not so far as a culture, 
is the reliance on the transatlantic relationship and its extended deterrence. On 
the other hand, its extended deterrent role and commitment to the transatlantic 
partnership is inherent within U.S. Strategic Culture.
This is not to say that reluctance within different subcultures does not exist on either 
side of the Atlantic. The Jacksonian tradition in the United States retains a central 
role in offering the possibility of an inward-looking foreign policy that prioritises 
domestic considerations over international needs. Likewise, European States such as 
France often favour the aspiration towards a more independent foreign policy that is 
less reliant on the United States.
The policies of the current U.S. president and the challenges faced within the 
present international order provide an opportunity for Europe to build both a 
strategic culture and outlook and common strategic identity that will strengthen 
Europe’s role on the world stage, and prove itself a continuing worthy partner to the 
United States within the transatlantic relationship.
The real benefit in these initiatives will be in strengthening the capability of 
European States within the alliances they form part of, and in maintaining on the 
agenda the efforts to move closer towards a common European outlook, if not a 
European strategic culture.
This chapter explores the impact of current U.S. posturing on the prospects 
for security and defence developments in the European Union. I will begin by 
presenting an overview of the international context within which European security 
developments must be considered, together with the historical developments and 
policy trends that have shaped the trajectory of European security and defence 
integration thus far. Within this context, policy implications and options may be 
measured.
Thus, the main question is, will the EU develop its own security and defence 
identity and strategic autonomy independent of the United States? It could, but 
should not necessarily want to. Yet developing and strengthening its political and 
strategic identity within a European and world order in flux may allow it to maintain 
a more cohesive political union, and strengthen its value as a strategic partner within 
the transatlantic alliance.
The world Europe lives in
To begin any discussion of European Security and Transatlantic relations by citing 
Lord Ismay’s conceptualisation of intending to keep the Americans in, the Soviets 
out and the German’s down has become cliché. To also talk of Europe as an economic 
giant yet a military dwarf is also overly reiterated.
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Yet such tropes persist despite the radical changes and shifts that have taken place 
within the international system and across the European continent.
Lord Ismay’s sentiments capture concerns that prevailed for many of the key 
players and participants. Would the Soviet Union pursue expansionist tendencies 
into the West of the European Continent, or would the Atlantic Alliance succeed in 
containing its influence? Would Germany be contained in its ability to rebuild itself 
and expand its influence across the continent, or would it be successfully integrated 
with its European neighbours and allies?
And would the United States maintain its international focus and sustain its 
conviction to engage within the international community and extend its deterrent 
role and capabilities?
Seventy years after the foundation of NATO, and over sixty years since the Treaties 
of Rome, current debates are dominated by concerns that have evolved according 
to the changing international milieu, but are not too far removed from those that 
troubled the founders. European security remains overshadowed by the possibility of 
a Russian revival, questions over the extent of American commitment, and whether 
European partners are able to commit sufficiently to collective security.
Moreover, the debate over the current status quo in European Security has largely 
been overshadowed by events that have disrupted, so to speak, the peaceful progression 
of European political and security developments and integration, including the 
election of Donald Trump, and Brexit. Furthermore, the EU remains surrounded by 
unstable regions, including the Mediterranean and the Middle East, by challenges 
posed by migration, a more confident Russia, and the lingering threat of terrorism.
Meanwhile, the international liberal order that the Europeans and Americans spent 
the past decades designing and constructing appears to be gradually unravelling. 
Niblett has described a situation of “Liberalism in Retreat”, citing stumbling blocks 
in the progress and expansion of liberalist principles at an international level, but 
perhaps more importantly challenges posed by internal threats to the liberal 
order stemming from “domestic political and economic uncertainty” (Niblett, 
2017). The 2018 IISS Strategic Survey also warned that “statecraft is back”, arguing 
that “States that are unhappy with the international order, or wish to create their 
own, are finding weaker resistance to their efforts to change things in their favour” 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018). Kagan has famously warned that 
the international liberal order designed and carefully preserved by the United States 
and its allies is under threat, resulting in the proverbial geopolitical “jungle” growing 
back (Kagan, 2018). Yet, Mead has long argued that “westerners should never have 
expected old-fashioned geopolitics to go away” (Mead, 2014). In assessing the viability 
of the international liberal order, Nye has reinforced this argument by stating that 
“Governments will continue to possess power and resources, but the stage on which 
they play will become ever more crowded, and they will have less ability to direct the 
action” (Nye, 2017). Ikenberry has maintaind that “The future of this liberal order 
131
hinges on the ability of the United States and Europe – and increasingly a wider 
array of liberal democracies – to lead and support it” (Ikenberry, 2018).
Thus, the world in which Europe is living is currently in flux, both internally and 
externally.
Within this context, President Donald Trump has repeatedly derided his European 
counterparts for their apparent woeful contributions to defence spending and 
burden sharing within NATO, resulting in questions over the certainty of the 
United States’ commitment to European Security (Howorth, 2018). Whilst progress 
within security and defence integration in the European Union has increased over 
the past two decades, European Security has largely remained the domain of the 
Transatlantic Alliance. Yet in the current context it appears that the stars may be 
aligning to provide an impetus for a more entrenched European Security Identity 
(see Riddervold & Newsome, 2018; Leonard & Shapiro, 2019; Witney, 2019).
Whilst the process of European integration was one that was always intended to 
be ongoing, both in terms of geographic breadth and political scope, the current 
international milieu has provided the EU with the opportunity to demonstrate its 
benefit in providing a steady global political hand.
Security & Defence – Present at Europe’s Creation
The recent efforts at strengthening the EU’s “security and defence” dimension are by 
no means new. The very essence of European integration is in itself security, in that 
it sought to banish the possibility of conflict between European states.
France’s then Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, famously declared on 9th May 
1950 that Europe would not be built “all at once, or according to a single plan.” He 
called for institutionalising cooperation that would make “any war between France 
and Germany… not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Schuman, 
1950). The founders also acknowledged the security objectives of integration within 
the Preamble to the 1951 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, expressing their resolve to “substitute for age-old rivalries the merging 
of their essential interests” (Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, 1951).
Simultaneous proposals for a European Defence Community (EDC) were 
also championed. In recounting the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, Sloan details the concurrent talks over the establishment of the EDC 
(Sloan, 2016). During the discussions on the establishment of a European Defence 
framework, Sloan highlights the key concerns that prevailed, including U.S. worries 
regarding “European shortfalls” in contributions, as well as the duplication of efforts, 
French fears about German rearmament, and the possibility that the United States 
and Britain would retreat, leaving France to ‘balance’ or contain Germany alone. 
Eisenhower summed up French perceptions when he said that “the French have an 
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almost hysterical fear that we and the British will one day pull out of Western Europe 
and leave them to face a superior German armed force” (Sloan, 2016, p. 39).
Despite the failure of the European Defence Community, the European States went 
on to pursue alternative paths of integration, by signing the Rome Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community in 1957, and pledging to “lay the foundations 
of an ever-closer union” (Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 
1957).
Thus, European security and defence integration progressed under the banner of 
NATO. Even during the Cold War, when the United States’ extended deterrent role 
was at its height, concerns were also raised about the disparity in burden sharing. 
NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report explored the “Future Tasks of the Alliance”. The report 
approved on 18 December 1967 states that “the exercise has shown that the Alliance is 
a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing 
conditions.” It pointed out that “Although the disparity between the power of the 
United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is 
on its way towards unity” (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 1967).
Since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the bipolar divide allowed the European 
Community to step up the pace of its quest for ever closer union, transforming 
itself into the European Union, and widening the scope of its collaboration as well 
as its membership. Thus began its endeavours in building a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy through the Maastricht Treaty, and eventually establishing a 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) through the Lisbon Treaty.
American multilateralism and extended deterrence
Inextricably linked to the development of European security has been the role of the 
United States as an integral player through the provision of its security umbrella to 
the continent, which has been a consistent feature of the U.S.’ strategic outlook and 
defence policy over the decades.
Yet the past years have seen developments that rattled the assumptions regarding 
European Security and the frameworks within which it may rest.
In his analysis of “the transatlantic bargain” and its “defence of the west”, Sloan 
recalls George Washington’s advice during his farewell address in 1796 regarding the 
avoidance of permanent alliance – advice heeded to until the signing of the NATO 
treaty (Sloan, 2016). Yet the temptation to look towards a future disentangled from 
such permanent alliances remains one that is at times considered within U.S. Political 
and Strategic establishments. The Jacksonian tradition, if you will, has never been 
altogether ruled out (Mead, 2002).
Under the current Trump administration, the desire to “Make America great again” 
has also been accompanied by unfiltered and undiplomatic complaints about the 
133
imbalance in contributions towards European security. Yet such statements are not 
new. Successive Presidents and Administrations have long maintained that defence 
budget concerns needed to be addressed, culminating in the 2014 defence budget 
agreement reached at the NATO summit in Wales (Kaufman, 2017). Since 2014, 
NATO allies have reportedly made progress in increasing their defence spending, 
and have reported national plans to reach the goal of 2% of their respective GDP by 
2024 (see North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2019). In spite of this, American former 
diplomats and analysts such as Lute and Burns continue to argue that “President 
Trump has been right to push allies to spend more on defense. He has the support of 
the U.S. Congress and many Americans in doing so” (Lute & Burns, 2019, p. 3). They 
maintain that it is unfair that only five NATO allies currently spend at least 2% of 
their GDP, whilst the United States spends 3.5%.
The importance of multilateralism and in particular, transatlantic multilateralism 
is embedded within the very fabric of the United States’ strategic culture and 
outlook. Indeed, European political and security developments began and remained 
a reference point in the geopolitical outlook of the United States; initially due to the 
American rejection of European politics; out of a sense of exceptionalism with which 
the United States viewed itself and its role in the world (Mahnken, 2009).
With the end of the Second World War, the U.S. acknowledged that its exceptionalism 
and primacy within the international community needed to be translated into an 
engaged leadership role, both in the wake of the war and the construction of a liberal 
world order, but also within the context of the Cold War that emerged. Thus, whilst 
the U.S. pushed for the emergence of the United Nations, it also pursued multilateral 
frameworks and a system of alliances that would uphold the international order that 
U.S. primacy both favoured and required. However, reservations over the indefinite 
role that the U.S. would be expected to provide as guarantor of the international 
security order have always persisted.
The concerns surrounding multilateralism and international engagement often 
espoused today were indeed present within early Cold War strategy documents, such 
as the 1953 NSC162/2. Such documents underlined the necessity of a strong military 
posture, which should be complemented by multilateralism and alliances. It was 
also acknowledged that the U.S. did not want to indefinitely serve as the West’s sole 
security guarantor (U.S. National Security Council, 1953).
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence 
of the U.S. as the sole remaining superpower, within a “new world order” within 
which it sought to replace the bipolar divide with liberal multilateralism (Bush, 1990). 
Yet concerns regarding over-stretched engagements and guarantees continued to 
resonate.
Successive post-Cold War strategy documents affirmed that “the American 
commitment to an alliance strategy” was not only based on shared interests 
and common threats, but on shared values (The White House, 1990). They also 
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acknowledge that “while the United States cannot become the world’s policeman 
and assume responsibility for solving every international security problem, neither 
can we allow our critical interests to depend solely on international mechanisms 
that can be blocked by countries whose interests may be very different from our own” 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 1993).
Multilateralism and engagement remained central to U.S. Strategy under the 
Clinton administration, and the indivisibility of Transatlantic security continued to 
be emphasised (The White House, 1995; U.S. Department of Defense, 2000). Yet the 
Clinton administration also encouraged Europeans to assume greater responsibility 
in Europe. However, with the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia and the 
conflict that ensued, European inaction showed that American intervention became 
inevitable and remained necessary.
The George W. Bush Administration was often criticised for adopting a unilateral 
approach and appearing to disregard multilateral efforts. However, multilateral 
concerns continued to play a key role. Even within a changing security context, the 
quest for a collaborative security strategy remained a starting point (U.S. Department 
of Defense, 2001). In this respect, the Administration valued both established 
multilateral frameworks, as well as ad hoc security arrangements designed to suit 
specific needs (U.S. Department of Defense, 2001; and The White House, 2002).
The Obama Administration sought to restore the role and perception of U.S. 
multilateralism, yet expressed concern over the demands being placed on the United 
States (U.S. Department of Defense, 2010). The 2010 NSS states that “the burdens of 
a young century cannot fall on American shoulders alone – indeed, our adversaries 
would like to see America sap our strength by overextending our power” (The White 
House, 2010). There continues to be an emphasis placed on a wider distribution 
of effort and burden sharing: “This modernization of institutions, strengthening 
of international norms, and enforcement of international law is not a task for the 
United States alone—but together with like-minded nations, it is a task we can lead” 
(The White House, 2010). Whilst multilateralism and engagement were prioritised, 
the Obama administration, like previous ones, reserved the right to ‘go it alone’ (The 
White House, 2010; The White House, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015).
The December 2017 National Security Strategy published by the Trump 
Administration acknowledges the post-war international liberal order that was built 
in collaboration with other European and Asian counterparts, and the institutions 
that have formed the backbone of that international order (The White House, 2017). 
In asserting the priority of the strategy as protecting American citizens, values and 
way of life, the strategy states “Engaging with the world, however, does not mean the 
United States should abandon its rights and duties as a sovereign state or compromise 
its security” (The White House, 2017, p. 7). The document acknowledges the need for 
cooperation with partners and alliances in order to counter prevailing threats.
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The 2017 Strategy also attaches the exceptionalism of the United States to its 
historical track record in assisting “fragile and developing countries become 
successful societies”, citing as its foremost example the recovery of Western Europe 
through the Marshall Plan (The White House, 2017, p. 38). Moreover, the NSS 
reaffirms the importance of a “strong and free Europe” (The White House, 2017, p. 47). 
It underscores the interdependence of U.S. and European shared values; prosperity, 
stability and security; and affirms the U.S. commitment to European allies, stating 
“the NATO alliance of free and sovereign states is one of our greatest advantages 
over our competitors, and the United States remains committed to Article V of the 
Washington Treaty.” The strategy goes on to maintain that “The NATO alliance will 
become stronger when all members assume greater responsibility for and pay their 
fair share to protect our mutual interests, sovereignty, and values” (The White House, 
2017, p. 48).
Thus when placed in context, it becomes clear that whilst the tone of President 
Trump’s remarks (and tweets) on the subject are in stark contrast with those of his 
predecessors or what is expected of a head of state, the substance of his administration’s 
policy statements are reflective of the historical evolution and in keeping with the 
variations generally expected out of a change in administration or the change in 
political party in office. They are a continuation of past policies.
Defining a European Strategic Outlook
Since its foundation, a primary challenge in developing a coordinated foreign and 
security policy under the umbrella of the European Union has been agreement over 
a common European strategic outlook and culture (Schmidt & Zyla, 2011). Such 
challenges have been inherent in all areas of political and economic integration, yet 
external policy has proved to be more sensitive due to the issue of sovereignty.
Leading European States such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy 
have also retained the desire to maintain a leadership role within the international 
community, and have recognized the benefits of utilizing the European Union to do 
so.
A challenge in identifying a coherent European strategic culture has been the fact 
that 28 Member States bring with them 28 different perspectives and sets of interests 
(Biehl, Giegerich & Jonas, 2013). Yet there appears to be a common agreement on 
the role of the EU’s economic and value-based political leadership within the 
international community.
Significant progress has been made in the EU’s integration in security and defence 
over the past two decades, particularly in identifying a common outlook towards 
the strategic challenges that the Union faces. In this regard, the EU Global Strategy 
(EUGS) in 2016 has sought to bridge existing gaps, and focus on commonalities 
between member states, most evidently in developing the role of the EU as a civilian 
security actor. In fact, in discussing the “construction of ‘European security’”, Selchow 
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reviews the discourse and language used in the EUGS, and considers them a space for 
the negotiation and contestation of concepts and identities that make up the notion 
of European security (Selchow, 2016).
There are indeed several strong narratives and themes that emerge from the EUGS 
that are reflective of the broad EU-wide consultative process before the strategy was 
drawn up. The document also acknowledges the importance of collective security. 
The EU’s member states may have varying strategic outlooks and priorities, but as 
High Representative Federica Mogherini acknowledges, “none of our countries has 
the strength nor the resources to address these threats and seize the opportunities 
of our time alone” (European Union, 2016, p. 3). She emphasizes the importance 
of “shared interests, principles and priorities”. She notes that “Grounded in the 
values enshrined in the Treaties and building on our many strengths and historic 
achievements, we will stand united in building a stronger Union, playing its 
collective role in the world” (European Union, 2016, p. 7).
In highlighting the priorities of the EU’s external action service, an emphasis is 
placed on enhancing the EU’s strategic autonomy. Yet it is also maintained that the 
future of European security and defence remains embedded within the framework 
of NATO. It is acknowledged that “NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock 
of Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years. It remains the strongest and most 
effective military alliance in the world” (European Union, 2016, p. 36). Enhancing the 
EU’s capabilities would firmly complement those of the transatlantic alliance.
The EUGS states that “a more credible European defence is essential also for the 
sake of a healthy transatlantic partnership with the United States” (European Union, 
2016, p. 20). It also highlights that “On the broader security agenda, the U.S. will 
continue to be our core partner” (European Union, 2016, p. 36).
The 2018 review of the strategy’s implementation emphasizes the relationship with 
the United States, despite the uncertain rhetoric and statements being made. The 
review asserts that “A strong and well-functioning transatlantic partnership remains 
a crucial element for Europe’s security and prosperity. The EU remains committed 
to the strategic partnership with the United States, based on shared values, interests, 
and a willingness to play a responsible role in world affairs to our mutual benefit.” 
Whilst the successes in collaboration are underscored, it is noted that the EU has 
also “stood up for our values, principles and interests when we felt that they were 
challenged and we will continue to do so. This is particularly true when it comes 
to defending and promoting the rules-based international order that has been built 
together with the U.S. in recent decades” (European Union, 2018, p. 11).
Whilst the EUGS maps out the vision that the Member States seek to achieve 
through their coordinated role, the annual reports published on the implementation 
of the strategy provide detailed insight into the practical progress that has been made. 
In her forward to the 2017 report, Mogherini notes, “more has been achieved in the 
last ten months than in the last ten years” (European Union, 2017, p. 5). Achievements 
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over the past years include a new command centre for EU training and advisory 
missions, and progress towards developing greater ‘military mobility’, a political 
agreement to establish a ‘European Defence Industrial Development Programme’, 
and more ambitious proposals to set up a ‘European Defence Fund’ and a ‘European 
Peace Facility’ (see European Union, 2017; European Union, 2018). Enhanced 
cooperation has also seen the development of a Coordinated Annual Review on 
Defence (CARD) and a Civilian CSDP Compact (see European Union, 2019). The EU 
also deepened its partnerships with NATO. In fact, the third annual review highlights 
the “unprecedented cooperation between the EU and NATO, with no less than 74 
common actions to date in the framework of the two Joint Declarations of 2016 and 
2018” (European Union, 2019, p. 11. See also European Union, 2017, p.23; European 
Union, 2018, p.8).
Perhaps the most visible achievement has been the launching of Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017 (see Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017), 
which aims to fulfil the need for “enhanced coordination, increased investment and 
more cooperation in developing defence capabilities”. The fact that such cooperation 
is taking place within a treaty-based framework is a revolutionary aspect, in light 
of the historical political hesitancy that has always existed in this regard (see EEAS, 
2019).
In reviewing the progress made and assessing prospects for the future of the 
European Union in this regard, two points must be raised.
Firstly, the real test to PESCO and the EU and the leaps and bounds that have 
been made in coordination in this field will come in the face of crisis that requires 
intervention, particularly one in which other “like-minded” military actors (such 
as the United States) will be reluctant to act. If one thinks back to the reaction of 
the international community to the Arab Spring, and more specifically to the civil 
war that broke out in Libya, political and public opinion within the United States 
recognized the need for intervention, but felt that it was not a priority for the United 
States but should have been for other regional allies. Thus, the U.S. agreed to lead 
from behind, and facilitate a greater political role while the military intervention 
was spearheaded by the UK and France. At the time, Germany was a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council, but it abstained when the vote was taken. The 
question is whether the technical cooperation facilitated by PESCO will trickle into 
the political deliberations when the EU faces similar scenarios.
Secondly, it may be argued that the benefit of PESCO is the existence of PESCO 
itself. The coordination and enhanced investments in military and defence will 
expand the military profile of the EU as a collaborative power within the international 
community. Furthermore, the ability to boast such capabilities, even if not put to use, 
is in itself a demonstration of power and influence within the international system. 
Therefore the benefit of PESCO may be in the collaboration itself, even if it is not put 
to the test.
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Envisioning Europe’s world role
The end of the Second World War provided an opportunity for integration. Whilst 
attempts were made at pursuing integration at a political and defence level, it 
was evident that the climate was not yet ripe. The end of the Cold War provided 
a natural next step for furthering European integration, whereby the international 
milieu facilitated, if not expected, the European Union to begin to rely on its own 
capabilities without necessarily requiring the United States to extend its reach across 
the Atlantic.
We witnessed efforts to develop both the political and logistical requirements, 
embodied in treaty reforms from the Maastricht Treaty, to St Malo and finally 
the Lisbon Treaty. Concurrently, we also saw NATO evolve and redefine the way 
it perceived its own role within the evolving international system through the 
publication of updated strategic concepts to better reflect the times.
The course of events has also tested the political will and strategic commitments 
of both the Europeans and their American allies. The fragmentation of the former 
Yugoslavia, Kosovo, the Iraq War, Libya and Syria, have all tested the resolve of the 
transatlantic allies and raised debate as to which side of the Atlantic leadership and 
responsibility should lie (Anderson, 2018).
Moreover, the delicate balance between pursuing European security and stability 
via NATO and/or the European Union is a continuous debate that seeks to ensure 
effectiveness and a smart distribution of capabilities (see Smith, 2018; Howorth, 2018).
The EU has weathered crises and rifts before. Challenges, particularly those related 
to failures in security and defence policy, have always been followed by renewed 
efforts over integration and continuity. After all, the process of European integration 
is one that at its roots was defined as an “ever closer union” that would be brought 
about gradually and over time. Thus, the EU – and its member states – may seize the 
opportunity at hand to further the course of European integration when it comes.
It is within these contexts in mind that the recent statements by President 
Donald Trump must be measured, and the implications for the wider transatlantic 
relationship and prospects for European security considered.
The current milieu is unique in that we are not witnessing a drastic turn of events 
that is transforming international order, but gradual shifts that are indicating a slow 
retreat by the United States. Whether this shift will be temporary or not is impossible 
to predict. In the meantime, it is certain that an erosion of the liberal international 
order has been set in motion – which will be difficult to reverse.
This context has set the stage for the possibility of further progress in strengthening 
the technical and political collaboration between the EU member states within the 
sphere of security and defence.
Success has been achieved in the institutionalization of commitment and 
cooperation through the work of the European External Action Service, the 
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publication and implementation of the EUGS, and the commitment to develop its 
own strategic autonomy through PESCO. In parallel, the past five years have seen 
greater efforts to move towards increased defence spending under the umbrella of 
NATO.
We have seen greater efforts to strengthen European initiatives from within the 
institutions and also from leading member states.
France and Germany have traditionally been at the helm of the European integration 
process, and have sought to tap into the current climate in order to strengthen the 
international political profile of the EU, and their respective roles at the forefront.
In June 2016, the French and German Foreign Ministers at the time – Jean Marc 
Ayrault and Frank Walter Steinmeier – published a joint “vision” on the future 
of Europe on the heels of Britain’s Brexit vote. They described the result of the 
referendum as a regrettable decision that would result in consequences for both the 
UK and the rest of the EU. They asserted that the EU is a source of stability in the 
world, and would work to champion cohesion within the Union and strengthen its 
role on the world stage (Ayrault & Steinmeier, 2016).
In September 2017, France’s President Macron spoke about his vision for the future 
of Europe, and pegged the challenges being faced in consolidating European security 
and defence on the lack of a common strategic culture. He therefore proposed the 
creation of a European Intervention Initiative which would seek to foster collaboration 
and bridge the varying European strategic cultures that exist (Macron, 2017).18 This 
initiative has been described as separate, but complementary to the work of the UN, 
NATO and the EU, in that it would facilitate cooperation within the context of such 
multilateral frameworks (Letter of Intent, 2018).
President Macron also sought to lead the European debate on the future of 
European security and defence taking due account of President Trump’s remarks 
regarding the share of defence spending within the transatlantic alliance. In a widely 
reported interview on French radio in November 2018, in the midst of centennial 
commemorations for the World War One Armistice, President Macron spoke of the 
need to create a “true European army” (BBC News, 2018). Macron spoke of the need 
to “have a Europe that can defend itself alone – and without only relying on the 
United States – in a more sovereign manner” (Noack & McAuley, 2018). This was 
met with mixed reactions – namely positive – from the likes of German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and European Commission officials (see BBC NEWS, 2018; Reuters, 
2018). Trump misleadingly tweeted that France’s suggestion “that Europe build its 
own military in order to protect itself from the U.S., China and Russia” was “very 
insulting” (Noack & McAuley, 2018).
18 The initiative was later launched in June 2018, with the Defence Ministers of Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK as 
signatories to the Letter of Intent.
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Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has also actively remarked on the role that 
Germany as well as Europe should pursue in the light of President Trump’s repeated 
statements on European Defence spending. In a speech delivered in August 2018 he 
referred to Kagan’s proverbial “jungle growing back” which would replace the rule-
based liberal international order that the western allies had cultivated. He expressed 
the opinion that the rhetoric emerging from Washington could result in fundamental 
shifts within the strategic realities that Germany and Europe function, and therefore 
necessitates policies that would maintain collaboration and balance within Europe 
and across the Atlantic. He maintained that “By strengthening the European pillar of 
the transatlantic alliance, we are creating the conditions for ensuring that Americans 
and Europeans can rely on each other also in the future” (Maas, 2018a).
Maas has also spoken of the need to cultivate an “alliance of multilateralists”, turning 
to partners such as France, Canada, and also appealing to Japan and other European 
partners to join a network of countries committed to a rules-based world order. He 
has described this not as an “anti-Trump alliance” but as an effort to counteract 
“those who have declared war on the multilateral world order.” (Hoffmann, & Schult, 
2019). He has argued that the security challenges being faced can only be addressed 
collectively, and that it is in Europe’s interest to lead such an initiative (see Hoffmann, 
& Schult, 2019; & Maas, 2018b).
Whilst applauding the progress that has been made within the EU through PESCO, 
he also maintained that the EU has an important role to play as a civilian actor and in 
crisis prevention, highlighting that “Security is not exclusively a military question” 
(Hoffmann, & Schult, 2019). During the 2019 Munich Security Conference, Maas 
argued that security must be conceptualised holistically without focusing on defence 
budgets alone (Maas, 2019).
These sentiments have also been echoed by High Representative Federica 
Mogherini, who referred to the evolution of the European Union into a “security 
provider ‘at large’”. She describes the success achieved over the past years as the 
fruition of “A dream that our founding fathers and mothers always dreamt of, but 
never managed to accomplish”. She asserts that European soft power is now finally 
complemented by “a credible hard power component” (Mogherini, 2019).
In fact, Mogherini has also acknowledged that cooperation with NATO remains a 
fundamental aspect of EU’s security and defence outlook, noting that “NATO is the 
pillar of Europe’s collective defence; it is even mentioned in the European Union 
treaties”. She maintains “For us Europeans, strategic autonomy and cooperation with 
our partners are two sides of the same coin” (Mogherini, 2019).
This reality is epitomized by the fact that other EU member states do still prioritise 
the relationship with the United States and will go to great lengths to anchor its 
security umbrella within the continent. This was exemplified by the Trump 
Administration’s commitment to boost U.S. troop presence in Poland, and the 
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efforts that have been made on the part of the Polish Government to secure a more 
permanent U.S. military presence in that country (Baker, 2019).
Despite the remarks coming from the White House, the relationship between the 
United States and its European counterparts continues to function across a broad 
range of issues. Testament to this is the visit to Germany by U.S. Secretary of State 
Michael Pompeo in May 2019. Here Heiko Maas asserted that “The very close contacts 
between Europe and the United States of America is not only in our mutual interest, 
I think it is also the expression of a deep-rooted friendship, which is based on shared 
values above all”. Both Maas and Pompeo spoke of the broad range of foreign and 
security issues over which strong collaboration remains important (U.S. Department 
of State, 2019).
Concluding Remarks
Through his frequent remarks deriding the contribution of European states towards 
their individual and collective defence, President Donald Trump has sown seeds 
of doubt into the prospects for the transatlantic relationship. Yet a wider review of 
this relationship and security and defence efforts within the EU shows less cause for 
alarm.
It may be argued that the message of Trump’s foreign policy remarks is not 
necessarily new. Concerns over burden sharing have always persisted and will remain, 
but so too will Atlanticist sentiments and commitments, both within the current 
administration and the opposition. U.S. strategic culture is in fact defined by both its 
commitment to extended deterrence, but also the tendency to “look inwards”.
Security has always been at the heart of European Integration. Identifying and 
formulating a common European strategy has been a challenge, yet considerable 
progress has been made in cultivating a common European strategic outlook, if not 
culture. Moreover, the current international milieu provides the EU, and its member 
states, with the opportunity to focus on building its strategic autonomy and common 
strategic outlook, and in the process seeks to cultivate a common strategic culture 
that may generate greater cohesion. In fact, the third annual review of the European 
Global Strategy recommends that “Europeans can work towards a common strategic 
culture, entailing convergence in threat assessment, commitment to common 
responses, and, as a prerequisite of this, acting on the principle of solidarity enshrined 
in our Treaty” (see European Union, 2019, p. 12).
Recent developments beg the question as to whether the EU is trying to move 
towards creating capabilities that would make it completely autonomous from the 
United States, and even hypothetically eventually allow it to detach from NATO, 
should the circumstances arise. Perhaps this is the case, but we are certainly not 
there yet, be it in terms of capabilities and autonomy, or even in terms of political 
will. Thus, bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the United States, and the role 
of NATO will remain at the heart of Europe’s strategic activity, and ultimately, EU 
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strategic culture for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the ability to rely on NATO’s 
(and U.S.) hard power will allow the EU to focus more effectively on civilian security 
capabilities and its soft power as a global actor.
As with all foreign and security policy, a major source of influence comes from 
domestic sources. Recent political developments and elections have shown that 
traditional politics and political establishments are increasingly being challenged, 
and the EU will likely spend the coming years distracted by having to deal with 
domestic instability in an attempt to overcome the challenge posed by fringe and 
anti-establishment political parties.
Whilst this has the potential to “distract” the EU from external policies, the current 
political fragmentation may alternatively be remedied by the efforts championed by 
the institutions, as well as by leading member states such as France and Germany, to 
create internal cohesion through effective external action. This is the great hope of 
the EUGS.
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Chapter Eight
The Future of EU Defence and inter-
Parliamentary Co-operation
Roderick Pace
Abstract
The EU has embarked on new initiatives to achieve closer union in defence policy. 
This was signalled by the establishment of a Permanent Structure Cooperation 
(PESCO) in 2018. At the same time the EU institutions are on the cusp of approving 
the new European Defence Fund (EDF). In the context of the 2016 EU Global Strategy 
(EUGS), this chapter looks at some aspects of future developments in this field and 
argues in favour of more parliamentary involvement and oversight by the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments mindful that – with the exception of 
a few of them – the latter have not shown a lot of activism. In the context of the 
EU’s norms, the chapter looks at the traditional EU approaches in external relations 
such as ‘civilian power’ and ‘democracy promotion’, and how the parliamentary 
oversight could ensure that they are preserved in the EU’s foreign policy repertoire. 
Parliaments can also contribute to the clarification of strategic autonomy and the 
still vague “principled pragmatism” cited in the EUGS.
Introduction
The discussion on the future of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) is part of the broader issue of European Security and the wider subject of the 
future of the European Union. The EU’s main justification for embarking on further 
integration in defence is the need of achieving a modicum of strategic autonomy. 
Strategic autonomy has various possible connotations. Both the European Parliament 
(EP) and national parliaments (NPs) (collectively referred to as EU Parliaments) have 
a role to play in scrutinizing the EU’s defence policy individually and by engaging 
in inter-parliamentary cooperation. Decisions in the CFSP-CSDP are taken by EU 
governments and are meant to be scrutinized by their own national parliaments, 
but this does not always happen. The level of scrutiny varies across all parliaments 
for different reasons such as the parliaments’ constitutional position, formal and 
informal power on defence and foreign policy, parliamentary traditions, composition, 
resources and the readiness of members of parliament (MPs) to involve themselves. 
In the meantime, the EP has a consultative role in the Common Foreign and Security 
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Policy (CFSP) and an even more limited role in the CSDP. However, it has a bigger 
role as co-legislator in several policies of relevance in the broader field of the EU’s 
external relations.
A 2017 European Commission white paper on the Future of European Defence 
outlines three scenarios. The first proposes enhanced cooperation; the second 
projects increased shared security and defence; while the third suggests a common 
defence and security union (European Commission, 2017). The three scenarios imply 
different levels of pooling of sovereignty and resources. The third is probably the 
most effective, but requires the deepest political integration.
Public support for a common European defence is high. According to Eurobarometer, 
“more than three-quarters of Europeans (76%, +1 percentage point since spring 2018 
survey) say they are in favour of a common European defence and security policy, 
while 18% are opposed and 6% (-1% over the previous survey) express no opinion” 
(Eurobarometer 90: 2019). The same survey shows that among the citizens’ main 
concerns, the “EU’s influence in the world” is only seventh at a low 11%; when asked 
to identify the main positive results of the EU, they rank “political and diplomatic 
influence in the rest of the world” in sixth place. EU citizens support a common 
defence but are not so enthusiastic about the EU’s influence in the world.
What is unclear is the kind of defence union that European citizens support. 
This is because the strengthening of the CSDP is still a work-in-progress, and the 
meaning of “strategic autonomy” is vague. It is not the aim of this chapter to engage 
in a lengthy discussion of strategic autonomy,19 but whatever level of autonomy is 
eventually achieved it will require EU citizens to take on a bigger share of the burden 
of their own defence. NATO is likely to remain indispensable for Europe’s defence 
for the foreseeable future. The 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) says that “The EU 
will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability 
development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions 
to build the capacities of our partners…” (p. 37).
There are no prospects that the EU could emerge, or plans to become, a global 
power like the USA, Russia or China. The treaties do not permit it to acquire nuclear 
weapons nor to develop autonomously from NATO. The Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) specifies that the CSDP “shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations 
of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)…” (Treaty on European Union, Article 42(2)). 
The same treaty article says that a common defence policy will be adopted when the 
European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. In this case, the Member States 
19 Some very pertinent points about strategic autonomy are raised in the paper by Barbara 
Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza and Volker Perthes (eds.) (2019).
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have to ratify such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements (Treaty on European Union, Article 42(2)).
In the debate on the future of EU defence, little to no attention has been given 
to the enhancement of the parliamentary dimension. Can the current structure of 
inter-parliamentary cooperation and scrutiny of the CFSP/CSDP be improved, and is 
it necessary to improve it?
Inter-parliamentary scrutiny of defence harks back to the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Western European Union (PA-WEU) which was founded in 1954 on the basis 
of the Modified 1948 Brussels Treaty. In 2008, the PA-WEU became the European 
Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA), but by 2011 the WEU was wound down and 
a new inter-parliamentary initiative began under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty 
(LT). The Conference of Speakers of the European Union (EU) Parliaments, meeting 
in Brussels on 4–5 April 2011 and in Warsaw on 20–21 April 2012, established an Inter-
Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (IPC-CFSP/CSDP). The first 
meeting of the IPC-CFSP/CSDP took place in Cyprus in 2012 during its presidency of 
the Council of the EU. Since then, the parliament of the member state holding the 
presidency of the Council of the EU has led the event. Fifteen IPCs have been held so 
far; the last one took place in Helsinki in September 2019.
This chapter focuses on three main issues:
1. The scrutiny role of parliaments in the CFSP-CSDP and how this can be 
improved.
2. New avenues that parliaments can explore in strengthening the legitimacy of 
EU actions in the CFSP-CSDP.
3. To give new meaning to the traditional concept of ‘civilian power’ in a context 
of a more defence-minded EU.
Turbulent Times
Turbulence is an eternal condition of world politics, and in this sense our times may 
not really be different from other times. International developments since the start of 
the Ukraine crisis have been cited as reasons triggering further integration in defence. 
This is true but only to a limited extent. EU defence integration has been on the 
agenda for several decades. The most significant event was doubtlessly the adoption 
of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) to replace the 2003 European Security Strategy 
(ESS). That was followed by the EU-NATO Joint Declaration (NATO, 2016) adopted 
in Warsaw a few days later in which the two sides pledged to strengthen cooperation. 
These developments lessened some of the pessimism that had descended on the EU 
after the UK referendum of 23 June 2016 in which a majority voted for BREXIT.
The leaders of the EU-27 meeting in Bratislava in September to take stock of the 
situation created by BREXIT, agreed that at the December European Council, they 
would decide on a concrete implementation plan on security and defence; how to 
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make better use of the options in the Treaties, especially as regards capabilities; 
and start implementing the joint declaration with NATO immediately (European 
Council 2016).
Hot on the heels of the EUGS, in November 2016 the High Representative/Vice 
President Federica Mogherini launched the Implementation Plan on Security and 
Defence (IPSD) with three main objectives: to enable the EU to respond to crises, 
strengthen the capacities of the member states and protect the EU from external 
threats and actions. A year later, in December 2017, a Permanent Structured 
Cooperation on Defence (PESCO) was launched by 25 EU member states. This was 
followed by the adoption of a European Capability Plan, Coordinated Annual Review 
of Defence (CARD) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), which is still in the 
process of approval, and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme 
(EDIDP).
Since the start of the USA presidency of Donald Trump in January 2017, the trans-
Atlantic Partnership has gone through trying times. However, this is not the reason 
why the EU started the process of further enhancing its defence policy, though 
doubtlessly Trump’s tactics gave it impetus.20 The aim of a common European 
defence had featured in the Union’s foundational treaties since 1993 (26 years before) 
following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.
20 President Donald Trump halted negotiations on the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) with the EU, criticised the EU on several occasions, threatened to leave 
NATO and quarrelled with his European allies by withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement.
A Historic Glimpse
The magnitude of the challenge of a common European defence is better appraised 
by recalling that it has been discussed intermittently for more than 300 years. In 
1710, the English Quaker John Bellers had proposed the reorganization of Europe 
into 100 cantons of equal size with a common European law, and each contributing a 
thousand men, money or ships of equal value to defend Europe’s borders. Three years 
later, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre proposed a European “Grand Alliance” (1713) which 
would command a European force to make Europe’s borders impervious to external 
challenges while exercising a hegemonic stability internally to stop any member 
state of the Alliance from growing at the expense of another by the use of force. In 
both proposals, intra-European conflicts were to be resolved by diplomacy pursued 
within a permanent European assembly, while the borders of Europe were to be 
guarded by a European army.
The contemporary efforts to strengthen European defence are traceable to several 
developments since the end of the Second World War (WWII). The 1948 Brussels 
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Treaty, the Washington Treaty (1949) and the founding of the Trans-Atlantic 
Alliance, the launching and failure of the Pleven Plan (1950–54), the establishment 
of the Western European Union (WEU, 1954) and the Fouchet Plans (1959–62) debacle 
are the most familiar landmarks. The start of European Political Cooperation (EPC, 
1970), later incorporated in the founding treaties by the Single European Act (1987), 
improved inter-governmental harmonisation in foreign policy among the European 
Community’s (EC) member states, but had a negligible impact on defence cooperation. 
The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) established the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and its component, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which 
since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has become the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP).
The emergence of ESDP-CSDP was helped by NATO’s 1996 decision to allow the 
WEU to develop the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) permitting 
the deployment of NATO military assets in EU-led peace-keeping/peace-building 
missions in line with the Petersberg Tasks21, which were originally codified in 1992. 
The Lisbon Treaty expanded these tasks further.
Several difficulties lie in the way of a common European defence: member states 
prioritize their own national security, 22 of them are members of NATO while the rest 
are not. The larger member states have more resources than smaller states and larger 
states have wider global interests than smaller ones (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, 
2017; Handel, 1990; East, 1973). Member states have to invest more, the European arms 
industry needs restructuring and rationalization, and more synergies are required 
between national research organizations. Public support is key to the achievement 
of a more effective defence union. Parliaments and political parties have a role to 
play in maintaining this support by engaging the public, civil society and the media.
21 In the original WEU Declaration of 1992, the tasks consisted of humanitarian and 
rescue tasks; peacekeeping; the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace making. The Lisbon Treaty expanded them to: “joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention 
and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-
making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against 
terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their 
territories” (Treaty on European Union, Article 43).
The Parliamentary Dimension
The parliamentary dimension of the CSDP is justifiable because the EU is a 
community of democratic states with elected parliaments, which since the end of 
WWII, and to varying degrees, have gradually acquired more power in scrutinizing 
their respective national executives. Democratic parliaments (as opposed to rubber-
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stamp ones) legitimize decisions. The literature on parliamentary scrutiny is 
extensive and reference to it is made in this section.
The LT has increased the powers of national parliaments particularly through 
Protocol 1 on the role of National Parliaments in the European Union, and Protocol 
2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The IPC-
CFSP/CSDP justifies its legality by reference to Protocol 1. National parliaments 
started meeting in 1989, when the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for 
Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC) was set up. COSAC 
received a strong impetus from the Amsterdam Treaty and then from the LT’s 
provisions on national parliaments (COSAC Secretariat, 2012).
The Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) introduced by the LT led to speculation 
that national parliaments could constitute the third chamber (after Council and 
the EP) in the EU’s legislative process (Cooper, 2011). However, the effectiveness 
with which the national parliaments exercise these new powers varies considerably 
across the member states. The CFSP-CSDP proved to be the most difficult to secure 
inter-parliamentary cooperation and involvement, mostly because of its inter-
governmental nature and conflicts between the EP and NPs (Hefftler et al., 2015, p. 21). 
In 2018, the number of national Parliaments not issuing any opinions under Protocol 
2 had risen to eight (ten chambers) (European Commission, 2019) showing a degree 
of laxity in scrutinizing EU affairs.
The party structure and political tradition of parliaments affects the type of 
scrutiny and control that they exercise on the executive. Holzhacker (2008) identifies 
several modes of parliamentary activism each of which determines the depth and 
manner of scrutiny or control of the executive: non-party mode where a parliament 
tries to increase its power vis-à-vis the government, i.e. it defends what it sees as 
its constitutional powers within a democratic system; cross-party mode where 
members from various political parties unite to press a government to consider their 
geographic or sectoral interests usually pursued through informal channels; inter-
parliamentary mode in which government and opposition diverge along party lines. 
Ariella Huff (2015) argues that the “CFSP in general is of relatively low salience across 
the board, particularly since the advent of the financial and Eurozone crises which 
have captured so much public and political attention since 2008”.
The latest Eurobarometer (2019) data shows that the EU’s influence in the world has 
low saliency among European citizens, though this varies across the member states. 
This could be a reason why MPs seem so lukewarm, and parliaments so reluctant, to 
scrutinizing the CFSP. Huff (2015) (see also Fiott, 2019) observes that “unlike scrutiny 
of EU legislation, oversight of the EU’s foreign policy generally remains ad hoc, non-
automatic and non-systematic, even in archetypically ‘strong’ parliaments like the 
Folketing. In this context, parliamentarians must first choose to make use of their 
authority and ability; if they remain uninterested in doing so, then scrutiny either 
does not happen at all (as is typical in the Polish case) or is largely a matter of going 
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through the motions and rubber-stamping government actions (as in Italy). Thus, the 
elements of both authority and ability that best indicate strength are those that serve 
to make scrutiny a systematic, normatively accepted part of everyday parliamentary 
work.” In short, formal authority matters, but it is useless if the parliamentarians are 
not able or willing to exercise it. Raising national parliaments’ interest in the CFSP-
CSDP is one of the challenges that needs attention to avoid serious cleavages between 
voters and governments on the CSDP.
The European Parliament’s Powers
Since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, the EP gradually increased some of its powers and 
contribution to the CFSP-CSDP and external relations; ranging from parliamentary 
diplomacy, to trade and climate change (see Stavridis and Irrera, 2015). The founding 
treaties (TEU and TFEU), as established by the LT, are the source of the EP’s powers. 
Article 36 (TEU) obliges the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy (HR) to regularly consult the EP on the main aspects and the basic 
choices of the CFSP/CSDP, and to inform it on how those policies evolve. The HR 
must ensure that the views of the EP are taken into account. The Parliament can also 
make recommendations to the HR, and twice a year it holds a debate on progress 
in implementing the CFSP/CSDP. In addition, as a result of inter-institutional 
agreements, the parliament participates in Joint Consultation Meetings (JCMs) to 
exchange information with the Council, the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and the Commission. Outside the EU it participates in the NATO Parliamentary 
Assembly. Its consent is required in enlargement or when a country decides to leave 
the Union, as well as in the ratification of international agreements and the right to 
be consulted on CFSP/CSDP agreements (TEU, Publications Office of the EU, 2016; 
Turunen, 2019).
The European Parliament has about 44 delegations for relations with non-
member countries’ parliaments. It sends delegations to five regional parliamentary 
assemblies (e.g. NATO-PA, Union for the Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, 
etc.) and has several joint parliamentary committees involving third states and 
regions. This constitutes the main thrust of the Parliament’s diplomacy. The most 
important EP committee is the powerful Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) and its 
sub-committees covering Human Rights (DROI) and Security and Defence (SEDE). 
Then there are the committees which respectively cover International Trade (INTA) 
and Development (DEVE). Further integration in defence policy has involved, and 
is likely to involve several other committees, such as the one covering Industry, 
Research and Energy (ITRE) which in 2018 together with AFET and SEDE, reviewed 
the proposed Commission Regulation for the establishment of the European Defence 
Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP).
In theory and within certain limitations, the EP can wield its budgetary powers 
to have a bigger say in other aspects of defence policy as it did in the case of the 
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setting up of the EEAS in 2010 but this tactic has several limitations and cannot be 
used frequently. Moreover, considering several policy areas hitherto considered to lie 
outside the purview of external relations overlap with, the parliament’s influence is 
most likely to increase particularly since the EUGS advocates a broad comprehensive 
and integrated approach to crises management that involves several EU policies. In 
its December 2018 report and resolution on the CFSP, the EP supported the main 
thrusts of the EUGS and the developments which have occurred so far in the defence 
sector. However, the parliament also stressed that further integration in defence 
must be accompanied by increased parliamentary control. The meaning of “control” 
also raises several arguments and needs further clarification.
National Parliaments
At the first IPC-CFSP/CSDP in Cyprus, Elmar Brok (2012), Chairman of AFET 
proposed the following objectives for EP-national parliaments’ cooperation: (a) to 
deepen cooperation and make the parliaments’ voice count on key foreign policy 
challenges; (b) to scrutinize better the decisions made by executives, and thereby 
provide parliamentary legitimacy in the area of CFSP and CSDP; (c) to promote a 
more strategic approach to foreign policy priorities; (d) to monitor and ensure that 
these policies include specific support to countries in democratic transition, and in 
particular in the southern neighbourhood; (e) and, finally, to address the problems 
which result from declining defence capabilities and promote the development of 
new civilian capacities for the CSDP. In the final statement the IPC-CFSP/CSDP 
resolved “to enhance the democratic engagement in the Union’s CFSP and CSDP by 
promoting a more systematic, regular and timely exchange of information on the 
different aspects and implications of the CFSP and CSDP, at national and European 
level and to (use the parliamentary dialogue) to address the decision-making, 
capacity‐building and operational weaknesses of the CFSP and CSDP, so as to make it 
more effective and efficient in addressing our common challenges and pursuing our 
common goals” (Paphos, 2012). This approach can be implemented, but successful 
implementation depends on the resources and willingness to engage in each of the 
national parliaments. There is no question that the EP is already engaged up to the 
powers granted to it by the LT. There is also little to disagree with the point which 
is often stressed (see for example Fiott, 2019) that effective parliamentary scrutiny of 
the CSDP requires EP-national parliamentary cooperation.
Some national parliaments have the means to be effective scrutinizers others do 
not. For example, in the setting up of the European Defence Fund (EDF), a work 
which is still in progress, the deadline for the submission of reasoned opinions on 
grounds of subsidiarity was 24 September 2018, but none were submitted (EPRS, 
2019). Seven-member state parliaments have completed the scrutiny, nine are in the 
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process of doing so, and 12 have provided no information22. In a resolution on the 
implementation of a Union Common Position on arms exports, the EP laments that, 
“that not all EU national parliaments scrutinise governmental licensing decisions 
by, inter alia, producing annual arms exports reports, and, in this regard, calls for 
a general increase in parliamentary and public oversight…”. The resolution urges 
national parliaments to do more (European Parliament, 2018).
22 Visit also the IPEX web-page available at: http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/
document/COM20180476.do (Accessed: 21 July 2019).
Taking Parliamentary Oversight Further
In a report on the scrutiny of the EDF by the EP and national parliaments, Daniel 
Fiott (2019) made several observations: (a) that the EP and national parliaments should 
seek clarification about their role in the evaluation of the EDF; (b) that there are limits 
to present inter-parliamentary cooperation to enable parliaments to scrutinize the 
EDF properly; (c) that without a concentration of parliamentary expertise, the EP 
could find it challenging to continuously and effectively monitor and scrutinise 
developments under the Fund; (d) the EP and national parliaments need to move 
from a focus on levelling information asymmetries to thinking more strategically 
about what defence capabilities the EU will need in the future. An in-depth study 
or debate on the future of defence technologies and EU security and defence should 
initiate a longer reflection process on the EDF in the European Parliament. There is 
little point to argue with these points because they are reasonable and reflect realities 
on the ground.
Fiott (2019) makes a number of recommendations on the parliamentary scrutiny of 
the EDF. The first is that the “Structured scrutiny of the EDF by the EP and national 
parliaments’ involvement in the EDF evaluation phase could allow the Parliament 
to make suggestions for future work programmes as well as ensure that the Fund is 
meeting its stated objectives”. Secondly, “the EP and national parliaments should 
engage in a more strategic understanding of the EDF, especially with regard to how 
the Fund relates to other initiatives such as PESCO and national defence priorities….”, 
adding that “COSAC and CFSP-IPC formats, while useful for formal exchanges 
between parliamentarians, have not been optimised for specifically scrutinising the 
Fund or building an inter-parliamentary consensus on EU defence research and 
defence capability prioritisation”. He also recommends that the EP should strengthen 
its skills’ base to be in a position to properly scrutinize the technicalities of EDF.
Parallel arguments could be applied to the whole of EU defence policy. Inter-
parliamentary co-operation, both among national parliaments and between 
national parliaments and the EP, has increased progressively in the last decade. 
The EP and national Parliaments exchange information, best practice and national 
156
parliamentarians visit the EP often to attend EP parliamentary committee meetings. 
But as is argued in this chapter, parliaments need to develop their own internal 
structures to scrutinize better the EU defence policy and the level of analysis needs to 
be deepened. Parliaments have achieved different levels of oversight capabilities and 
small parliaments tend to struggle in commanding sufficient resources, information 
and expertise, but in cooperation with the EP and other national parliaments 
(through COSAC and the IPEX network, as well as bilateral contacts) they can address 
some of the more serious gaps. The EP has more expertise and resources than the 
national parliaments to oversee the CSDP, but national parliaments can supply 
useful knowledge from their respective domestic political contexts.
National parliaments have increasingly become more involved in external relations 
and defence. The effects of globalisation have almost obliterated the thicker lines that 
once divided domestic from international policies. Immigration, the environment, 
human rights, climate change, trade, terrorism, pandemics, and energy are not easy 
to assign to the traditional spheres “internal” or “external”. Conflict in faraway regions 
attract less domestic interest than the ones closer to Europe which have a spill-over 
potential. But trade and environment agreements can lead to winners and losers at 
the national level, a re-distributional effect that directly impacts voters – leading to 
public responses. External policies have a direct bearing on the lives of citizens and 
national MPs frequently become immersed in external policy issues for this reason. 
Sub-national parliaments can at times also play a significant role in the ratification 
of international agreements: the EU-Canada Agreement (CETA) almost collapsed 
under the weight of opposition from Belgian regional parliaments which precluded 
Belgium from ratifying it. However, more tellingly, for more than a decade, around 
76% of EU citizens have supported the development of the CSDP. This provides the 
strongest reason why national parliaments need to strengthen their contribution to 
the discussion that is taking place at EU level.
Civilian Power Europe
As the EU busies itself with the task of strengthening the CSDP, there is a tendency 
to dwell too narrowly on the technicalities and to leave aside some important 
characteristics of the EU external relations such as ‘civilian power’, the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As has been discussed earlier, the aim 
of developing the CSDP and to strengthen its strategic autonomy is to achieve the 
Union’s interests and norms as enshrined in the treaties, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, and the myriad of resolutions and stands taken by the EU institutions. The 
fact that the LT and the EUGS refer to interests and norms, entails that the EU needs 
to find a balance between the two in its external policy. The use of military force 
has never been a prime instrument in the Union’s foreign policy and will not be 
the only asset at the EU’s disposal in the event that it achieves a stronger common 
defence union. After all, the EUGS refers to a comprehensive and integrated approach, 
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including civilian means, in confronting international crises. One of the tasks of 
national parliaments and the EP’s inter-parliamentary cooperation could be that 
of ensuring that the EU maintains its civilian power characteristic, redefined in 
response to the exigencies of our times.
‘Civilian power’ was developed by François Duchêne who implied that the 
European Community, being short on military power, could nevertheless influence 
international relations by ‘civilian means’ such as trade and non-military policies 
due to the growing interdependencies among states and the near improbability of 
war because of the nuclear stalemate. Subsequently, as the EU developed into a world 
trading power (but remained a ‘political pygmy’), and particularly after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the ‘civilian power’ approach gained more 
saliency.
In 2001, when reacting to the arguments by Karen E. Smith (2000) that a militarily 
stronger EU undermines the concept of civilian power, Stelios Stavridis drew attention 
to the dual characteristics of Duchêne’s definition of ‘civilian power’, namely “a 
civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces” and “a 
force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards” (2001,p. 44). 
Stavridis argues that civilian power means nothing if it refers only to non-military 
means. It is the way in which military power is used that determines whether the 
EU is a ‘civilian power’. For Stavridis, “The second dimension or normative side 
of Duchêne’s definition, that is, the promotion of civilian values, is as, if not more, 
important than the first” (2001, p. 48). He cautions that civilian power should not 
be equated with pacifism. A ‘civilian power’ by choice or design considers military 
means to be at one end of a long spectrum of possible actions which include trade 
and the use of economic sanctions at the opposite end. “Sanctions should be seen not 
only as an alternative to military action, but also as a first step towards the extreme – 
but still available and possible – case of using force. In other words, the possession of 
military capabilities is necessary because it allows for the possibility of using them, 
thereby adding to the credibility of an international actor” (Stavridis, 2001, p. 50).
The EUGS parts company with a narrow definition of ‘civilian power’, claiming that 
“In this fragile world, soft power is not enough: (the EU) must enhance (its) credibility 
in security and defence” (p. 44). The EUGS then goes on to propose civilian and 
military measures, applied separately or in tandem, to confront international crises, 
safeguard EU interests and promote its norms. Since it is mostly governments who 
decide in the CSDP, inter-parliamentary cooperation has a difficult task to perform 
in scrutinizing decisions and to monitor that a balance between norms and interests 
is being reached, following the concept of “principled pragmatism” proposed by the 
EUGS.
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Democracy Promotion
The EU has been influenced by democratic peace theory, signifying that generally 
democracies are less likely to go to war. The EUGS does not turn this objective on 
its head, but draws attention to the fact that not all the states of the world believe in 
democratic peace. President Putin’s statement to the Financial Times of London that 
liberalism is obsolete (June 2019) surprised no one, but his world view is contrary to 
the EU’s. Democracy promotion is not always possible to achieve and is often seen 
as intrusive by many countries. It is not a panacea, and in some regions military 
deployments are needed to disarm armed groups, separate warring factions, defend 
civilians from aggression or simply maintain the balance of power. Military power is 
needed to defend Europe’s borders, and though this is still NATO domain, Europeans 
are under growing pressure to shoulder more of the costs of their own defence.
Democratic peace theory harks back to Immanuel Kant’s famous essay “Perpetual 
Peace”, which for centuries laid dormant in the debate on international relations 
until it was resurrected by Michael Doyle in the 1980s (2006; 2012, pp.68 ff.). It was 
strengthened by what turned out to be overoptimistic conclusions in the 1990s, 
such as those of Francis Fukuyama and his “end of history”. The sentinelling role 
of parliaments is central to this theory as they are the institutions by which citizens 
can exercise restraints on government. Parliaments are the conduit through which 
citizens’ opposition to the use of force in particular situations and contexts is conveyed 
to national governments who then are supposed to adapt their actions accordingly. 
The spread of democracy globally is no guarantee of long-term stability and is not 
the sole aim of the CFSP-CSDP; it is another restraining force in an anarchical 
world because only in democracies do citizens stand a better chance of stopping and 
reversing failing policies or decisions which are detrimental to their well-being.
EU parliaments and the EP can use their international links and parliamentary 
diplomacy to help the EU pursue its policies on strengthening democracy globally. 
According to the EUGS “Peace and security, prosperity, democracy and a rule-
based global order are the vital interests underpinning our external action” (p. 13). 
Further on, the Strategy adds that “It is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the 
resilience of states and societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south 
down to Central Africa. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, 
and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state” (p. 23). Parliaments 
have a role in defining resilience and the policy tools to implement it.
Promotion of EU ‘values’ or Norms
The EUGS respects the values inscribed in the EU founding treaties (Article 2, TEU, 
Publications Office of the EU, 2016) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. ‘European 
values’ or ‘our values’ are often mentioned in public pronouncements (European 
Council, 2017). Charles Grant, the first Director of the Centre for European Reform 
(CER), prefers ‘European’ to ‘universal’ values for three distinguishing factors: they 
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are more social, more secular and more liberal (2007). In Article 3 (5) TEU we find 
that “In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its 
values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute 
to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection 
of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance 
and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter” (Publications Office of the EU, 2016, p. 17).
Since 1995, the EU has inserted essential element clauses in association and 
cooperation agreements concluded with third countries (the first such clause was 
actually inserted in Lomé IV in 1989). These clauses make the respect for human 
rights and democratic principles the cornerstone of the agreements. The essential 
clause provides a legal basis for positive EU engagement and dialogue with its 
partners. The clause also empowers each side to impose restrictive measures or limit 
trade, suspend the whole or part of the agreement, in the case of extreme human 
rights violations. The EU can adopt sanctions autonomously or in response to UN 
decisions. In addition, guidelines for the adoption of sanctions first launched in 2004 
were revised in 2018 (Council of the EU, 2018). The EU also publishes a list of sanctions 
being implemented at any given time.23
The essential clauses give the EU the possibility of engaging its partners in a 
constructive dialogue on human rights and the rule of law, but it has been extremely 
reluctant to impose trade restrictions on countries which have not made real progress 
towards achieving these goals. This reluctance has been noted by all its trading 
partners thus diminishing the clauses’ effectiveness.
The U.S. and Canada have started including human rights clauses in their trade 
agreements with third countries, but unlike the EU, they have tended to restrict them 
to a narrower range of rights of direct relevance to the operation of the agreements 
such as labour rights, transparency, due process and anti-corruption (Zamfir, 2019). 
While the UN and its agencies have linked each of the 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) with the achievement of several human and civil rights found in a 
plethora of international charters (UN, 2019), many countries consider the EU’s policy 
as politically intrusive or a protectionist trade measure. The EU encounters difficulties 
when trying to employ trade as a foreign policy tool. It increases dissonance among 
the member states (e.g. Russian sanctions in the Ukraine crisis have divided the 
member states) and the EU’s interests are hurt. The EU has been reluctant to punish 
states which cooperate with it in the security field, such as the war on terrorism.
The EUGS takes a more realistic view by stressing long-term engagement in 
strengthening human rights protection. This has been the Council’s constant 
refrain when EP members (MEPs) criticise the EU for concluding trade and fishing 
23 Sanctions map available at: https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main (Accessed: 9 July 2019).
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agreements with certain countries. According to the EUGS, trade is still relevant 
to underpin “sustainable development, human rights protection and rules-based 
governance” (pp. 26–27) and “trade and development – working in synergy – can 
underpin long-term peacebuilding” (pp. 31–32). But it also stresses other aspects of 
soft power and civilian means apart from human rights promotion, which in the 
long-term could also help strengthen fragile states, hopefully paving the way toward 
improving human rights protection and the rule of law in those countries.
The European Parliament has been scrutinizing the EU’s Human Rights policies 
in third countries while most national parliaments are scrutinizing their own 
governments’ performance on human rights. Inter-parliamentary co-operation on 
this aspect of external relations is crucial.
24 See list available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-
operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en (Accessed: 20 July 
2019)
Principled Pragmatism
Clearly, the EUGS does not favour a ‘civilian power’ approach that rejects the use 
of military force and instead proposes the use of an array of civilian and military 
tools, applied separately or in tandem to confront international crises, an integrated 
approach, according to the situation. Currently there are 16 CSDP military and 
civilian missions in three continents.24 The EUGS stresses that action must be guided, 
by a still undefined “principled pragmatism” (pp. 8, 16). This can mean that when 
it lies in its interests, the EU may waive aside the primacy of values, though only 
reluctantly, to achieve a higher pragmatic goal. It is meant to stop criticism of double 
standards but it may still fail to achieve this purpose.
“Principled pragmatism” appears to free the EU from the contradictions, 
constrictions and embarrassment, of putting human rights at the top of its objectives, 
only to backtrack from them for economic or strategic gains. Such ambivalence 
exposes the Union to international criticism. However, situations arise in which 
advancing the cause of human rights cannot be pursued further because it imposes 
disproportionate costs on the EU and prevents it from influencing change in the 
longer term. Political decisions have often had to settle for the second best. This leads 
to the conclusion that it is not always possible to reconcile idealism and pragmatism, 
particularly in a world of competing powers which are unconstrained by normative 
frameworks. The problem for the EU is where to draw the fine line between the two 
extremes.
The concept of “principled pragmatism” signals that for the first time the EU is not 
claiming to be a “disinterested” or “altruistic” power on a mission to change the world, 
and that apart from values it also has interests and needs to find a balance between 
the two. Nathalie Tocci (2016, p. 6) gave this meaning to “principled pragmatism”:
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“(it) seeks to move the debate away from false dichotomies and well-known 
hypocrisies: be it the sterile debate on ‘interests versus values’, or on 
interventionism versus retrenchment’. The point it tries to make is that we 
should observe the world (and ourselves) as it is, not as we would like to see 
it. We must be more modest at times in what we believe we can achieve and 
what we cannot. But modesty should not translate into closure or passivity. 
We must engage the world and do so responsibly, but without the illusion 
that we can unilaterally bring peace, security, democracy or prosperity to the 
world. Not only is this an illusion, it is also a dangerous one.”
The clarification and application of “principled pragmatism”, is an area in which 
both the EP and national parliaments need to engage to clarify its meaning and 
policy implications, and ensure transparency (as opposed to opaqueness) which a 
majority of EU citizens expect.
Conclusion
The parliamentary dimension of the EU defence policy has advanced since 
Maastricht but there is still a lot of work to be done. As we look toward the future 
of the EU and of the EU’s defence, we notice a number of issues that have to be 
attended to. National parliaments and the EP have an important role to play in all 
this and they have already made the first important step by establishing an IPC-
CFSP-CSDP, the successor of the PA-WEU. Parliaments still need to strengthen 
their inter-parliamentary cooperation to scrutinize the EU institutions and member 
state governments, exchange information, build up resources and expertise and 
exchange best practices. Since the establishment of the IPC-CFSP/CSDP in 2012 they 
have accumulated knowledge, experience and increased their activism. It is clear 
that the task of creating a European defence union, at whatever level it is pitched 
and eventually realized, requires closer cooperation between the EP and national 
parliaments. They need to strengthen their capacity to deal with the legislative 
changes, the implications of EU policy and technical details that are necessary to 
ensure proper scrutiny.
Parliaments can play a significant role by pursuing parliamentary diplomacy, 
particularly in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, to strengthen mutual confidence 
between the EU and its neighbours. This has not been treated at length in this 
chapter, but both the EP and national parliaments are already engaged in this form 
of diplomacy, some more than others, and can thus strengthen their role in the EU’s 
external policies and in developing its defence structures.
The EP and national parliaments need to better articulate the role they wish to play 
in future defence integration, and where they actually fit in the integrated approach 
or whole-of-government approach (WGA) to international crises proposed in the 
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EUGS: the EP in relation to EU policies, and national parliaments with respect to 
national policies. Both can play an important role.
The project of a European Defence union is not a technocratic project, though 
in many aspects it is highly technical. National parliaments are the link between 
the inter-governmental Council where the decisions are taken and the people, 
particularly those who disagree or have a different outlook on developments. 
Opposition parties out of government and unrepresented in Council, convey their 
views through national parliaments. Furthermore, parliaments legitimize decisions 
and mobilise public opinion, but they need to strengthen their power and use it.
The EUGS recognises that in the future, the EU will need to compete with 
stronger rivals in the global arena while its own relative importance is declining. 
It will have to use soft and hard power to safeguard its interests and secure itself. 
The Strategy favours multilateralism, regional cooperative regimes, dialogue and 
interdependencies. A stronger defence policy, or union, need not force the EU to 
renounce its ‘civilian power’ approach, its values or ‘democratic peace’. It needs to 
look at them from a different perspective, that takes account of several facts: that a 
‘civilian power’ is ineffective without military assets to deploy; that the promotion 
of values cannot be abandoned just because other powers disagree with them; that it 
is not true that democratic peace is worthless because what really counts is military 
power. Parliaments and inter-parliamentary cooperation can clarify these issues and 
open new policy horizons.
There are undefined concepts in this debate: “strategic autonomy” and “principled 
pragmatism”; the separation of trade and norms; relations with NATO and the 
trans-Atlantic relations; the future of the global institutions and the liberal order. 
Parliaments can lead the search for meaning. National parliaments can act as bridges 
between the several demoi and the EU institutions. The EUGS is to be updated 
and revised from time to time, and the EP is one of the institutions which will be 
consulted. There is also a need for national parliaments to make their views heard.
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Chapter Nine
EU Cybersecurity Governance – Stakeholders 
and Normative Intentions towards 
Integration
Agnes Kasper
Abstract
In the last decade, the EU’s policy on cybersecurity has changed significantly, both as 
to its referent objects and priority level. While the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy focused 
almost exclusively on the importance of cybersecurity for the proper functioning 
of the single market, its 2017 version also contained an analysis of malicious cyber 
activities that threaten the political integrity of Member States and the EU as a whole. 
As the field’s level of complexity grows and forward-looking initiatives are constantly 
being proposed in order to promote cyber resilience across the EU, it is increasingly 
challenging the Union in the process of coordinating and implementing the planned 
actions.
Cybersecurity has also become a national security issue entangling private and 
public, external and internal, civilian, and military issues making it necessary, 
but very challenging to widen and deepen ties among stakeholders in the EU. Yet 
cybersecurity governance is fragmented at the EU level, and there is an evident lack 
of trust that prevents effective cooperation among stakeholders on crucial aspects of 
the process. This contribution argues that as a result, cybersecurity policy in the EU 
remains unsystematic and predominantly reactive in nature, addressing the issue-
specific incidents that have already occurred, although in our technology-dependent 
societies more emphasis should be placed on prevention. Therefore, in a natural 
scholarly quest for explanations, this chapter focuses on the development and 
main elements of the EU’s cybersecurity policy, followed by mapping the attitudes 
of cybersecurity stakeholders and their normative objectives in the context of EU 
integration in this domain.
Introduction
The EU, a technological powerhouse, is of colossal significance for the world’s 
economy, although it is still debating its relevance as such in terms of cybersecurity 
and struggles with its dependence on external technology providers. The recent 
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debate and controversies concerning Huawei’s influential presence for the supply of 
5G technology for next generation wireless networks has brought about the issue of 
cyber-geopolitics, and the entanglement of civilian and military domains has started 
to feature more prominently on the political horizon (Kaska, Beckvard and Minarik, 
2019). Choices concerning fundamental digital infrastructure that the European 
information society is dependent on have critical implications and are strategic 
questions at both national and European level. However, the EU has been rather the 
subject and recipient of global powers’ national policies of technological superiority.
Certainly, when the issues of geo-strategy are left aside for others to deal with, 
the EU’s positive competence (in all possible senses of the word) in operationalizing 
both trade and technology is undisputed in terms of volume. Therefore, it was not 
surprising when the EU’s 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy (European Commission, 2013), 
adopted at an unpredictable time of recondite change, was emphasizing the special 
significance of cybersecurity for what the EU became globally respected for – the 
single market and its proper functioning. Four years later, the Strategy’s revision 
(European Commission, 2017) effectively made a step further to clearly outline the 
EU’s understanding that a range of malicious activities in cyberspace represents a 
threat to its political integrity. At the same time, the EU, while leading the world in a 
high number of economic indicators, has not come closer to establishing a common-
for-all-Member-States method of governance on cybersecurity. In this EU-wide 
debate, cybersecurity is still loosely defined (for a lawyer, it is still undefined), and is 
the EU not able to establish a governance mechanism that would shield the domain 
from the underlying factors to the highest levels of responses, and to cyberattacks.
This underlines the argument that the EU’s cybersecurity policy remains 
predominantly reactive (be it normatively or operationally), having no particular 
system-driven approach and generating plenty of post-factum activities, while 
selectively providing for prevention. It does so by dividing cybersecurity into three 
conventional areas – not very consistently – and still separates cybersecurity, cyber 
resilience and cyber defence issues, leaving significant gaps where the preventive 
mindset does not apply. Christou (2019, p. 281) notes that the EU cybersecurity 
policy is “fragmented and differentiated temporally across three areas – cybercrime, 
network and information security, and cyber-defence”. Dunn Cavelty (2012) describes 
three interlocking cybersecurity discourses namely the technical, cybercrime/
cyberespionage, and military/civil defence, all with different main actors and 
referent objects. All of these are touched upon in the EU’s cybersecurity strategies, 
however the proper linkages between these domains still have to be mapped in 
detail. While entanglement of private and public, external and internal, civilian and 
military issues in the cyber domain makes a good case for further integration in 
many relevant policy areas, the same entanglements pose significant challenges to 
widen and deepen ties among stakeholders in the EU. In the EU’s case, as already 
noted, though technology is an issue, and there is a gap with the major powers, here 
we question the willingness and readiness to address key issues of cybersecurity at 
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policy level and from the perspectives of stakeholders – which according to different 
integration theories may be considered as key actors driving the process.
In view of the above, the idea behind our observations is firstly, to outline the main 
building blocks of the EU’s cybersecurity policy, focusing on its roots, as they likely 
define the EU’s attitude and approach to cybersecurity. The next step is to understand 
who is involved in the process, the stakeholders. This approach lays the groundwork 
for further systematic enquiries on integration theories and EU cybersecurity policies. 
This chapter thus contributes to existing knowledge by outlining the emergence of 
an EU wide cyber security architecture and policy, and provides a useful analysis of 
the main institutional arrangements and structures.
25 See more in ‘The Role of Science and Technology in the context of International Security 
and Disarmament’. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/disarmament/topics/informationsecurity/
Cybersecurity Policy of the EU: Basic Notions and Current 
Understandings
Defining the notion of cybersecurity
When discussing cybersecurity policy, one should be conscious of the terminology 
that is used by various actors and at many levels. A range of technical notions that 
are established by the industry have infiltrated policy and legal discourses related to 
technological advances, however it appears to be a challenge to establish a consistent 
vocabulary specifically related to cybersecurity. Data or information security, network 
security and cybersecurity are related concepts, yet they appear to differ in their scope. 
The ISO/IEC 27000:2017 standard defines information security as the ‘preservation 
of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information’. ISO/IEC 27032:2018 
refers to network security as being “concerned with the design, implementation 
and operation of networks for achieving the purposes of information security on 
networks within organisations, between organisations, and between organisations 
and users”. However, when addressing national, EU-level or international policy 
issues at large, one may encounter inconsistencies giving rise to confusion about 
the scope and purposes of a policy in question. The issue of ‘information security’ 
has been on the UN agenda since 199825, but the EU would refer to this discussion as 
related to ‘cybersecurity’. Naturally, ‘cybersecurity’ may not be used by other major 
international actors, such as Russia or China, in the same way as in the EU, and 
hence the terminological content of this notion depends on the context.
The EU has been struggling to find a commonly agreed working definition of 
cybersecurity, one that “enables identifying the common goals across the EU” 
(ENISA, 2012). While in the 1951 Treaty of Paris, European states were clearly able to 
identify the potential harms to be prevented (bloody conflicts), in the current context 
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of interdependent cyber societies, cybersecurity remains a field where differing 
levels of dependencies on information and communication technologies determine 
different perceptions and priorities for actors. To exemplify the different approaches, 
the 2013 Austrian Cybersecurity Strategy describes cybersecurity as a process; the 
2011 German strategy refers to it as “the desired objective of IT security situation”; 
the 2013 Spanish strategy states that “cybersecurity is a necessity of our society and 
our economic model”; the 2017 Swedish strategy refers to a “set of security measures 
to preserve the confidentiality, authenticity and availability of information”; while 
the recent Estonian cybersecurity strategy uses three Estonian language-specific 
definitions that all translate to English as ‘cybersecurity’. This leaves us with 
contextual definitions; contributing little to the clarity on what harms the EU, and 
what policies aim at preventing this from happening. At the same time, the working 
definition used in the 2013 EU Cybersecurity Strategy notes that:
“cyber-security commonly refers to the safeguards and actions that can be 
used to protect the Cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from 
those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent 
networks and information infrastructure. Cyber-security strives to preserve 
the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the 
confidentiality of the information contained therein.”
However, the recently adopted Cybersecurity Act (Regulation (EU) 2019/881) defines 
cybersecurity for the purposes of the act as “all activities necessary to protect network 
and information systems, their users, and affected persons from cyber threats” 
(Article 2), which signifies a departure from the previous working definition in the 
EU strategy, because it includes in its scope the protection of persons, and not only 
cyberspace in itself.
Emergence of EU cybersecurity policy
Since data and information security certainly form part of cybersecurity, one can 
trace back the EU’s policy on cybersecurity to the Bangemann Report addressing 
the topic of Europe and the global information society (High Level Group on 
Information Society, 1994), and the EU’s precarious personal data protection policy 
from the mid-1990s. The Bangemann Report predicted the game-changing nature 
of digital technologies, argued for the liberalization of the telecommunication 
sector, and mentioned the repercussions of misuses. Article 17 of the Personal Data 
Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) imposed an obligation – through national 
implementing measures – on regulators to implement appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to protect personal data. In searching for justification 
of the measure, one encounters in the preamble of the Directive the need for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.
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Entering the new millennium, the EU’s legislative activity intensified addressing 
security issues in the telecommunications field, the Telecom market was liberalized 
by the regulatory framework adopted in 2002, and following the developments in 
the Council of Europe (2001) the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was adopted. 
The early EU policies in the field, which we can now treat as cybersecurity, had 
three main considerations: protection of privacy, cybercrime and harmonisation in 
specific, electronic data-related fields (Commission Communication, 2001). The latter 
included telecom market policies, exemption from liabilities of service providers 
(e-commerce directive), and e-signatures.
Parallel to these EU processes, the concern for national security implications of 
information and communication technologies arose, prompting the U.S. to include 
cybersecurity aspects in its national security strategy in the aftermaths of the 9/11 
attacks and, in Europe, the adoption of the Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) 
as a response to the 2004 Atocha bombing in Madrid. Yet, it still took a few years 
for the EU to take the issue of cybersecurity to the highest level of its agenda. The 
2007 cyberattacks against Estonia captured the attention of most of the EU Member 
States (Haataja, 2017), and cybersecurity as such was for the first time expressly 
addressed in the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana’s 2008 report 
(Council, 2008). A process was ignited in the EU that resulted in the adoption of the 
first comprehensive EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013, and, with the intensifying 
diffusion of information and communication technologies, it further culminated 
in the second, revised cybersecurity strategy in 2017 aiming at integrating various 
cybersecurity considerations into all relevant EU policies.
As of today, more than 70 nations have formally raised issues of cybersecurity to 
the level of national policy and national security, adopting national cybersecurity 
strategies. A list of countries, which are active in this field, includes those from both 
the developed and developing worlds, regardless of the regional economic integration 
they belong to. Therefore, issues of cybersecurity at the national level raise questions 
about the correlations between economic development and the need for regional 
cooperation and integration. Placing cybersecurity issues at the forefront also raises 
the question of whether we should consider ourselves to be in a crisis; or rather, we 
accept that cybersecurity is a continuous quest for stability in cyberspace.
Cybersecurity Strategies of the EU
Prior to 2013, the EU’s approach to different aspects of cybersecurity had been widely 
criticised for its fragmentation, lack of clear direction and overlapping competences 
between institutions (Bigo et al., 2012). As a response to a changing security 
environment, the 2013 EU Cybersecurity Strategy thus consolidated the relevant 
policy areas into one framework and indicated factors that are operating regardless of 
state borders, as well as arising from complex economic interdependencies. It needs 
to be stressed that the main elements of the strategy could already be found in a 
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2009 Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection (European 
Commission, 2009).
Cybersecurity has become a buzzword in the last decade, and despite the alarm 
bells on militarization of cyberspace26, and discussions on the use of information 
and communication technologies in the context of international security (UN GA 
A/RES/53/70 of 4 January 1999; UN GA A/RES/58/32 of 8 December 2003; UN GA A/
RES/60/45 of 6 January 2006; UN GA A/RES/66/24 of 13 December 2011), the EU’s first 
cybersecurity strategy in 2013 remained focused primarily on economic implications 
of cyber threats. Interdependencies in operating, maintaining the reliability and 
interoperability of cyberspace, and complexities between smooth functioning of 
information systems and key economic sectors were highlighted. Although the 
strategy noted that cybersecurity is an increasingly important international issue, 
it significantly played down the points on how global power struggles were moving 
online, and how they were affecting the EU as such.
The 2013 document emphasized two main aspects of cyberspace: its role for 
political and social inclusion, and its importance as a critical resource and backbone 
of economic growth. In these respects, the strategy identified four categories of 
potential harm associated with cybersecurity incidents: the loss of a user’s trust and 
confidence in participating in the Digital Single Market; disruption of essential 
services that rely on information and communication technologies, such as water, 
healthcare, electricity, mobile services; negative effects of cybercrime on the EU 
economy manifested in stealing data and economic damages; and the curtailment 
of fundamental rights online by foreign governments outside the EU. On a more 
concrete note, it stipulated that “[t]hreats can have different origins — including 
criminal, politically motivated, terrorist or state-sponsored attacks as well as natural 
disasters and unintentional mistakes” (EU Cybersecurity Strategy, 2013, p. 3). Hence, 
cyber threats are construed in the EU’s 2013 policy framework as existential threats 
emanating mainly from the economic fields, although it can be argued that misuses 
of cyberspace for surveillance and control of a country’s citizens is presented as 
an existential threat in terms of the constitutional principles of the EU; hence an 
existential threat emanating from the political sphere. Additionally, some concerns 
were raised about essential services, which could be targeted by terrorists and state-
sponsored groups, suggesting that some threats could be perceived as being crucial 
to national security.
Measures proposed by the European Commission in the 2013 Strategy build on 
the principles outlined in 1.2. of the document: the EU core values apply as much 
26 Quoting the US-Russia Joint Statement on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of 
the Twenty-First Century, 2 September 1998: “We recognize the importance of promoting 
the positive aspects and mitigating the negative aspects of the information technology 
revolution now taking place, which is a serious challenge to ensuring the future strategic 
security interests of our two countries”.
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in the digital as in the physical world; protecting fundamental rights, freedom of 
expression, personal data and privacy; access for all; democratic and efficient multi-
stakeholder governance; a shared responsibility to ensure security. It is centered 
around five strategic priorities, however leaving cybersecurity predominantly for the 
Member States to deal with, and identifying the EU’s role as merely supportive and 
complementary in: a) achieving cyber resilience; b) drastically reducing cybercrime; 
c) developing cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP); d) developing the industrial and technological resources 
for cybersecurity; and e) establishing a coherent international cyberspace policy for 
the European Union and promoting core EU values.
The 2017 EU Cybersecurity Strategy (European Commission, 2017), however, 
represents a significant policy shift from a comprehensive to an integrated approach, 
clearly referring to threats in the economic, political and military spheres in nearly 
equal proportions. The priorities remain similar in their essence to previous strategies, 
but the Strategy also states that “[w]hile Member States remain responsible for national 
security, the scale and cross-border nature of the threat make a powerful case for EU 
action providing incentives and support for Member States to develop and maintain 
more and better national cybersecurity capabilities, while at the same time building 
EU-level capacity”. The document proposed a set of concrete measures, which, for 
example, included the strengthening of the European Network and Information 
Security Agency; the introduction of EU-level standards and the setting up of an 
EU cybersecurity certification framework; limiting foreign acquisitions on critical 
technologies; integrating cybersecurity into EU crisis management mechanisms; 
the establishment of the Cybersecurity Emergency Response Fund; the adoption of 
technological and normative measures to combat cybercrime; the implementation 
of the framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities; 
engagement in international cybersecurity processes on the part of the EU, and 
similar objectives. Evidently, the strategy signified a deepening of EU integration 
in a matter of few years, moving from the uncoordinated isolated policies (where 
cybersecurity aspects were often incidental) to a horizontal policy with significant 
political implications at Member State as well as EU levels.
Although the new strategy may strengthen resilience as a whole, it certainly 
makes only baby-steps to integrate defence issues into the whole picture. The 
division between cybersecurity and defence is paramount in the 2017 strategy, and 
is even more palpable in its implementation. The need for a truly integrated policy 
is demonstrated by recent cyberattacks; it is not the first and probably not the last 
time that a malware such as Wannacry or NotPetya was rampaging across Europe, 
heavily affecting the private sector. This malware was publicly attributed to North 
Korea and the Russian military respectively by some European states and the U.S., 
demonstrating interconnections and entangled relationships between private and 
public sectors (as well as digital single market policy and defence), although the EU 
as such has not attributed these attacks (Ivan, 2019, p. 5). The EU’s response as a whole 
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was tested in these cases – and some might say that the technical level cooperation 
was good. However, the Council of the EU admitted that it was not enough, and more 
needed to be done (Council of the European Union, 2018).
Although the 2017 strategy gives the impression of a well-integrated policy, the role 
of the EU as an advisory body is unclear therein, let alone any strategic or operational 
mandates in the area of cyber defence. In the absence of a clear function assigned to 
the EU in cyber defence – an issue which lies at the heart of sovereignty – the forward-
looking initiatives, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 
2016/679) or GDPR, which can be viewed as one of the most important preventive 
measures in cybersecurity, the cybersecurity policy remains incomplete unless 
it is further developed to cover all levels from the bottom to the highest national 
security. While the GDPR and the NIS Directive commonly impose some significant 
obligations to secure personal data and networks in the majority of the EU’s – and 
related private sector – entities, the Police Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/680) takes 
a rather moderate view on data protection in the public sector (focused on criminal 
investigations and proceedings). However, these come with notable exceptions in, for 
example, national security issues and there is no guidance on how these levels are 
interrelated, or what is the competence, if any, of the private sector in this regard27. 
Having a policy that does not fully appreciate the private sector’s role across the 
board, and remains reactive to major breaches mainly in the form of fines, cannot 
be categorized as a forward-looking EU cybersecurity policy, given the private 
sector’s importance not only in the digital single market, but also beyond that. This 
EU posture may change with the newly adopted Cybersecurity Act (EU 2019/881), 
which promises efforts in standardization, although they remain mostly within the 
boundaries of the EU’s market-oriented competences. It is not clear whether the 2017 
cybersecurity strategy is aimed at moderating the adversary’s behaviour or takes a 
more ambitious (and likely impossible) posture to eliminate adversarial behaviour. 
Yet the recent EU policy-making and legislative activity in cybersecurity represents 
a consolidation as well as a path-finding effort, not short of a significant leap in 
European integration.
It could be suggested that the contributing factors for this leap in EU integration exist 
(at least, partially), firstly, outside the usual framework of economic interdependence, 
and, secondly, the Member States’ associated preferences and bargaining habits. 
While integrating national economies in the EU has certainly not been exhausted 
in the field of cybersecurity, the integration of relevant policies is accelerating. Thus, 
having detected the EU’s normative objectives on the issue, this contribution is now 
ready to start addressing the ‘relationships-framework’ question – in other words, 
27 Although the detailed analysis of the particular cybersecurity legislation of the EU is 
omitted here, we emphasise the importance of the GDPR and other relevant acts. For a 
more detailed review on the EU’s cybersecurity legislation, see, for example, Kasper and 
Antonov, 2019.
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who are the interrelated actors on the issue and in what framework can the policy 
application productively take place? Keeping in mind the obvious need to be selective 
in covering relevant issues, this analysis focuses on the overall picture, bringing 
some examples and arguments for the sake of provoking a discussion rather than 
providing elaborated accounts on all elements of cybersecurity.
In order to cover the former part of the question, an observation on stakeholders 
is required. As for the latter part, a search for a theory-bound framework will be 
performed in Chapter Seven of this book titled “Towards a ‘Cyber Maastricht’’. Should 
a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ become a goal that the EU begins to aim for, the process will 
need a robust model, consisting of meaningful elements (‘building blocks’, factors, or 
pillars). As argued, theories of regional cooperation and integration generally point to 
contributing factors, such as security interdependence, political instability, need for 
legitimacy, institutional lock-in of reforms and involvement of informal institutions 
(Börzel and Risse, 2018). In this context, there is a likelihood that technological 
interconnectedness and diminishing importance of geographical proximity can 
become risk multipliers as well.
Stakeholders or ‘Who You Are With’
Evidently, EU cybersecurity policy spans through and overlaps with several sectors 
and policy areas, both on the economic as well as political levels. This implies that 
relevant stakeholders and institutions are diverse and numerous, often representing 
sharply opposing interests, hence the multitude of participants in decision-making 
processes will certainly be a significant factor that may affect outcomes.
Multiplicity of Supranational Institutions in EU Cybersecurity
To illustrate the breadth of the policy, the following departments of the Commission 
are involved in cybersecurity: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, 
Content and Technology (DG CONNECT), Directorate-General for Migration 
and Home Affairs (DG HOME), Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER), Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG 
MOVE), Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital 
Markets Union (DG FISMA), Directorate-General for the Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). Furthermore, the main actors also include 
the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), CERT-EU, 
European Defence Agency, and EC3 at Europol.
A range of new actors which are gaining experience in cybersecurity include the 
European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER); the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA); 
the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA); the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). Additionally, cybersecurity is being 
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integrated into research and training frameworks for example at the European 
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, the European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, 
the European Security and Defence College, the European Cybercrime Training and 
Education Group, the European Cybersecurity Research and Competence Center, et 
cetera.
Given the number of responsible departments, agencies and actors for different 
aspects of cybersecurity in the EU, some of which may rather be recipients than 
shapers of the EU’s cybersecurity policy, this research would venture with a dose 
of confidence to raise doubts about the neo-functionalist premise of political 
spillover, where particular significance is attributed to socialisation processes, and 
esprit de corps among officials. Although the visible efficiency of Commission policy 
formulation, decision-making processes, and enforcement authority should not be 
doubted purely on the basis of the number of parties involved, and we certainly do 
not intend to dwell upon a comparison with actual states, it is observed that the EU 
lacks a single centre of government and its governance system has been compared 
to no less than a “garbage can” by some influential scholars like Jan Zielonka (2012, 
p. 510).
However, the list of supranational institutions that actually influence the 
integration processes is longer still. Judicial or quasi-judicial authorities in the 
EU have significant influence on cyber-related policies; e.g. the European Court 
of Justice and the European Data Protection Board. In both cases, when it comes 
to cybersecurity policies, one may find not only contradictions – which would be 
natural in the course of the discussion within the EU – but also hesitance or outright 
disobedience by some of the Member States to comply with EU rules. In particular, 
while the EU Court with its 8 April 2014, Digital Rights Ireland judgement invalidated 
the Data Retention Directive (CJEU, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12), Member 
States still kept and keep on retaining the exact same categories of data, which led 
to further clarifications in the Tele2 Sverige case (CJEU, C-203/15). This shows the 
relative reluctance or incapability of the Member States to follow community rules 
and testifies to the limitations of influence of the supranational institutions.
Member States’ attitudes to cybersecurity
The EU Cybersecurity Strategies push the main responsibility down to the national 
level. Currently all Member States have a national strategy as a key policy feature, 
where the central focus is on cybercrime, critical information infrastructure 
protection, digital literacy and cyber hygiene, capacity building and cooperation, 
both private-public and international. All states emphasize in their respective 
strategies that digitization has fundamentally changed the state, the economy and 
society, and that they need to ensure the smooth functioning of the information 
society. As a result of the fundamental changes driven by technology, internal and 
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external security cyberspace can no longer be clearly distinguished, and both state 
actors and criminal groups pose a threat. The 2016 Belgian document ‘The Strategic 
Vision for Defence’ points out for example that “[c]yber environment has not only 
become a part of everyday life, closely linked to the physical and social well-being 
of the Belgian and European population, it has also become the backbone of the 
Belgian and European economy […] and has more and more security consequences” 
(Vandeput, 2016, p. 31). “In the future, the European countries will be less able to call 
in the strategic support capabilities of the U.S. such as… offensive cyber capabilities 
and intelligence gathering… which means that the European countries will have 
to invest more in these capability gaps in order to obtain the necessary autonomy” 
(Vandeput, 2016, p. 44).
In most national strategic documents cyber defence is complementary to other 
cyber-related policies, and the use of cyberspace is presented as a prerequisite for the 
operational capability of the armed forces.
Cybersecurity in Germany is defined as the desired state of IT, where the risks the 
country is facing from cyberspace are reduced to an acceptable and manageable 
level. “This objective can be achieved by means of cyber protection (measures against 
criminal cyber activities), cyber defence (measures taken against cyber-attacks 
mainly from abroad), cyber security policy, and cyber foreign policy”. In the 2016 
White paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr, Germany 
pledged to prepare and enhance the Bundeswehr for the cyber and information 
domain, including high-value defensive and offensive capabilities (The Federal 
Government of Germany, 2016, p. 93).
Spain, in the 2019 National Cybersecurity Strategy, aims to strengthen capabilities to 
deal with threats from cyberspace and to implement measures, such as strengthening 
cyber defence and cyber intelligence capabilities, implanting active cyber defence 
measures in the public sector to improve response capabilities, as well as boosting the 
development of notification platforms, exchange of information and coordination 
to improve sector-based cybersecurity, and guarantee coordination, cooperation and 
exchange of information between the public sector, private sector and competent 
international organizations (Gobierno de España, 2019, p. 44). The Italian strategy 
also focuses on cyberspace defense operational capacities, including the need to 
establish Command and Control structures capable of effective cyberspace military 
operations planning and implementation (Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 
Italy, The Italian Cybersecurity Action Plan, 2017, p. 14).
France’s 2015 National Digital Security Strategy also emphasized autonomous 
strategic thinking, security of critical networks, privacy, awareness raising, and 
the importance of cyberspace for the economy. In 2017, France established a Cyber 
Command, Commandement de la cyberdéfense – COMCYBER, and adopted a Cyber 
Defence Policy in 2019 based on six pillars: prevent, anticipate, protect, detect, react, 
and attribute (Ministère des Armées, Politique ministérielle de lutte informatique 
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défensive, 2019, pp. 4–5). Cyber defence capabilities have been created in the Finnish 
Defence Forces, including cyber-attack capabilities (The Security Committee, 
Finland, Implementation Programme for Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy for 
2017–20, p.13) and the National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic for 
the Period 2015 to 2020 is clear: the “state defence forces must have the capability to 
effectively respond to threats coming from cyberspace and proactively participate 
in the elimination thereof (National Security Authority, National Cyber Security 
Centre, 2015, p. 14). Hence one of the aims is to increase national capacities for active 
cyber defence and cyber-attack countermeasures (p. 18), as well as to train experts 
specialized in questions of active counter-measures in cyber security and cyber 
defence, and in offensive approaches to cyber security in general. The Lithuanian 
National Cyber Security Strategy also sets as an objective the development of cyber 
defence capabilities, stating that, “in case of failure to ensure effective deterrence, 
the Lithuanian Armed Forces would defend the Republic of Lithuania by using 
military cyber security measures acting autonomously and in cooperation with 
allies” (Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Lithuania, 2018, p. 8).
Cyber commands were also established in Estonia in 2018 and in Hungary in 2019, 
yet the Estonian Cybersecurity Strategy 2019–22, unlike others, expressly points 
to Europe’s limited technological autonomy (computer and network hardware is 
produced largely in Asia, and operating systems, software and services come mainly 
from the U.S.), which forces the EU into a passive position, limited to responding to 
security flaws and focusing on risk prevention (Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications, Republic of Estonia, 2018, pp. 21–22).
Member states’ Cybersecurity policies address both military and civilian dimensions 
of protecting the information society, however these areas are highly interdependent. 
While in general states are actively militarizing cyberspace, the civilian population 
is impacted significantly, because attacks like WannaCry and NotPetya were/
are indiscriminate in nature and not confined to military, intelligence or other 
governmental targets (Griffith, 2018, p. 11). The defence posture of all EU Member 
States relies on increasing security and resilience-building, dissuasion of adversaries 
by establishing norms, some also emphasize denial-based deterrence and security 
(for example by adopting the ‘no-legacy’ principle and advocating strengthening 
strategic autonomy, in particular the European cyber industry). However, many EU 
Member States also deploy classical deterrence strategies aiming to establish credible 
threats.
Transnational Actors in the Private Sector
In the private sector the number of players is enormous, however we can try to 
make a distinction between two groups of enterprises: the ones that operate in one 
of the priority areas, which already fall under EU regulatory frameworks (telecom, 
financial services, essential service providers and digital services operators in the 
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meaning of NIS Directive, etc.); and the ones that fall under generic policy areas 
(personal data protection, information society services, IT product manufacturers, 
as well as cybersecurity companies and specialized associations, etc.). Transnational 
forums often bring together private actors, and allow for governmental and non-
governmental experts to exchange information and experiences, and building 
mutual trust, which is known as the multi-stakeholder approach. Such forums 
include the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the 
International Cyber Security Protection Alliance (ICSPA) and the Financial Services – 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC). However, these forums mainly 
focus on narrow and technical issues, and only few (such as the Global Commission 
on the Stability of Cyberspace) aim to connect the various cyberspace communities 
and engage with broader policy questions. One should not lose sight of the user-
consumer and citizen level, which may be represented by specific lobby and rights 
protection organizations (for example, BEUC, the European Consumer Organisation, 
has been vocal about cybersecurity, but privacy advocacy groups also take influential 
action, such as the one which culminated in the Schrems judgement (CJEU, C-362/14) 
which declared the ‘Safe Harbo[u]r’ agreement between the EU and U.S. to be invalid). 
In the preparations for the EU’s first cybersecurity law, the NIS Directive, the private 
sector stakeholders participating in the consultations included individual electronic 
communications service and network providers; Internet service providers, and 
industry associations; suppliers of hardware and software components for electronic 
communications networks and services, and industry associations; providers of 
products of services for network and information security; and representatives from 
the banking and financial sectors, as well as from the energy sector.
Despite the existence of the consumer and privacy lobby, it should be clear that 
digital manufacturers and producers are constrained by their context and profit-
oriented shareholders, and as long as security is considered by the markets as 
a luxury side-service, there are few incentives to consider implementing costly 
principles, such as security by design, notwithstanding that the private sector is 
in charge of over 80% of cyberspace. Indeed, the common industry practice is to 
give preference to product functionality and user-friendly design, while security 
considerations are secondary and fixes are issued (if at all) when flaws are discovered 
during use. In principle the market seems to accept the release of insecure products.28 
For the boardroom, security appears to work well when nothing happens, hence 
28 Software updates and patches are issued by producers for fixing different ‘bugs’ or flaws, 
which are discovered from time to time. Such security flaws can be misused for malicious 
purposes. ‘Security by design’ approach advocates that producers should focus more on 
security (e.g. security testing, fixing the found flaws) prior to release, which would likely 
eliminate significant part of the security issues.
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additional resources are hard to get for departments responsible if  nothing happens. 
However, apart from security diligence, the imposition of security levels in sectoral 
and generic contexts is being generated by the EU, and by at least some awareness on 
all sides, including supply-chain participants.29 Yet, the EU legislation still focuses 
only on some of the most significant market players, which are likely to have the 
resources to invest in their security or have already been doing so. The EU plans 
to address concerns and challenges faced by SMEs, as well as best practice in  the 
public sectors and e-governance services, although these still remain a long-term 
challenge. Stakeholders showed support for the EU’s plans of ensuring a high level 
of network and information security, and indeed the overwhelming majority looked 
up to the governments and the EU to take steps in this regard, pointing out that 
users were unaware of cyber threats (European Commission NIS Directive proposal, 
COM/2013/048 final). The EU is facing a puzzling double-headed question on how 
to present ‘cybersecurity’ as a marketable product, and how to create more demand 
for high-level security by users on an organizational and national level. While the 
benefits of privatization of governance and integration of private actors into the 
political process can be shown  (e.g. increased transparency and accountability), it 
is also a source of several problems, in particular when it comes to issues of national 
security and defence. Nevertheless, the intellectual capital of the industry has been 
exploited by ENISA, where the proposed regulatory standards and norms often 
originate from the private sector (Dunn Cavelty, 2018, p. 314).
29 NIS Directive.
Salience and attitudes to cybersecurity in national political debates
When it comes to the Member States’ and effects of the governments’ constituencies 
on the cybersecurity policies of the EU, one can also take as a point of departure the 
emphasis on digitization by national political parties which can help explain aspects 
of  the current EU cybersecurity policy. According to König and Wenzelburger (2018), 
the salience of digitization in party manifestos have reached the highest level in 
Germany, Austria and Italy, and recently increased yet remains relatively modest 
in the UK and France. Digitization generally does not appear to be a priority issue 
in Ireland, Spain and Portugal. Once the priority of digitization as a policy at the 
national level is determined, one may reasonably expect that cybersecurity issues 
(where digitization is a core precondition) could also gain salience within this broader 
context. Therefore, there is a likelihood that those Member States’ governments 
would be under stronger national pressure to act, particularly in countries where 
digitization is more politicized, although there are also a number of other policy 
issues that may act as catalysts for cybersecurity-salient national policies (for instance, 
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personal data protection debates related to data retention regulations, surveillance 
scandals, and election ‘hackings’).
A brief examination of political party manifestos prima facie confirms the saliency 
of cybersecurity in the countries which prioritize digitization; however, the link 
is not straightforward between the saliency of digitization and cybersecurity. In 
Germany, the CDU/CSU and SPD 2017 programmes featured clear and expansive 
points on cybersecurity, while the Austrian ÖVP 2015 Policy Programme briefly 
mentions only cybercrime, and in 2018 SPÖ refers to the ‘dark side of digitization’. 
Among the Italian parties, M5S dedicated some attention to cybersecurity within its 
Programme on Security, Lega just mentioned cyber bullying, but Forza Italia and 
Fratelli d’Italia did not raise the issue at all. In the UK, the Conservative Party’s 2017 
manifesto elaborates on cybersecurity in detail, while the Labour Party’s manifesto 
does the same but to a lesser extent. In 2017 in France, En Marche! confirmed cyber 
defence and cybersecurity as priorities, and the Irish Fine Gael also expressed 
ambitions towards innovative responses to new and emerging criminal threats. In 
2019, the Spanish PP and PSOE extensively elaborated on cybersecurity issues in 
their electoral programmes. In 2017, the Czech ANO manifesto raised several issues 
on cybersecurity, while a complete silence about cybersecurity was encountered in 
the Hungarian Jobbik’s 2018 programme, and the FIDESZ programme has not been 
traced.
Characteristically, those states, where the level of digitization is already high, may 
not have this item on their political agendas as such. For instance, in Estonia, the 
Estonian Center Party, instead, focuses on the depth and the quality of existing 
databases and services, the use of Artificial Intelligence technologies for making 
existing systems more user-centered, as well as how to raise the quality and security 
of e-governance systems. The Reform Party’s programme concentrates on expanding 
digital services; however, it specifically raises the issue of cybersecurity in the context 
of hybrid threats, and also addresses cybercrime and the security of the e-state. Yet, 
Estonia has been a vociferous policy entrepreneur when it comes to the EU and 
cybersecurity. Therefore, the low salience of digitization and/or cybersecurity-related 
issues at national level may not always indicate low priority, but could result from 
the deep integration of digital policies, including cybersecurity, into other policy 
areas.
Countries that stress digitization usually address cybersecurity as well, but in some 
cases (particularly, in the case of  Ireland and Spain) it appears that cybersecurity 
has disproportionately stronger emphasis. It may suggest that beyond the economic 
factors related to digitization, other factors come into play when engaging in mass 
politics. The most cybersecurity-conscious states who raised the issue in the public 
debate with a holistic approach (addressing economic, social, political, defence, 
international cooperation questions) are Germany, the UK, France, Spain, and, to an 
extent, Estonia. A second round of the Treaty of Paris (the 2018  Paris Call for Trust 
and Security in Cyberspace) will probably happen at some point soon (with more 
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legitimization this time), because distinct security concerns are prompting further 
integration.
A report on the costs of cybercrime suggested that a good predictor of cybercrime 
is the income level of a country, since wealthier companies are more likely to be 
targeted, while countries tolerate malicious activity as long as its cost remains at an 
acceptable level. However, were the cost to rise above 2% of GDP, it would prompt a 
strong call for action from companies and society (McAfee & Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2014). Germany, which loses 1.6% of its GDP to cybercrime, 
is the most severely affected country globally, which explains the saliency of 
cybersecurity in German politics. However, in countries like Estonia and the Czech 
Republic, it is more likely that a trigger event occurred which ignited awareness 
about cybersecurity and turned it into a political issue.30
30 In 2007, large-scale cyberattack mainly originating from Russia against critical Estonian 
targets demonstrated the potential to bring to its knees a country dependent on 
information and communication technologies. Heightened concern about cybersecurity 
in the Czech Republic is preceded by the discovery of years of Russian and Chinese 
presence throughout the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ information systems.
Conclusions
Cybersecurity became a strategic and national security issue in the past two decades. 
Although it is a fluid concept, it has been raised to the highest-level agendas and 
the European Union cybersecurity policy developed from a single market-oriented 
one to a comprehensive one, tackling issues horizontally. Integration in some core 
problem areas; such as addressing cybercrime, critical information infrastructure 
protection, network and information security, and personal data protection are 
benchmarked by instruments like the NIS Directive, GDPR and the Cybersecurity 
Act. However, in the light of the entanglement between private and public, external 
and internal, civilian and military issues in cybersecurity, significant gaps remain 
in the EU’s supposed-to-be-integrated policy. Incidents reported daily affect both 
private and public sectors. Nation states and cybercriminal groups use digital attacks 
hiding behind anonymizing features of cyberspace, while cybersecurity in the 
civilian context and cyber defence in the military context address the same threats, 
follow the same basic principles, and require similar measures and procedures 
(Powell, 2018, p. 36).
Although EU institutions involved with cybersecurity are numerous and 
many exert significant influence on the integration process in the cyber domain, 
constraints inherent in the EU’s lack of competences, the lack of clarity about its 
exact role, and resistance by Member States lessen  the perspectives for integrated 
and EU-wide preventive policy. While both the EU and Member States focus on the 
reduction of vulnerabilities, both technological and human, with their other hands 
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many Member States establish offensive cyber capabilities fitted to exploit the same 
vulnerabilities. Granted that defence issues mainly fall outside the competences 
of the EU, but such an approach makes cybersecurity governance in the EU even 
more fragmented and unsystematic. In addition, despite the dependence of the 
EU on external technology providers, the need for autonomy in cyber industrial 
terms, as well as the need for stronger public sector commitments (e.g. information 
sharing, high security standards for public sector information systems) cyber 
security is still under discussion in the EU when in fact it should have passed to 
action. Transnational private actors use their comparative technological advantage 
to exert influence on the EU’s cybersecurity policy, they typically do not address 
cybersecurity comprehensively. Constituencies of the Member States’ governments 
remain unengaged with cybersecurity policies, since the issue, as such, rarely enters 
the arena of mass politics.
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Chapter Ten
Towards a ‘Cyber Maastricht’: Two Steps 
Forward, One Step Back
Agnes Kasper & Vlad Alex Vernygora
Abstract
This chapter evaluates the EU’s cybersecurity policy from four perspectives – 
neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, post-functionalism, and the 
imperial paradigm. A search for a theory-based framework is performed to ensure 
that the analysis in this chapter is completed within a set of boundaries, and does 
not stray into speculation about the EU’s prospective strategic steps. Using this 
contribution’s findings and elaborations, a proposal on the policy-associated model is 
made. Having observed the empirical data, while analytically reflecting on actuality, 
it can be argued that a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ is long overdue.
Introduction
Cybersecurity is an invisible, collective and ubiquitous challenge in our modern life, 
as we have computerised most of the main human functions suited to contemporary 
lifestyles. Computers are used to distribute natural resources, feelings, and state 
functions, and, within our communities, we have begun to set some rules for these 
processes. The current EU cybersecurity policy is a result of several developments, and 
considering this chapter’s title, there is a certain degree of positivity associated with 
this process. However, it is still unclear how this development is being strategised and 
where it might lead the EU to. Regardless of any ideological or historical connotations, 
one can assess the step-by-step developments when the process takes place within 
a framework. In the context of cybersecurity, it appears that different forces are 
pulling and pushing the actual development and the complexity of the domain can 
lead us to contradictory logics, while we are searching for explanations. Arguably, a 
framework can be ‘crafted’ for the EU by political science, and this contribution will 
be relying on several multi-disciplinary approaches to clarify the issues.
Retrospectively, if we focus too much on the revolutionary prediction that 
“Cyberwar is coming!” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993) and the no less revolutionary 
“Cyber war will not take place” (Rid, 2012), it is likely that a number of important 
events, which occurred between these Cassandrical statements, will ensure that 
those statements will not be forgotten. For example, in 2007, the Republic of Estonia 
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became a “subject of a new form of ‘cyber violence’”, when it experienced a large-
scale denial of service (Haataja, 2017, p. 160). Those cyber events were a side-story for 
many, who found themselves living through an unexpected ‘explosion’ of political 
tensions, which demonstrated how an entire country can easily be brought to the 
brink of collapse if it is dependent on information and communication technologies 
for its vital functions.
In 2010, a cyber ‘worm’ called ‘Stuxnet’ affected over 60,000 computers in several 
countries (from Iran to the United States, from Germany to Australia), interlinking a 
simple USB stick with centrifuges containing uranium-235 (Farwell and Rohozinski, 
2011, pp. 23–24). Indeed, theoretically, in order to make a destructive difference, no 
tanks and artillery are needed. Although this scenario remains popular for science 
fiction movies, rather than the history books – right now technological developments 
may have brought us close to these scenarios and for a geo-strategically ‘herbivorous’ 
entity as the EU, such a situation should be of special concern. In scholarly terms, it 
has arguably become one of the main catalysts for the grand-debate on what the EU 
is and in what framework the EU acts.
The roots of the EU lie in the historic rivalry between France and Germany, and the 
recognition that peace can be maintained through intense collaboration in the field 
of political economy. In the early 1950s, coal and steel were the basis of a country’s 
power, given the industries’ role in war-waging, and hence the 1951 Treaty of Paris 
concentrated on the prevention of future security threats by pooling resources, 
establishing common oversight mechanisms, and a common market for products 
and resources in these areas. The mid-twentieth century economic collaboration was 
seen as a means to prevent war – a paramount security threat. Today, the EU has 
turned into an entity that is unmatched elsewhere in scope and depth of integration, 
and this process took place in the context of lasting peace. This provides a platform 
for theories of positive integration, which acknowledges that security threats led 
to economic interdependencies. However, most of these integration theories seem 
to ignore the changed and modern security interdependencies. As Börzel and 
Risse (2018) argue, economic interdependencies are not always able to explain the 
reasons for (or lack of ) regional integration: in economically interdependent North 
America or Northeast Asia, supranational institutions are scarce, and the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), is empowered to intervene militarily 
in its member states without their consent, although trade levels between ECOWAS 
members remain low.
Historically, the EU’s legal and policy measures in the field of cybersecurity have 
been motivated by the need to create and complete the European Single Market, whose 
dynamics have been mostly explicable by the spillover effect (Kasper and Antonov, 
2019). The EU’s new Cybersecurity Strategy sets out a plan to improve cyber resilience, 
deterrence and defence, and creates a horizontal policy overlapping and intertwined 
with several other EU policy areas. Such a complex issue as this is naturally ‘plagued’ 
by conflicting interests and controversies; in particular, that the implications go way 
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beyond economic aspects and the Single Market associated needs. A distinct problem 
has been the difficulty in collecting, sharing, and operationalizing cybersecurity 
information among actors (sometimes, it is referred to as cyber threat intelligence 
or CTI, be it in the private or public sectors). Nothing illustrates this point better 
than the legislative history of the Directive on security of network and information 
systems (Directive (EU) 2016/1148, NIS Directive), where the Commission’s original 
proposal was changed to exclude the public sector, while calls for more actionable 
information sharing with the private sector were ignored at the EU legislative level. 
Cooperation and integration in this field deserve special attention, since at the core of 
resource pooling, oversight and regulation of the market,  we are dealing with data 
and information – which, probably, are also the main resources for waging cyber and 
hybrid wars, because, arguably, they are the twenty-first century equivalent of coal 
and steel.
It is likely that the EU may be losing its way in the process of reflective, unsystematic, 
and inertial application of its very own and predominantly spillover-based integrative 
elements of cooperation and entering into a set of objectively new relationships, 
which necessarily require a different framework, an issue-specific system, a revision 
of all major theories of positive integration, and an explicitly determined range of 
policy clusters to confront it. In other words, cybersecurity is more complex than 
it is currently represented by existing EU processes, and more express links should 
be drawn between the market-oriented, security and defence fields. Cybersecurity, 
whether it is considered as a process or a point of arrival, makes it nonpareil for 
‘shining’ at the EU’s highest echelons of discussion, because “[a] stable system defines 
the behaviour of the collective as a whole” (Lotman, 2013, p. 62).
Hence, an enquiry on a strengthened theoretical framework should be performed, 
investigating the fit between EU cybersecurity policy and integration theories, to 
detect where the borderlines of the relationship should be, so that a proper policy 
framework can be provided within its boundaries. To achieve this end, a proposal 
based on a schematic three pillar-based model is made here. We do not adopt any 
particular theory to explain the EU’s policy on cybersecurity, but we do engage in a 
path-finding mission to find correlations. Indeed, we leave it for future research to 
dwell on the details.
Methodologically, this material extensively employs a pluralistic range of 
classic and cross-boundary qualitative techniques, elicited from discourse analysis, 
process tracing and normative content analysis. As Neumann (2008, p. 62) argues, 
discourse analysis not only “seeks to capture the inevitable cultural changes in 
representations of reality”, but a particular discourse in itself “maintains a degree 
of regularity in social relations […], produc[ing] preconditions for action”. It is not 
worrying that the reason for an action cannot be fully determined by analysing a 
discourse that is corresponding to it – instead, process tracing is required in such 
cases. Characteristically for this classic qualitative tool, it can assist in providing 
a number of theoretical alternatives, because the in-depth checking procedure 
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(on what factor is linked to which) can encourage research to consider different 
theoretical frameworks. Indeed, the further the EU drifts away from the theoretical 
paradigms of the 1950s, the more stagnating its integrative framework is becoming. 
In the highly complicated case of cybersecurity, this contribution suggests that, by 
necessity, EU policy requires a solid theoretical fit (or, at least, the EU is in askance of 
a useful theory) built on a neo-functional, intergovernmental, and post-functional 
analytical instrumentarium, whilst keeping in mind an imperial paradigm as a 
means to explain the EU’s organisational nature more precisely.
Finally, on a further methodological note, the EU has an inbuilt normative 
characteristic. Norms are thus very important in this empirical investigation to 
observe the relevant processes and find interlinkages between them. By determining 
the right set of normative material and contextualising the data, it is possible to 
analytically “account for the nuances and complexities that are part of any political 
phenomenon” (Hermann, 2008, p. 160). For the context and stakeholders’ attitudes, 
we will also refer back to the previous chapter in this book – ‘EU Cybersecurity 
Governance – Stakeholders and Normative Intentions towards Integration’ – which 
outlined the rise and current features, as well as the institutional background of the 
EU’s cybersecurity policy.
Searching for a proper framework
There is nothing extraordinary in searching for a framework, because an academic 
wishes to “place rigid boundaries around the domain of philosophical inquiry” 
(McCormick, 2003, p. 255). Apart from being attributed by positivists to Immanuel 
Kant, it has a longer history and a life within post-positivism. It is advantageous 
to achieve a “greater accuracy of description” (Lotman, 2013, pp. 48–49), and it goes 
well with this contribution since it is aiming at detecting the exclusive range of 
constituent clusters for EU policymaking on cybersecurity.
What is also relevant for the context is that the EU, meticulously treasuring its 
‘theoretical’ organisational background, has consistently been a theory-driven 
entity in its policymaking. Through its existence, the EU has literally encouraged 
international scholarship to analyse its development, and in the process, this ‘created’ 
some of the major integration theories as well. There was a relatively sceptical vision 
of Robert Keohane (1984, p. 49) that “the Europeans” do not have the functional 
capacity to grow into a hegemon “in the foreseeable future”, but this is questioned by 
actuality. A hegemon has different qualities, and the EU’s distinct hegemonic stance 
in international trade is not a matter for serious academic disputes.
Practically and usually, a particular EU policy could receive backing from a single 
theoretical concept (for example, intergovernmentalism for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). However, there are many situations when the EU aims 
at combining a few theories in order to establish a decent framework for a policy 
(e.g. regionalism, neo-regionalism, functionalism and neo-functionalism for the 
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European Neighbourhood Policy/ENP). The level of effectiveness in each case has 
been different: the EU’s ‘exam marks’ in political economy are rather high, but when 
it comes to the entity’s ‘tests’ on geo-strategy, there is still plenty of ‘homework’ that 
needs to be completed by Brussels and, to an extent, Strasbourg. On cybersecurity, as 
it was argued in the introductory notes of this chapter, there is a likelihood that, in 
order to positively benefit from the policy-focused theoretical support, the EU has 
to seek some assistance from among the analytical postulates of the following four 
concepts: neo-functionalism, intergovernmental theory, post-functionalism, and a 
scholarly ‘treatment’ of the EU as a contemporary political empire.
Neo-functionalism: a ‘puzzle’ of transnational interdependence and 
supranational capacity
Within a decade from the start of the European integration process, Ernst Haas 
(1958), reflecting on the project’s development, offered a holistic observational 
concept exemplified by it. His neo-functionalism, was only semantically linked 
to David Mitrany’s seminal contributions (1975), but it helped the EU’s founders in 
interpreting what they were functionally doing to ‘run away’ faster from the past. 
At the end of the day, as the theory was elucidated by its competing ‘cousin’ (post-
functionalism) much later in time, the neo-functional framework postulated “a series 
of mutually reinforcing processes that [would] lead to further integration” (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2019, p. 2). Arguably, the so-called neo-functional spillover became the 
EU’s major, as well as almost unquestionable, methodological tool in a number of 
important framework-building exercises (for example, in the case of working out 
the euro convergence criteria). It is also true that the EU missed few opportunities 
to perform some kind of “distilling” (McGowan, 2007) of neo-functionalism. 
Further down the track, the ‘spillover effect’, as noted, became “almost completely 
detached from its puzzling fathering theory” and, like in the peculiar case of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), was even applied to a geographic area, which 
Brussels could not operationally control (Vernygora et al., 2016, p. 14). Should neo-
functionalism be employed in the context of the EU’s policy on cybersecurity?
The basic underlying rationale for cybersecurity cooperation can be viewed in 
terms of securitised functional logics: the dependence of the EU’s economy and 
citizens’ every-day life on information and communication technologies create 
exposures that endanger the Digital Single Market, European democracies, freedoms 
and values. Bergmann and Niemann (2018) point out that sectors and issues can be 
interdependent to the extent that differentiation may prove extremely difficult. This 
is even truer in the context of cybersecurity, where the underlying technologies 
operate without respect for state borders and are decentralised in nature.
Functional discrepancies and links can certainly be identified in the EU’s 
cybersecurity policy, for instance between the free movement of digital products 
and the need for safe and secure Internet that fosters consumer trust. In this case, 
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criminal law enforcement plays a significant deterrent role against cybercrimes, but 
it compromises consumer trust. In order to investigate offences, law enforcement 
agencies, more often than not, need to collect evidence from information systems 
outside their national borders, and they need it fast, whereas the current mechanisms 
for cross-border cooperation to collect evidence can be burdensome. Hence, the EU 
proposed the E-evidence Regulation that creates the European Preservation and 
Production Orders, mechanisms associated with procedures that are, presumably, 
easier to implement vis-a-vis private sector stakeholders. However, this has also 
opened a window outside the EU, since the largest actors in the EU are U.S.-based 
companies. The USA had also decided to address digital evidence collection, which 
resulted in conflicting legislations with the EU (additionally there are some legal 
issues and conflicts in the GDPR), while the Council of Europe (CoE) is also busy with 
negotiations on an additional protocol to the Cybercrime Convention, addressing 
questions of digital evidence.
On 5 February 2019, the European Commission proposed to start a round of 
international negotiations on cross-border access to electronic evidence, which 
is necessary to track down dangerous criminals and terrorists, and two sets of 
negotiating directives were issued: one for negotiations with the USA, and the other 
for the Second Additional Protocol to the CoE-originated Budapest Convention on 
Cybercrime (Joint Statement on the Launch of EU-U.S. Negotiations to Facilitate 
Access to Electronic Evidence, 2019). The logic that a single market issue needs to 
create higher levels of consumer trust for digital products, leads to functional 
pressures in the security and foreign relations domain, in this case the e-evidence 
negotiations with the USA and the CoE, which Bergmann and Niemann (2018) 
described as “external spillover”.
Another functional discrepancy can briefly be indicated between the high-level 
network and information security requirements, as in the NIS Directive (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2016) and the need for standardisation and certification 
schemes. Evaluation of the security levels of networks and information systems, 
as well as digital services and products, to ensure conformity with EU-wide or at 
least harmonised cybersecurity standards, hence the Cybersecurity Act (European 
Parliament and the Council, 2019), confer new competences, tasks and resources on 
the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) (which has been 
transformed into the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency).
Functional pressures stemming from the Single Market also seem to appear in 
the field of security and defence, notwithstanding that some scholars deny this 
(Bergmann and Niemann, 2018). On the basis of the 2013 Single Market-focused 
Cybersecurity Strategy, the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework was adopted in 
2014 (Council of the EU, 2014) and updated in 2018 (Council of the EU, 2018a). These 
strategies envisage EU and NATO cooperation on cybersecurity and defence. In 2018, 
the EU cyber defence staff also took part in the NATO’s Cyber Coalition exercise, in 
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Estonia (NATO News, 2018).31 Functional pressures, linkages and interdependencies 
may seem to point to the neo-functional theory of integration; however, it is not able 
to account for a significant part of the EU’s cybersecurity policy, since transnational 
actors remain ‘toothless’ when it comes to issues beyond purely private business and 
the Single Market.
The role of supranational institutions enjoys distinct attention of neo-functionalist 
theories of integration. Niemann (2016) explains that supranational institutions foster 
integration processes when they behave as policy entrepreneurs or when leveraging 
their central positions or authority to influence various actors. Hooghe and Marks 
add that this is a continuous process reinforced by learning, changing preferences 
and tactics, until the supranational actors become stronger and more autonomous 
(2019, pp. 2–3). After learning the lessons from international cyber incidents, and 
because of direct attacks, cybersecurity became one of the most salient issues in the 
EU’s agenda (Christou, 2016, p. 1), and the European Commission has played a very 
significant role in promoting integrated policy development in cybersecurity.
However, the cross-jurisdictional nature of problem areas put supranational 
institutions in a position where their impetus for greater cooperation and integration 
encounters significant resistance based on Westphalian principles. One of the most 
intricate issues involves cybersecurity information collection and sharing, which 
cuts across policy levels. During the 2012 stakeholder consultations in preparation of 
the NIS Directive, 87.5% of respondents indicated that public administrations should 
be subject to security requirements. In particular, 93.5% considered that public 
administrations should report security breaches (besides banking and financial 
sector, transport, health, energy and internet services). While this signified a call for 
Member States’ accountability and was backed by the EU institutions such as the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, the European Parliament, and the European 
Economic and Social Committee, the Council of the EU was not ready for a new 
grand design that impinges upon the heart of the Member States’ sovereignty. The 
Economic and Social Committee (2014) had stated that the NIS Directive should 
take the form of a regulation, which would leave little discretion in Member States’ 
hands. The proposal’s provisions would have led to the setting up of a cooperation 
network and secure information-exchange system between the Member States, the 
Commission and ENISA, and provide for coordinated response according to the 
EU’s NIS Cooperation Plan. It would have imposed security requirements of public 
administrations, but these were toned down to the minimum by the Council which 
meant that only some core private actors in cyberspace (essential services operators, 
cloud services, e-marketplaces and search engines) were affected and breach 
notification frameworks were set up. The focus remained one-sided, imposing 
31 See more in NATO (2018) NATO and the European Union work together to tackle 
growing cyber threats. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_161570.
htm?selectedLocale=en
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mandatory controls on information flows between the private and public sectors and 
leaving cooperation between Member States at the voluntary level. The Council’s 
formal message was (Council of the EU, 2013):
Many Member states have been in favour of more flexibility, limiting the 
adoption of binding rules at EU level to critical and basic requirements, to 
be supplemented by optional measures. Other delegations on the contrary, 
considered that only legally binding measures could guarantee the network 
security throughout the EU.
Additionally, competences and resources are still lacking at the supranational level, 
since implementation of the cybersecurity policy and operational capacity lies with 
the Member States, as the “Member States remain responsible for national security, 
the scale and cross-border nature of the threat make a powerful case for EU action 
providing incentives and support for Member States to develop and maintain more 
and better national cybersecurity capabilities, while at the same time building EU-
level capacity” (European Commission, 2017).
The EU’s capacities are being strengthened, and the establishment of the EU’s 
Cybersecurity Agency endowed with financial, human and some operational 
resources testifies to this ongoing process, but in politically more sensitive areas 
the competence of supranational institutions is called into question by the Member 
States while they are engaging in a “common reflection process” with DAPIX experts 
[Working Party on Information Exchange and Data Protection (DAPIX)] on data 
retention (Council of the EU, 2018b). This behavior amounts to ignoring the highest 
courts’ repeated rulings against blanket data retention legislation. This is not to 
say that neo-functionalist ‘episodes’ do not take place in the EU and cyberspace. A 
number of EU institutions have been active and accumulating significant expertise 
in cybersecurity, including the Commission, ENISA, European Defence Agency, etc, 
which on their own or by leveraging functional inefficiencies, budgetary powers or 
institutional gaps, can lead to a strengthening of their role, which could eventually 
lead to deeper integration of the EU (Kasper and Mölder, 2019, forthcoming).
With reference to the explanation by Hooghe and Marks (2019, p. 3) of the neo-
functionalist views that “integration is the outcome of cooperation and competition 
among societal actors”, one can find little evidence to support a claim that stakeholders 
other than the Member States steer the deepening European integration in the 
cybersecurity domain. Since 2016, the EU has positioned itself on a trajectory towards 
strategic autonomy, including that in cyberspace. The 2017-revised EU cybersecurity 
strategy, and, in particular, the 2018 update of the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework, 
emphasise the growing linkages between cybersecurity and cyber defence, yet the 
Member States’ hesitation about the EU as a (cyber) security community is still 
manifested in the volunteer nature of information sharing mechanisms (apart from 
the breach notifications obligations imposed on private sector players), signifying 
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their readiness to work to create a ‘cyber steel and coal community’, which is still a 
long way from a ‘Cyber Maastricht’.
(Still) Liberal Intergovernmentalism: Member States, their preferences 
and bargaining power
In a way, Liberal Intergovernmentalism could hardly be outlined using a more 
straightforward route than the one chosen by Andrew Moravcsik. Being presumably 
driven by a justified desire to reshuffle the postulates of intergovernmentalism and 
to see how much out of the Westphalian paradigm would be considered practically 
applicable in the present situation, Moravcsik (1998, p. 4) linked the positive 
effectiveness of European integration with “economic interests, relative power, [and] 
credible commitments” of the Member States as long as they continue to subscribe 
to a liberal outlook. In other words, as Schimmelfennig (2015, p. 178) extensively 
explained much later, the process of integration “results from three steps that translate 
the incentives created by international interdependence into collective institutional 
outcomes: the domestic formation of national preferences, intergovernmental 
bargaining to substantive agreements and the creation of institutions to secure these 
agreements”. Another summary of this iconic concept is supplied by its ‘competitors’ 
– Hooghe and Marks (2019, p. 4) – who noted that “[l]iberal intergovernmentalism 
conceives institutional outcomes as functional responses to cooperation problems 
[…,] anticipat[ing] that states will delegate or pool just enough authority to ensure 
that national governments will find it in their interest to comply with the deal”. 
Once again, the obvious assumption here is that the EU Member States remain 
effectively liberal in general, and positively liberal towards the EU’s ‘togetherness’ 
when such an exercise needs to be performed. Arguing, bargaining, and being not 
fully satisfied are distinguishing features of the liberal intergovernmentalism-based 
framework. Undermining, humiliating, and questioning the EU as an objectively 
reliable provider of multi-dimensional opportunities cannot be considered natural 
for liberal intergovernmentalism in the process of seeking solutions. The latter 
statement is still in full agreement with Schimmelfennig’s argument that this theory 
of integration “offers no specific propositions to account for the crisis as such” (2015, 
p. 178).
Since 2007, when Estonia realised that its dependence on information and 
communication technologies leads to new vulnerabilities and exposes its society to 
existential threats operating through cyberspace, it has become a global heavyweight 
in cybersecurity with several innovations implemented in the technological, 
legal and political domains, and deservedly can be referred to as an avant-garde 
experimental bunny after introducing innovations like e-residency (Särav, Kerikmäe, 
and Kasper, 2017). Inspired by Estonia’s success and after examining other top scorers 
in cybersecurity indexes, several observations can be made, and which will provide 
an overall discussion in this chapter.
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According to the ITU’s Global Cybersecurity Index, Estonia achieved peak scores 
in legal and technical commitments, occupying the fifth position after the UK, the 
USA, France and Lithuania (ITU, 2018, p. 18). Although cooperation commitments 
generally remain low, Lithuania, Estonia, the UK, Spain and France take the lead 
in the EU, while the EU as a whole is far more committed to cooperation than other 
regions of the world (ITU, 2018, p. 49). According to the National Cyber Security 
Index administered by the Estonian E-Governance Academy, which measures the 
preparedness of states to prevent cyber threats and manage incidents, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Spain, Lithuania and France are the global leaders, with Germany 
and the UK following them. However, the digital development levels of these 
countries do not seem to provide a simple plausible explanation for scoring high 
in cybersecurity. The curious cases of Estonia, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic – 
where the digital development scores are modest – imply that factors other than 
economic ones may have significant impacts on governments’ plans.
Since the end of 1990s, the EU has been engaged in fighting ‘classical’ cybercrimes 
and it has adopted positions on the negotiations on the CoE Convention on 
Cybercrime. As one of the early attempts to raise the complex issue of cybersecurity 
to the EU level, the Spanish Presidency proposed in 2001 the establishment of an 
EU Research and Technological Alert Center (Council of the EU, 2001). Although 
the proposal referred to ‘cybercrime’, its reasoning was based on concerns raised 
from national security threats following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Spanish 
proposal was somewhat misinformed about the lack of initiatives. The Stockholm 
European Council of 23–24 March 2001 concluded that “the Council together with 
the Commission will develop a comprehensive strategy on security of electronic 
networks including practical implementing action” (European Council, 2001). A few 
months earlier, the Commission had also referred to the growing national security 
concerns and difficulties in providing security due to liberalization, convergence 
and globalization (Commission of the European Communities, 2001). Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Council was quick to turn its attention to address 
terrorist threats and critical infrastructure protection, which included information 
and communication technology and the internet (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004).
While the Commission has examined the available electronic communication 
infrastructures and their robustness in 2007 in high detail, cybersecurity remained 
an ‘exotic’ topic for the Member States. Three overlapping sets of EU policies were 
pursued in parallel. One was on cybercrime, which could be traced back to the need 
to deal with organised and high-tech crime – predominantly motivated by economic 
gain. The other concerned critical information infrastructure protection, which 
can be linked to the recognition of terrorist threats – assumed to be motivated by 
ideology. The third was on strengthening the information society to complete the 
Single Market, hence economic considerations.
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After the large-scale cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007, the terminological 
construct of critical information infrastructure protection started featuring in the 
Council’s agenda with increasing frequency, and, between 27 and 28 April 2009, 
Tallinn hosted a ministerial conference, stressing the importance of cybersecurity 
based on its own painful experience. The Member States’ ostrich-like policies were 
about to change, following security threats close to home, and after realising the 
possibilities that cyberspace could be used for political purposes, following the 2008 
cyberattacks against Lithuania and Georgia.
Preferences shifted towards establishing common policies, common mechanisms 
and coordination. The interdependencies between policy areas, the evolving and 
growing threat landscape, and the complexity of cybersecurity left Member States 
with no real alternatives but to merge the separate policies into a single comprehensive 
one at EU level. While 12 Member States decided to ratify the CoE Convention on 
Cybercrime after 200732, the 18-month trio-presidency programme of the Council led 
by the Polish, Danish and Cypriot Presidencies, in 2011 already raised cybersecurity 
issues going beyond cybercrime (Council of the EU, 2011).
In 2012, the Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues was established as a 
cross-cutting forum for coordination and cooperation and exchange of information 
encompassing various fields of expertise. In a December 2012 meeting of the group on 
Cyber Issues, the Netherlands  reported yet another real cyberattack33, and emphasised 
the need for cross-border cooperation. In the meantime, Estonia announced its next 
Cyber Security Conference, which was organised in Brussels.
In the context of the 18-month trio-residency programme of the Council for the 
period 1 January 2013 to 30 June 2014, the Irish, Lithuanian and Greek Presidencies, 
clearly referred to cybersecurity as one of the global challenges faced by the EU 
(Council of the EU, 2012). The first EU Cybersecurity Strategy was adopted in 2013, but 
the Member States resisted significant deepening of integration in several politically 
sensitive areas. The Member States’ approach to comprehensive cybersecurity 
was tailored to the needs of sovereign states and was followed by the adoption of 
an outline for European Cyber Diplomacy Engagement. The Members States 
regularly discussed cyber defence questions, and the Council adopted the EU Cyber 
Defence Policy Framework at the end of 2014 (Council of the EU, 2014a). While the 
Member States’ approach to information sharing and their readiness to express their 
positions publicly on cybersecurity is still cautious, the high interest in clarifying 
the normative frameworks became evident in The Hague Process, when over 50 
countries participated in the Tallinn Manual 2.0 consultations on how international 
32 Those were Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, and the UK.
33 The Netherlands have previously experienced the Diginotar incident, although there are 
no indications that this particular case was discussed at the meeting.
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law could apply to cyber operations – although, state input in the Manual remains 
confidential (Asser Institute, 2016).
The subsequent Italian, Latvian, and Luxembourgish trio Presidencies also 
strongly emphasised comprehensive cybersecurity, and laid out an ambitious agenda 
prioritising internal and external actions (Council of the EU, 2014b). For the period 
between 1 January 2016 and 30 June 2017, the Dutch, Slovak and Maltese Presidencies 
aimed to have a comprehensive and integrated approach to cybersecurity, and kept 
the focus thereon, although their programme was more pragmatic, and increased 
secrecy in the Council’s work on cyber issues became evident (Council of the EU, 
2015). The Friends of the Presidency Group on Cyber Issues, drawing on the “claimed 
to be state-sponsored hack of the Ukrainian power grid” prepared a non-paper 
suggesting a joint response to coercive cyber operations, namely the development 
of the cyber diplomacy toolbox under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (Council of the EU, 2016). The strategic 
environment also led to a new impetus in EU-NATO partnership, and the Joint 
Declaration in Warsaw on 8 July 2016 included cybersecurity and defence as an 
area where cooperation should be enhanced. In 2016, the Horizontal Working Party 
on Cyber Issues was established, replacing the Friends of Presidency Group, while 
the world learned about the DNC hack and Russian interference in U.S. elections 
(arguably, both cases sent clear signs about the vulnerabilities of national elections).
The Estonian, Bulgarian and Austrian Presidencies prioritized cybersecurity 
policy as an integral part of a genuine Security Union (Council of the EU, 2017), 
and Estonia laid out a very strong digital agenda building on its 2007 experience 
of large-scale cyberattacks and the EU’s cybersecurity package was rolled out on 13 
September 2017. This updated the EU’s cybersecurity strategy, and included proposals 
for institutional changes in terms of establishing the EU Cybersecurity Agency, 
integrating cybersecurity into existing EU-level crisis management frameworks, 
and adopting the Cybersecurity Diplomacy Toolbox. In 2017, the Czech Republic 
also discovered that for many years Russia and China had penetrated its Foreign 
Ministry’s information systems (Czech security service says Russia behind cyber 
attacks on ministry, Reuters, 2018).
Current focus in the Council appears to centre on the implementation of the Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolbox, the detailed discussion of questions related to attribution, cyber 
restrictive measures, preparation for the upcoming discussions in the United Nations 
(UN) on cyber issues in the context of international security, as well as cybersecurity 
capabilities and capacity building.
Having pointed out some key turning points, the authors note that despite the 
Commission’s thorough analyses and reasoning about interdependencies and security 
threats, the impetus to develop policies came from the Member States governments, 
prompted by their realisation of the political threats posed by cyberattacks. Since 
the EU is not a federal state, the arguments for sovereign autonomy of the Member 
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States overwhelmed the functional arguments for deepening integration, which is an 
underlying need for small states in an interconnected world. Ambitious Commission 
proposals were toned down and reformulated, under the Council’s leadership, in a 
manner that better corresponds to the Member States’ readiness to cooperate and 
share in potentially sensitive areas of cybersecurity.
Post-functionalism: channeling a political conflict towards a common 
good
A post-functionalist theory of European integration,  has  an empirically stable base 
as a point of departure: a) it has the possibility to detect how “domestic patterns of 
conflict across the [EU] constrain the course of European integration”; b) “no one has 
succeeded in reducing the debate to rational economic interest”; and c) since national 
communities are demanding more self-rule, “the preference for self-rule is almost 
always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority” (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2008, p. 2). However, where does the initial push for action come from? 
The theory refers to the prime role that a political conflict “makes all the difference, 
and […] engages communal identities” (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p. 2).
In the context of classical functionalism and apart from “common material 
needs” (Mitrany, 1975, p. 145), in principle an integrative task, “can be narrow or 
comprehensive in scope” (Smith, 2004, p. 22). In addition, “an action to stop the 
process or to go backwards is a function-performing exercise” as well (Vernygora et. 
al., 2016, p. 15). At the same time, this post-functionalist view on where a desirably 
effective functionality can ‘reside’ within the framework of European integration 
claimes that there could be a need to “probe beyond the economic preferences of 
interest groups” (Hooghe and Marks, 2008, p. 5). Is it not what cybersecurity needs 
to ‘hear’?
While post-functionalist literature on EU cybersecurity is almost non-existent, it 
could be possible that functionality resides with interest groups – since cyberspace 
is predominantly owned and operated by the private sector. However, one should 
consider those factors that characterise cyberspace – particularly, the compression 
of time and space in this context, which challenges not only the worldviews, but the 
core elements of the current international order based on territoriality. In addition, 
technical challenges and the lack of a common vocabulary in the technical and non-
technical fields do not favour political institutions in identifying common domestic 
constraints to integration, which could be formulated into a joint agenda by the 
relevant actors. Scholars who write on cyber power refer to the passive role of non-
state actors who recognize the need of their ‘intellectual capital’, while stressing that 
the “state is the political entity that needs to learn how to optimize its cyber power” 
(Dunn Cavelty, 2019, p. 307).
The fragmentation and diverse interests in cybersecurity make it almost impossible 
to create a community (besides the ones headed by  national  governments or another 
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central institution) on cybersecurity. Cybersecurity does not (yet?) typically feature 
on national political parties’ agendas, while interests intertwined with cybersecurity 
cannot be reduced purely to economic or political ones given their complexities. 
Policies on cybersecurity feature military, diplomatic, intelligence, economic, legal, 
ethical and social considerations. Cyberattacks are not immediately apparent to 
communities, and tend to be discovered months after their commencement. Unless 
they lead to consequences, which affect the physical world in a palpable manner, 
it cannot be confidently assumed that societal processes on their own will lead to 
comprehensive cybersecurity policies. People are unlikely to perceive a ‘common 
material need’ to have such policies.
Cyberspace is not a homogenous community, but a conglomerate resembling 
a loose open source community without a central point, sharing overlapping 
principles and agreements at the technological level. While some participants can 
be mature enough to ride on established frameworks, the rest move with the flow; 
trusting a central coordinating authority to show what is to be done next. Those 
who behave in this way often find their ideas suppressed by overriding political 
considerations, and naturally in such an environment only the strongest and most 
persistent, usually large private actors can pursue impactful initiatives. Joint private 
initiatives to engage with policy-makers have been reported in the USA (see, for 
example, Breland, 2018), and significant similar efforts by think tanks have become 
evident, such as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, but the 
situation in the EU remains considerably more fragmented given the different levels 
of development of the Member States’ cybersecurity policies. Controversially, Dunn 
Cavelty (2018) claims that the ENISA’s (EU Agency for Cybersecurity)  main reason for 
proposing standards and norms to the industry, was to ensure as little influence from 
governments as possible. However, do we expect (trans)national actors and industry 
to consider various potential national security implications to the full, and then 
choose the policy option that may be the best solution for European society, even at 
the expense of losses to shareholders?
In the meantime, while the responsibility for cybersecurity is pushed down to the 
national levels, little politicisation at the domestic levels can be detected (see Chapter 
six by Kasper in this book). Decision-making rarely takes place in the arena of mass 
politics and steps towards integration have not been linked to identity issues or to 
cultural divides that polarise societies. Hence, it appears that in its current form, 
the post-functional theory of European integration cannot provide a definitive 
explanation of all the realities of cybersecurity policy in the EU.
A contemporary empire on a mission to engage its periphery?
These days, as Zielonka noted, “[i]n the field of diplomacy it is virtually impossible 
to conclude any global negotiations without the consent of [the United States, the 
EU, Russia, and China]” (2012, p. 509), while also arguing that these important actors 
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“‘look, talk and walk’ like empires” (2012, p. 502). Arguably, this imperial paradigm is 
academically useful, has no negative connotation, and can be employed in different 
analytical exercises. The point is that the EU tends to claim its “technocratic or 
institutional superiority”, making the essence of the entity’s civilising mission 
to be bound around exporting ‘good’ governance (Zielonka, 2012, pp. 515 and 
511). Remarkably, it goes very well with one of the major priorities of the 2013 EU 
Cybersecurity Strategy, which proposed focusing on establishing “a coherent 
international cyberspace policy for the EU and promote EU values” (European 
Commission, 2013). It can be noted that one of the operational objectives of this 
priority may be based around an idea to engage the EU’s periphery into the process.
The race for domination in cyberspace has long begun and recently it has found 
concrete form in the UN-framed discussion on cybersecurity. While U.S. dominance 
of cyberspace, in technological terms, remains unquestioned (not unchallenged 
though), in other ‘soft’ areas a clear competition has become manifest. When, in 1998 
the Russian Federation proposed a draft UN resolution on cybersecurity, it was not 
taken seriously. However, it ignited a process in which the developments in this field 
were noted by the so-called UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
Security (UN GGE). The work of the UN GGE went mostly unnoticed and was fruitless 
until 2013, when the experts finally made a breakthrough: international law applies 
to states’ cyber operations (Kaljurand, 2016, p. 112). While this conclusion may now 
seem like a no-brainer, the UN GGE never managed to answer the question as to how 
international law applies (Henriksen, 2019).
A competition for the ‘legal’ dominance of cyberspace officially commenced in late 
2018, when both a new open-ended working group and a new GGE was approved 
by the UN. The proposal to set up an open-ended working group was sponsored 
by Russia, while the proposal for the GGE was backed by the U.S. and like-minded 
states, including the EU Member States. Many states in the UN are still undecided 
about their approach to cybersecurity, participating in both or none of these groups, 
hence these recent developments clearly signify a major contest between two 
fundamentally different ideologies on how cyberspace should be governed/ruled. It 
is no surprise that the Council and the EU Member States are preparing for these 
meetings, nevertheless it also straightens out illusions that the EU is limited to 
economic cooperation, since the EU seems to be embarking on a global ‘civilizing 
mission’, at least in as far as online human rights are concerned, while at the same 
time prioritizing capacity building in cybersecurity.
The EU has been engaging in bilateral cyber-partnerships with key countries, such 
as the U.S. (perhaps the most comprehensive relationship), Canada, Japan, Brazil (on 
cybercrime and research) and some other ’strategic partners’, amongst them India 
and the Republic of Korea, are seen as the most promising. Bilateral cooperation 
with Russia and China is less straightforward, since these countries are perceived 
as the main source of major cyberattacks and cyberespionage in the EU – although 
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confidence-building initiatives have been reported mainly in the fight against 
cybercrime and cyberterrorism (Renard, 2018, pp. 328–330).
The three ‘Cyber Pillars’ of the EU
In the past five years, the ENISA reported that each year cybercriminals remained 
the most active threat agent group in cyberspace. In 2018 they were responsible for 
over 80% of incidents, affecting approximately 0.8% of GDP (ENISA, 2019, p. 119). 
Over 60% of email traffic contained malicious content, and email was involved in 
90% of the cyber-attacks. In second place came the ‘insiders’ threat agent group with 
25% of breaches, attributed to insiders in corporate environments. That same year, 
states as threat agent group came in third place. ENISA observed attempts to increase 
the impact of cyberattacks (particularly, in critical infrastructures). ENISA (2019, 
117–118) also pointed out that “[i]t is assumed that traditional state sponsored threat 
agents are currently repositioning themselves in the changing geopolitical space”. 
The discovery of vulnerabilities continues to increase and advanced threat actors “are 
making progress in using the supply chain to achieve their objectives”. The EU is 
facing numerous challenges at different levels, but the most significant is clearly 
cybercrime, impacting the economy. However, threats originating from states, and 
the use of the internet by terrorists, as well as the manipulation of social media 
cannot be underestimated either. Links between cybersecurity and hybrid threats 
are also highlighted by the Joint Communication on Countering Hybrid Threats 
(European Commission, 2016b) and media reports using terms such as ‘social media 
warfare’ (The Telegraph, 2019). These trends call for national resilience-building and 
cooperation in law enforcement, as well as deeper trust and cooperation between 
allies such as that between the U.S., the EU and NATO.
Hostile or malicious activity passes through several jurisdictions and leverages 
assets in private hands: for example, botnets use networks and compromised 
computers, servers and IoT devices (i.e. a smart watch, smartphone, smart lightbulb, 
or any internet-connected device) to attack a target system. Similar techniques can 
be used by cybercriminals, terrorist groups, as well as states. Such hostile actors easily 
hide behind anonymity-enabling and/or plausible deniability features of cyberspace. 
In countering such ambiguous attackers, measures need to be applied in several areas 
including underlying technologies, business practices, and market dynamics. There is 
also a need to develop security standards covering critical infrastructure or consumer 
devices, rules for responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities, patching and updating of 
software, regulatory frameworks to address liability issues and the elaboration of the 
‘duty of care’ principle. It also requires building cyber threat intelligence capabilities, 
or controlling the foreign acquisition of critical cyber technologies. In short, it 
calls for a broader view where the lines between the internal and external policies, 
between market-oriented, criminal and defence policies are blurred.
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A nouvelle model of cooperation has to be created by/for the EU to realise its 
objectives in cybersecurity. Historically, the EU has been shaped by schematic 
grand-scale structural pillars. This approach can once again be used to clarify the 
EU’s vision and strengthen its actions on cybersecurity. A ‘Cyber Maastricht’ model 
could be constructed, based on the following three pillars: Resilience, Deterrence, 
and Defence & International Relations/IR (see Figure 1 for details). The model’s 
structural elements are not new, and what is more important is the place, the nature 
of the elements, and the interrelations between the proposed pillars as foundations 
for new governance institutions.
FIGURE 1: A ‘CYBER MAASTRICHT’ MODEL
Source: Authors
A gargantuan element of the world’s political economy, the EU needs to be capable 
of recovering as fast as possible after a prospective cyberattack. Moreover, given the 
tightness of intra-entity cooperation, a resilient EU means a great deal more than a 
resilient Member State taken separately from the EU, immaterial as to whether such 
a state is big or small. However, such a pillar structure finds plenty of operational 
space within a post-functional framework.
While cyber resilience-building in the EU is often justified by the need to complete 
the single market, one needs to look beyond economic considerations and realise the 
informational interdependence of actors, which is very visible, as for example in the 
vulnerability of disclosure mechanisms (or the lack of them). Security information, 
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just like cyber-tools, tends to have a dual use. Interdependence is multi-dimensional, 
and leads to the necessity of appropriate institutions and mechanisms for sharing 
information among private players, between private and public sector, and between 
states. However, current solutions include one-way or voluntary information flows, 
in which bridges to other pillars are difficult to build. Resilience is also linked to 
technological factors, such as the presence or absence of a high number of errors/
bugs/flaws in products, which leads to fewer public concerns and also calls for 
interaction with other pillars to decrease vulnerabilities. This also fits the concept 
of deterrence by denial as opposed to deterrence by punishment (Burton, 2018, p. 
9). Thus, the resilience pillar’s aim is to increase both private and public sectors’ 
accountability for technologies to absorb malicious cyber activities and incidents, as 
well as transparency among actors to the maximum possible level.
If a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ can establish a normative re-conceptualisation of the EU 
as a deterrence provider, it can lead to a significant change with regards to the EU’s 
geo-strategic role. The dominant legislative side of this pillar can, in principle, be 
supported by the theoretical platform of liberal intergovernmentalism. A range of 
serious ‘credible commitments’ can be worked out, for example, on ‘attribution and 
e-evidence’, which are also relevant in the context of the third pillar where they are 
guided by the strict constraints of criminal legal frameworks rather than political 
ones. Whereas national governments as gatekeepers to protect the interest of societies 
are privileged actors in the second and the third pillars, their losses in authority by 
means of surrendering competences to EU is compensated by gains in legitimacy 
and problem-solving capabilities. As reluctant or incapable as Member States have 
been to resolve conflicts between law enforcement needs and fundamental human 
rights regarding the data retention regime, functional pressures – arising from the 
trans-border nature of data flows and cyberattacks, and the fact that cyberspace is over 
80% in the hands of the private sector – provide strong and credible commitments to 
cooperation because it has become an existential need.
On cyber deterrence, some commentators do not accept the relevance of this 
concept due to the credibility of the threat of punishment (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
1996, p. 94) and attribution problems (Clark and Landau, 2010). On the other hand, 
Rid and Buchanan (2015, p. 7) argue that attribution is “what states make of it”, and 
not a binary relationship. Just as criminal law theory accepts that absolute obedience 
to the law cannot be guaranteed, the 2017 EU strategy accepts that no ICT product, 
system or service can be guaranteed to be ‘100 %’ secure and not all cyberattacks 
can be prevented. Therefore, the goal should not be that of achieving absolute 
deterrence and unrealistically seeking to prevent all cyberattacks from occurring, 
but to maintain an effective deterrence posture by strong messages and responses 
aimed against offenders and thus force aggressors to recalculate their intentions. In 
short, focus on prevention (Tor, 2017, pp. 94–95). The measures taken in this area 
by the EU range from technical to legal and political ones; from encouraging the 
uptake of IPv6(Intern Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is the communications protocol (IP) 
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that provides an identification and location system for computers on networks and 
routes traffic across the internet.)
 to stepping up the law enforcement and political response, to cooperation with the 
financial sector and building the cyber defence capabilities of the EU Member States.
A ‘Cyber Maastricht’, with its Defence & IR pillar, can lead the EU to a breakthrough 
by becoming more relevant geo-strategically. Cybersecurity is not an isolated policy, 
but in the context of today’s security challenges, a shift to new platforms enabled 
by current technologies. In the light of setbacks in integration due to Brexit and 
the mixed messages received from the U.S. on its defence outlook for Europe, a 
militarized cyberspace is certainly a good reason to aim for as part of the EU’s strategic 
autonomy and security union. An integral part of this militarised cyberspace relies 
on the EU’s cybersecurity efforts. However, as cyber defence is part of the EU’s broader 
cybersecurity policy, it remains unclear how it fits into the concept of “strategic 
autonomy” (European Commission, 2016a) and defence union – whether or not 
strategic autonomy includes EU level operational capabilities, and if yes, what kind, 
and whether or not strategic autonomy means ‘independence’ for the underlying 
industry. Although currently there are initiatives to boost operational capabilities of 
the member states and foster cyber defence innovation in the EU (for example in the 
framework of PESCO and the European Defence Fund), these actions are more aimed 
at coordination leaving the EU with the role of an advisory, or at best a coordinator 
in some areas related to budget and high-level crisis response. While BREXIT may 
open some doors for deeper integration in cyber defence, some might be perceiving a 
potentially growing strategic autonomy of the EU and a defence union as undesirable, 
and damaging to U.S. defence/industrial interests (Fiott, 2018, p. 7). Others advocate 
executive powers to the EU institutions in cyber defence and the establishment of a 
Cyber Defence Agency (Griffith, 2018).
Indirectly tilting toward the imperial paradigm, the EU will enhance its 
cooperation on cybersecurity with the like-minded NATO, and it will have more 
chances to cooperate with the UN, particularly with the UN GGE, while solidifying 
‘Capacity Building’ mechanisms in the neighbourhood. It will do the same, wherever 
its ‘civilising mission’ (e.g. promoting ‘Human Rights’) leads it to. Defence is not 
Resilience, but, together with Deterrence, it has a durable common basis, constructed 
out of the ‘Member States Defence Capabilities’, the ‘EU Crisis Response’, and ‘Cyber 
Diplomacy Toolkit in the CFSP’. Once again, in order to build this ‘pedestal’ for the two 
pillars, some ‘raw material’ will need to be supplied by liberal intergovernmentalism, 
but this is a routine issue, which should start by finding a common definition of EU 
cybersecurity, clarifying the content for clusters for its overall policy, identifying 
exogenous and endogenous influencing factors and taking stock of available 
resources in a systematic manner. In short, should the EU consider converting the 
model of a ‘Cyber Maastricht’ into reality, it just needs to make an effort. Time is, 
unfortunately, running out.
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Conclusion
This paper engaged in a comprehensive search for a relevant theoretical concept (or 
a right mixture of several theories) that best explain integration processes in the EU’s 
cybersecurity governance. We examined both internal and external domains – since 
the line between these is blurred in cyberspace – with the application of toolboxes 
provided by neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, post-functionalism and the 
imperial paradigm. The discussion led this research towards creating a schematic 
model that essentially represents a scholarly call on the necessity for the EU to 
formulate a ‘Cyber Maastricht’. Characteristically for the proposed pillar-based 
model, it requires almost no ‘assistance’ from the neo-functional spillover, which has 
previously helped the EU to realise achievements in the field of political economy, 
but has not been so effective in the sphere of geo-strategy. Instead, a far more 
sophisticated combination of integration-driven theories will be needed, and this 
fact in itself depicts a positive sign for the EU to remain relevant, creative and flexible 
in its policymaking. This is especially important when it comes to addressing the 
issue of cybercrime and cyber defence – the alternative, a cumbersome policy on 
cybersecurity, can quickly push the EU into mediocrity.
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Chapter Eleven
The Steps from Dublin III to Dublin IV
Amelia Martha Matera
Abstract
In 1992, the EU established the Common European Asylum System, which is based 
on five central directives one of which is the Dublin regulation. The debate about a 
possible Dublin IV regulation started a long time ago, but the discrepancies among 
the member states’ interests are huge and it is hard to find a compromise. In fact, 
since the third and last update in 2013, there have not been any further changes. 
However, all parties agree that there is a need of reform and that the current system 
is unfair and inefficient. This paper wants to highlight future possible scenarios. The 
Commission presented a proposal in 2016 to reform the whole CEAS, which included 
a proposal for Dublin IV. The European Parliament had already adopted a position on 
the proposal of 2016, while the Council did not. The first part of the paper is dedicated 
to the current situation and to the reasons why the Regulation needs reform. The 
second section analyses the Proposal submitted by the Commission in 2016, and the 
related problems and reasons why this Proposal has not been agreed upon. Before 
reaching the conclusion, the third section explores possible alternatives of the 
Regulation’s future. It is difficult to say what will happen; theseare all hypothetical 
scenarios. However, it is fundamental to deeply analyse the suggestions proposed so 
far with regard to an eventual reform of the current regulation.
Introduction
In 1992, the European Union (EU) established the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS), which is based on five central EU rules; one of these is the Dublin 
Regulation (the Regulation). Nowadays, the Regulation is often cited by the media 
and it is general knowledge that this Regulation clarifies which Member State (MS) 
is responsible for the asylum procedure of third-country nationals who entered 
the EU and applied for international protection. As the first country of entry with 
responsibility for assessing the asylum applications, the MS at the borders of the EU 
have been strongly opposed to the Regulation. Technically the criteria establishing 
the responsible MS, in hierarchical order, are the following: family consideration for 
minors, family members who are beneficiaries of international protection, family 
members who are applicants for international protection, visa and residence permit. 
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However, the consequence of the “first entry” criteria is that countries like Greece or 
Italy find they are under more pressure because they are the usual port of entry for 
Europe and therefore face a high number of migrants. There are numerous critics 
of the operation of the regulation and their objections reach to the core principles 
enshrined in the rules.
The first critics go back to 1997; the year in which the first Dublin Convention entered 
into force. It was criticised for its lack of substantive and procedural harmonisation, 
and because it excluded the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to ensure uniform 
interpretation (Marinho and Heinonen, 1998). The criticisms continued with Dublin 
II, with MS arguing that it was inefficient and unfair towards the southern and 
eastern MS (Nicol, 2007). The debate about what would become known as the Dublin 
IV Regulation started a long time ago; however, the discrepancies among the MS 
interests are broad, and finding a compromise has been fraught with difficulty. In 
fact, since the third and last update in 2013 (Dublin III), no further changes have been 
made.
Nevertheless, EU institutions, NGOs and various actors agree that there is a need 
for further reform and that the current system is unfair and inefficient. The aim of 
this paper is to highlight future possible scenarios. The European Commission (the 
Commission) (2016) presented a proposal (the Proposal) that year to reform the whole 
CEAS, which includes a proposal for Dublin IV as well. The European Parliament 
(EP) adopted a position on the Proposal, while the European Council (from now on 
Council) has not yet done so.
The recent refugee crisis 2015–16 and the continued criticisms and perceived 
failures of the system demonstrate the importance of analysing in depth any 
suggestions proposed so far for a Dublin IV Regulation. The first part of the paper 
is dedicated to the current situation and to the reasons why the Regulation needs 
reform. The second section analyses the Proposal submitted by the Commission in 
2016, and the related problems and reasons why this Proposal has not been agreed 
upon. Before reaching the conclusion, the third section explores possible alternatives 
of the Regulation’s future.
Why does Europe need Dublin IV?
The Dublin Convention entered into force in 1997 together with the Schengen 
Agreement. Once the borders were shared, the MS realized that there was the need to 
establish Regulations, which would clarify which MS has the responsibility to assess 
asylum applications. The current Dublin III Regulation was adopted in 2013.
The CEAS’s aim is to reach a certain level of standardization with regards to asylum 
procedure and policy. To this day, there is no complete harmonisation in the system 
and there is no mutual recognition of asylum decisions, which may lead an MS to 
process applications more than once. According to the Italian jurist and migration 
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expert Schiavone, the key for a successful and harmonised CEAS is a reform of the 
Regulation. (Bruni, 2018).
The current approach is to apply individual national responsibility; Art. 3. of 
Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 determines which MS is responsible for assessing 
asylum claims. However, there are “discretionary clauses” in Art. 17, which set 
out criteria for exemptions, to allow movement of asylum seekers between MS to 
address humanitarian issues such as family reunification. (Mouzourakis, 2014). Art. 2. 
Of the Regulation outlines the aim of the Regulation “A common policy on asylum, 
including a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), is a constituent part of the 
European Union’s objective of progressively establishing an area of freedom, security 
and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection 
in the Union.” (EU, 2013). The political aim of the Dublin system is to prevent and 
reduce secondary movement and ‘asylum shopping’. However, these aims have not 
been achieved successfully.
The EP (2019, p. 2) declared the following:
“The current migration and refugee crisis has revealed significant structural 
weaknesses in the design and implementation of the CEAS and of the Dublin 
regime. This has been confirmed by recent external studies on the Dublin 
system and acknowledged by the Commission […].”
Schiavone argues that due to the lack of harmonisation, MS have completely different 
procedures and take also different decisions (Bruni, 2018). In Italy, for example, there 
is a higher number of Iraqi and Afghani applicants because the Italian authorities 
usually decide positively in these cases. Therefore, those country nationals will 
choose to seek asylum in Italy – a clear case of asylum shopping (Bruni, 2018). This 
demonstrates the impact when directives are implemented differently among the 
European countries.
Theoretically, all countries of first arrival should push for uniformity in reforms, 
but Schiavone (2018) explains that internal political elements could easily change 
this logic. For example, Italy holds an ambivalent position towards the Regulation. 
Although Italy is one of the countries mostly affected by the 2015–16 refugee crisis, 
it has not proposed or advocated seriously for further reform of the Regulation 
(Schiavone, 2018). However, the role of Italy needs further analysis.
It is possible to summarize the major criticisms of the current Regulation as follows:
1. There is no sharing of responsibilities and solidarity mechanisms among the 
MS;
2. Countries at the border are under more pressure compared to internal MS;
3. The bureaucratic processes are slow and very often inefficient. This causes 
extreme delays or even the failure of transfer of the asylum seekers who in turn 
fall into a bureaucratic limbo (UNHCR, 2019);
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4. The mechanisms result in burden shifting rather than responsibility sharing;
5. The system operates contrary to the principle of solidarity;
6. The fact that MS are obligated to take asylum seekers creates an incentive for 
keeping the asylum standards low in countries of first arrival which are under 
pressure (Greens, 2016);
7. The system results in differing implementation scenarios.
Mouzourakis (2014) explains that there is a strong link between irregular entry 
and asylum application, and the Regulation practically pushes MS to protect their 
borders even more in order to avoid burden of any possible and eventual asylum 
application.
Another argument which openly shows the inefficiency of the Regulation is the 
fact that the courts have often enough decided to suspend the transfer to a MS of 
an asylum seeker according to the Regulation due to reasons such as “the risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment” (Edal, 2018). However, judicial reforms can only 
intervene in a reactive manner to remedy some practical deficiencies; courts cannot 
change the principles of the Regulation and also, they are not willing to challenge 
the Dublin’s state centric logic (Mouzourakis, 2014).
A clear example of the Regulation’s inefficiency is as follows. Mouzourakis (2014, p. 
25) reports that Germany sent 306 transfer requests to Switzerland, but also received 
350 people from Switzerland. This means that at the end of the day, the administrative 
efforts and the expenses are not equal; the country has to deal with the same amount 
of applications.
Mouzourakis (2014) also mentions some perverse and highly criticised effects of the 
Regulations. Ireland, for example, requests DNA tests for family reunification under 
the Regulation. Moreover, it is very common that requests to take back an applicant 
for international protection find no government response for three months or more. 
This situation leaves asylum seekers languishing in a bureaucratic limbo.
Many scholars hold the view that the burden sharing should include several criteria 
in order to establish the responsible country, such as language affinities, reception 
capacity, etc. Yet, all these criteria are currently omitted (Schneider et al., 2013) (ECRE 
(a), 2008). In order to reform the Regulation, MS agree that they need a clear and new 
mechanism to share responsibilities (European Council, 2018). In order to achieve 
this, Mouzourakis (2014) suggests shifting all decision-making power to Brussels, so 
it would decide about the sharing mechanisms to ease the current deadlock.
Commission Proposal of 2016
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, there is no doubt; all parties agree on the 
said problems. The major challenge for the EU is to find a common solution to these 
perceived problems.
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The EP (2019, p. 11) states that, despite repeated meetings and talks about the issues, 
there has been no agreement on a solution:
“The main elements for the balance between responsibility and solidarity 
were presented in May 2018 as a compromise proposal. […]At the European 
Council of June 2018, and at each subsequent meeting, in October 2018 and 
December 2018, however, EU leaders failed to achieve a breakthrough on 
internal aspects of migration and the EU’s asylum policy, showing remaining 
differences among Member States as regards, in particular, the reform of the 
Dublin Regulation.”
The Commission proposed a reform of the CEAS in 2016, which includes a revamped 
Regulation. So far, the negotiations are blocked at the trilogues34 stage. In 2017, the 
EP adopted its position about the Proposal. However, the Council has not expressed 
its opinion on it.
There have, however, been two possible compromises identified by AIDA (2017). 
The first focuses on the general principles upon which all MS should agree: the 
scope of relocation, the procedures in the country of first entry, and the principle of 
stable responsibility, which states that a MS is responsible for an asylum application 
for a period of 10 years (AIDA, 2017). The second possible compromise is about 
the three phases for the Regulation. The Proposal (Commission, 2016) presented 
during the Estonian presidency distinguishes between the following three phases: 
normal, challenging, and severe crisis. The normal circumstance is when the status 
quo remains intact and the responsibility criteria do not change. The challenging 
circumstance is the scenario in which a country reaches 90 percent of its share so 
that the MS would mobilise and support the MS in need. The third circumstance is 
the scenario in which a MS faces an extreme pressure despite the efforts of all other 
MS. In this case, as soon as the relocation cap is reached, the Council would intervene 
and try to determine whether it should include additional relocation or take other 
measures (AIDA, 2017).
The principle behind relocation affirms that the process of relocation of asylum 
seekers, whose application is considered likely to be unfounded or inadmissible, shall 
not be applied (AIDA, 2017). However, it is not clear which criteria have to be used to 
identify whether an application is likely to be considered unfounded or inadmissible 
before the end of the assessment in the proper asylum procedure.
The last innovative general principle is the stable responsibility, which affirms that 
a MS would be responsible for an asylum seeker for a period of 10 years (AIDA, 2017).
The main changes introduced by the Proposal are: the introduction of quotas and 
a three-phase Dublin system. The Proposal also introduces the mandatory procedure 
34 Tripartite meetings between Parliament, the Council and the Commission.
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of making a pre-Dublin check. However, ECRE ((c), 2018) holds the view that making 
these procedures mandatory brings several new concerns and does not improve the 
mechanisms of the Regulation. The concerns ECRE ((c), 2018) are referring to are as 
follows:
1. The risk of serious human rights violations;
2. The disregard of protection obligations relating to asylum seekers’ right to 
family life;
3. The risk of creating complex procedural layers before applying responsibility-
allocation criteria, the pre-Dublin procedure would seriously undermine the 
Regulation’s objective of efficient procedures ensuring rapid access to asylum 
procedures; and it will also make the system more unequal because MS of first 
entry are more likely to be affected by “challenging circumstances” and are 
therefore obliged to carry out the mandatory checks.
4. The risk that more applicants in MS of first entry will encourage the use of 
coercive measures to contain the high number of people (although this is 
already a reality, these measures could be further increased: detention and 
risks of substandard reception conditions).
The Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee 
adopted the position in autumn 2017 on the Proposal of 04 May 2016 (EP, 2019). 
The European Committee of the Regions considers the approach presented by the 
Commission inadequate; it suggests that the number of arrivals has to be taken into 
consideration in the reference key, and the threshold for triggering the mechanism 
for the allocation of applicants for international protection is too high (EP, 2019). The 
EP (2019) highlights that six national parliaments submitted their opinion as well: 
the Visegrád Group35, Romania, and Italy, stating that “The Commission Proposal 
does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity”.
In the first round of discussion within the Council, MS agreed that they need: “faster 
and more efficient determination of the Member State responsible for examination 
of asylum claims, and prevention of secondary movements” (EP, 2019). However, 
after this they could not reach any further relevant agreements.
The MS started the discussions within the Council, without success. Since the 
beginning there have been MS blocking the unanimity required to give a mandate to 
the Presidency to enter into interinstitutional negotiations with the EP, while other 
MS have submitted a position paper in favour of a reduced fair share, and alleviation 
of procedural burdens for the frontline MS (EP, 2019).
Despite discussions with MS the Council continues to have no formal position on 
the Proposal.
35 The Visegrád Group, Visegrád Four, or V4 is a cultural and political alliance of four Central 
European states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, which are members 
of the European Union (EU) and NATO. (Visegrad Group, 2019)
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Main challenges
There have been several critics towards the Proposal. ECRE ((e), 2018, p. 14) summarizes 
the main challenges as follows:
“Key points of disagreement among the Member States are: the role and scope 
of (mandatory) relocation of asylum seekers as part of the responsibility 
allocation mechanism; the duration of responsibility; the scope and nature 
of pre-Dublin checks; and the inclusion of beneficiaries of international 
protection in the scope of the Regulation.”
The Proposal seems, at first, to be a solution to many of the criticisms of Dublin III, 
because it finally introduces a system of quotas and sharing responsibility. However, 
as Schiavone (2018) explains, it is only in case of emergency that another MS would 
intervene to assist. Otherwise the Proposal does not reform the principle that 
allocates the first country of arrival as responsible for assessing claims. Furthermore, 
experts like ECRE, explain that the importance of a link between the asylum seeker 
and the country of eventual relocation is of foremost importance. Nonetheless, the 
interest of current national and European political parties in this topic is very low 
(Schaivone, 2018). ECRE’s ((c), 2018) main concern is also that the Proposal represents 
a deterioration of the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, and fails to address the 
fundamental dysfunctions of the Regulation.
In February 2016, the Greens published “The Green Alternative to the Dublin 
System”, calling for a fair allocation of asylum seekers across the MS based on 
objective criteria: to empower EASO, that included mutual recognition of asylum 
decisions, and a system built around the existing ties and preferences of asylum 
seekers towards MS. The Greens (2016) also advocated for specific procedural 
guarantees for unaccompanied minors.
The Greens (2016) warned the Proposal risked repeating the core failures of the 
current Regulation, such as the use of coercion, which has two deleterious costs: one 
for the MS and a second humanitarian cost for the asylum seekers. The Greens (2016) 
placed importance on acknowledging the preferences of asylum seekers; claiming 
this would enhance a positive prospect for integration, and arguing that the consent 
of a person to move voluntary to a MS would prevent him or her from secondary 
movement (or migration).
Tubakovic, argued that the Proposal adopts a timid approach when tackling the 
issues of secondary movement and the lack of solidarity among MS:
“Firstly, the added provision allowing member states to sanction asylum 
seekers reveals a more coercive trend in EU asylum policy and does not 
necessarily address the reasons why asylum seekers choose to move. Secondly, 
this rule is only effective if the asylum seeker has been registered. It does not 
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resolve the main contributing factor of secondary movement, the avoidance 
of registration in first entry countries.” (Tubakovic, 2017, p. 4)
According to Hruschka (2016), the Proposal does not offer a solution, lacks innovation, 
and keeps intact a system of national asylum systems, without common standards. 
Italy and Bulgaria hold a position against the Proposal (Magnani, 2018); nevertheless, 
there is no clear plan of another option proposed by the Italian government.
The main challenge is to find agreement on the Regulation reform. The Bulgarian 
presidency (January – June 2018) aimed to achieve progress in finding political 
consensus on the CEAS reform and the Regulation specifically. However, during the 
same six-month duration of his presidency, the Hungarian government announced 
that it would propose alternative amendments to the Regulation, based on security, 
a strict expulsion policy, and rejection of any kind of mandatory admittance quota 
(Atanassov, 2019). Despite all the presidencies, which have been alternating since the 
Proposal in 2016, have promised to work on finding political consensus, their work 
has been unsuccessful (Atanassov, 2019).
The current Romanian presidency states that the issue of migration and reforms 
of the Regulation remains in focus. But, given the difficulties in making any 
major progress on the Regulation reform in the short term, the current Romanian 
presidency has decided to concentrate on pushing for the other asylum reform files 
before the EP elections of 2019 (Atanassov, 2019).
ECRE ((b), 2018) reminds us that although the Council agreed to continue the work 
on the Proposal, there is no agreed-upon deadline. These comments highlight the 
need to factor in which MS is leading the presidency.
Future options
The current situation does not seem favourable to a fast solution and an easy 
approval of the Proposal. This section of the article aims is to present realistic future 
possibilities. These can be summarized in two options for the short-term scenario: 
maintaining the status quo or accepting, eventually with changes, the Proposal of 
2016.
Maintain status quo
It seems realistic that the Regulation in its current form, will continue to be overlooked. 
Currently a number of MS, often in Eastern Europe, refuse to apply it (AIDA, 2019). 
Other MS like Germany decided to put the Regulation on hold and to allow asylum 
seekers to enter Germany and be processed there, without considering the country 
of first arrival. Some administrative arrangements have been also developed, which 
will be addressed in full later.
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It is also necessary to mention that in the absence of reforms the MS, a system of 
ad hoc burden (or responsibility) sharing among (some) EU countries has emerged. 
14 member states, at this stage, have expressed their agreement with the Franco-
German document, which establishes the “solidarity mechanism” for allocating 
asylum-seekers across the EU (Zalan, 2019).
Currently, countries such as Italy or Malta will (usually) only carry out rescue 
operations, or let boats carrying migrants enter their ports, after an agreement on 
their redistribution has been reached (which now regularly seems to be the case).
Furthermore, several MS have chosen not to relocate asylum seekers who had 
their fingerprints taken in Greece; as a measure of support for the Hellenic country, 
which has experienced an influx of asylum seekers and has not been able to cope 
administratively with the situation.
However, these interpretations and implementations of the Regulations and 
adaptions towards dealing with large numbers of asylum seekers by individual MS 
remain the exception. It seems realistic to maintain the status quo even though the 
Regulation is not always implemented.
36 It is an informatics system, which collects compares and transmits the fingerprints of 
asylum seekers (EMN, 2014).
Brexit and Dublin Regulation
When considering the option of maintaining the status quo, it is important to 
examine the UK’s situation. Brexit has overlooked the debate about the CEAS and 
more in particular about the Dublin System. With Brexit, the UK has lost its position 
in the rule-making process. The UK had already opted out from several common 
directives in this field. However, the British have always supported the Dublin system. 
If the UK leaves without a deal, it will lose its right to transfer asylum seekers who 
have been fingerprinted in other MS and will also lose access to Eurodac.36 According 
to Bilgic (2019), this could lead to an increase in irregular arrivals and only a deal 
could maintain the status quo or a less drastic transition. The UK has limited options 
on this issue. In case of a no deal, the UK could negotiate bilateral agreements with 
separate MS, and non-EU MS (Bilgic, 2019). However, negotiations will take time and 
will not necessarily prevent irregular arrivals. The UK could either increase its naval 
presence in the Channel or consider an arrangement similar to the one between EU 
and Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein, which implies the States are 
members of the Dublin system and automatically also of the Schengen area.
Accept Commission Proposal
The second option is for the Council and the EP to vote in favour of the Proposal. 
So far, the negotiations have been very slow, and only the EP was able to make its 
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opinion public. The reform as proposed affects not only the Regulation, but also 
the whole CEAS, which consists of another three directives and one Regulation. 
However, this is not the only reason making an eventual approval of this proposal 
unlikely. The main challenge is to satisfy all MS whose interests are so diverse that 
reaching a compromise seems quite difficult. As Schiavone (2018) affirms, the Italian 
and the Hungarian political scenes do not incentivize the adoption of this proposal; 
his opinion is that several important points of the Proposal, such as the criterion of 
genuine link with a particular MS, will be excluded.
MS could accept the Proposal with the EP modifications, published in the report 
of the LIBE Commission in 2017, in the so-called Wikström report. The EP has made 
deep changes to the hierarchy of responsibility criteria establishing the responsible 
MS by: (1) introducing academic and professional qualifications as relevant criteria; 
(2) deleting irregular entry, visa waived entry and applications at airports and transit 
zones; and (3) introducing an allocation mechanism between MS as the fall-back 
criterion in the Regulation (Aida, 2017). The main amendments proposed by the EP 
(2017) are the following:
1. Abandonment of the criterion of first entry and the adoption of a quota system 
assigned to each State based on GDP and population (% of the total number 
of applications submitted). The main difference with the original Proposal is 
that this criterion will be adopted without any need of phases. The application 
must be presented in the country of first entry. This State verifies the existence 
of a wide range of “effective links” between the applicant and a MS, like family 
members and relatives, prior stays, possession of educational or professional 
qualifications, presence of a sponsor. Therefore, MS will receive applicants 
who have links with their community, and all this, within the limits of their 
quotas. If an applicant lacks connections, then he can choose between the four 
countries most distant from the fulfilment of his quota. If the declared bonds 
prove to be non-existent, the person will be allocated by the system to the State 
which is less “virtuous” with respect to its quota.
2. Legal access to EU from third countries – for example, through the UNHCR’s 
intervention – should be facilitated.
3. The Dublin transfers, which are against human rights, have to be stopped.
4. Particular attention to minors, especially if unaccompanied. The EP proposes 
to strengthen the rules in the best interest of the child: the major guarantees 
for the appointment of a legal guardian, no forced transfers, the country where 
it is located must take charge of the child’s vulnerable condition, and lastly for 
each transfer, there is the need for an evaluation by a multidisciplinary team 
and prior appointment of a guardian in the destination country.
5. The State of first entry will have to carry out a security check through national 
and European databases. The costs of reception in the identification phase of 
the competent State and the transfer will be covered by the EU budget Transfers 
and will be carried out by the European Asylum Agency. Moreover, it proposes 
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a three-year transition period for MS with less experience, and strong penalties 
for non-cooperative states: reduction of European funds.
Progin-Theuerkauf (2017) states that there is no real added value of the Dublin IV 
Proposal: “On the contrary: It would rather add to the existing problems, as it will 
not be able to encourage Member States to commit to more solidarity among each 
other and to a better treatment of asylum seekers. It is hard to imagine that such 
an instrument will find consensus in the Council and the Parliament. But: Some 
elements of the proposal might survive the ongoing negotiations. And these could 
still cause enough harm to the already weak position of migrants in Europe.”
Although the EP presented these changes, the Council’s position is still ambiguous. 
The latter is the most complicated to achieve due to the competing national interests.
Other alternatives
In case no agreement can be achieved, a third option to consider would be a new 
Dublin proposal. This would mean a restart of negotiations from zero. This option is 
realistic because there have been major critics of the Dublin system and the Proposal 
(as the Proposal does not really change the basic principles of the Regulation). There 
is a general agreement that the principle, which needs to be achieved, is: to share 
responsibilities among the EU because migration cannot be the problem only of the 
countries on the front line.
The negotiations of the Proposal of 2016 are ongoing. The Proposal has not yet been 
discussed within the Council, for this reason, the probability to restart negotiations 
from zero is quite low. However, the option of new negotiations does not have to be 
excluded.
What would a new proposal look like? There have been interesting ideas coming 
from different actors. The following sections introduce some of those ideas that could 
completely abolish the Regulation.
Free Choice
SVR suggests implementing the option of free choice. This is also advocated by 
several NGOs like the German ProAsyl (2015), which asks for the abolishment of Art. 
13 of the (EU) Nr. 604/2013 (Dublin III-Regulation).
ProAsyl (2015) highlights several reasons why asylum seekers choose to apply in 
one particular MS. They increasingly seek protection where refugees have already 
been accepted based on their cultural and national origins. This results in a network 
structure and it facilitates integration. Moreover, immigration societies are perceived 
as welcoming and therefore attractive to those seeking protection.
The necessary social and political conditions cannot be assumed to be the same in 
all MS. Until 1989, the Eastern European MS had no organized tradition of migration 
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and refugee reception. Even a quarter-century later, these MS are still not capable of 
handling or answering the refugee question, particularly compared to the level of 
development with the Central European Member States. This is particularly evident 
in the treatment of refugees and violation of human rights in Bulgaria, Romania 
and Hungary. The southern European Member States such as Greece, Italy and 
Spain, initially understood themselves to be classic transit states and did not have to 
establish refugee reception structures until 1997 (years in which the Dublin system 
was introduced for the first time). ProAsyl (2015) argues that a distribution of refugees 
among the MS, without incorporating the necessary transformation processes in the 
southern and eastern European member states, is at the expense of the refugees and 
runs counter to the integration goal of the European Union.
Finally, ProAsyl (2015) has concluded that free choice is a valid alternative to the 
current system, and proposes a system of quotas similar to what the Commission 
has proposed. It has also been proposed that refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary 
protection should be granted free movement immediately after granting status, and 
mutual recognition of MS status decisions in the area of refugee law and subsidiary 
protection should be granted.
Administrative arrangements between MS
The inefficiency of Dublin III and the unsuccessfully negotiations of Dublin 
IV have led some MS to sign bilateral agreements in the attempt of solving the 
problem of responsibility. As of 2019, Germany is the leader of these “administrative 
arrangements”. The establishment of these agreements with other MS was caused by 
the conflict with the interior minister and the German Chancellor. (ECRE (d), 2018) 
The Commission has not given any official statement about these arrangements. 
Germany signed such agreements with Spain, Greece and Portugal. Some of these 
agreements bypass the Dublin system, in order to implement fast transfers.
The agreement signed with Portugal foresees shorter time limits for replying to 
incoming Dublin requests: one month instead of three to “take charge” of requests, 
and “as soon as possible” to “take back” requests. ECRE ((d), 2018) considers the 
agreement signed with Greece more problematic, allegedly due to legal and political 
concerns. The reasons are the following: Germany is undermining the rule of law 
in general; the more MS try to find bilateral solutions, the less the EU will be likely 
to achieve a European reform. The first legal concern is that people who entered 
Greece and have been fingerprinted there and have expressed the will to apply for 
international protection in Germany, will be denied entry. ECRE ((d), 2018) reminds 
that the refusal of entry to people who applied for asylum in other MS goes against 
the Regulation and the Schengen Borders Code. The second concern is that there are 
procedural safeguards prior to the transfer, which have to be guaranteed, but these 
are nullified with the German-Greek arrangement.
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Third, the German-Greek arrangement sees asylum seekers who have been 
transferred as subsequent applicants in the country they were transferred to. This 
can be a problem since the Regulation Art. 18(2) clearly allows such applicants to 
re-access the asylum procedure without considering their claim as a subsequent 
application. The problem is that subsequent applications often imply less rights 
(ECRE, ((d), 2018). Moreover, ECRE ((d), 2018) is concerned about the constraints of 
human rights, which have to be safeguarded, and it reminds that the case law of the 
ECtHR and CJEU prohibits the transfer of asylum seekers in MS where the person 
would face a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.
The introduction of such arrangements can be interpreted as a threat to a common 
solution, but also as an attempt from the MS to find efficient instruments to overcome 
the inadequacies of the Dublin system.
These arrangements are implemented in the scenario of maintaining the status 
quo. However, should these types of arrangements increase, this could eventually 
lead to a complete replacement of the Regulation.
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Enlarge the Dublin system to countries outside the EU
The International Organisation of Migration (IOM) and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suggest there is the need for the establishment 
of an arrangement like the Dublin Regulation between coastal States on both sides of 
the Mediterranean. This option would involve actors of the EU and of third countries. 
The IOM-UNHCR Proposal to the European Union for a Regional Cooperative 
Arrangement Ensuring Predictable Disembarkation and Subsequent Processing of 
Persons Rescued at Sea (IOM, 2018) presents a broad framework covering all steps in 
the procedure from disembarkation to the return of failed asylum seekers (ECRE (e), 
2018).
The key problem with this proposal is the instability and the precarious state of 
human rights in the neighbouring countries to the EU. ECRE ((e), 2018) realistically 
states that this is not really an option, considering the lack of an asylum system 
in North Africa. However, this should not be completely excluded in a future long-
term scenario. As the EU has already shown, it has big interests in trying to solve the 
problems related to migration in third countries.
The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration37 (SVR, 
2018) is in favour of changes and more solidarity among the MS. The only options 
SVR sees for Europe, in order to avoid renationalisation and a legislative stalemate 
are:
1. Dublin Plus, which corresponds to the Commission proposal. It maintains the 
Dublin principle and it adds corrective solidarity mechanisms;
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2. fair quotas; when an applicant lacks links to none of the MS, the person will be 
allocated to a MS according to fairs quotas. This option corresponds to the EP 
proposal;
3. free choice: as the name suggests the asylum seeker has the free choice to select 
the MS in which he or she is willing to apply for asylum. This responsibility 
would be shared through financial compensation; this option is strongly 
promoted by NGOs.
Conclusion
This paper extends our knowledge of Dublin and its future possible development. 
It has differentiated between short-and long-term scenarios. The first option is the 
maintenance of the status quo, with a special eye on the UK; the second option is the 
acceptance of the Proposal. It is likely that the Proposal will be modified according to 
the position paper of the EP and the position of the Council.
The long-term projections mean there could be a completely new proposal, which 
according to experts, would revamp the principle of Dublin. These options are 
summarised in three scenarios, however other developments are not excluded. The 
first option is the implementation of free choice; the second is the increase of bilateral 
agreements between MS; and the third, proposed by IOM (2018) and UNHCR, is to 
enlarge the Dublin system to non-EU countries.
Finally, a myriad of other important factors needs to be considered. MS continue 
to see asylum seekers only as “objects of state acts”, and not as persons holding rights 
(Mouzourakis, 2014). National interests lead the negotiations and do not allow to 
achieve an efficient solution to manage CEAS and to make it function.
The future of the Regulation remains unknown and full of questions. It is likely 
that the future scenario is the adoption of the Proposal after an extended period of 
negotiation. The main concern is whether the changes proposed by the EP will be 
accepted. However, as highlighted in this paper, the Proposal still maintains several 
weaknesses, and does not revamp the Regulation as is required in reality.
Therefore, a key policy priority should be to plan a long-term agreement on the 
Dublin mechanism and more in general on CEAS.
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Chapter Twelve
EU Integration and Policy (In)coherence 
towards Irregular Migration
Nadia Petroni
Abstract
38 European Commission (2019a) Standard Eurobarometer 91: Public opinion in the European 
Union, p. 19.
Irregular migration in the European Union (EU) dominates the current EU political 
agenda. It is also the top concern of European citizens, according to the latest 
Standard Eurobarometer (Spring 2019).38 EU member states, however, are not affected 
to the same degree, resulting in political friction with regard to how to deal with the 
challenges of this phenomenon. Furthermore, the EU’s failure to provide an adequate 
and unitary response to the unprecedented influx of irregular migrants in 2015 
exposed the strength of state sovereignty within member states and led to divisions 
within the EU so far as to threaten the overall functioning of the Schengen Area. As 
a result, the EU approach to irregular migration shows clear signs of following an 
intergovernmental logic of cooperation, where the supranational institutions have 
a lesser role leaving member states in the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council 
in the driving seat. Nonetheless, there is an apparent paradox: EU institutions and 
member states are more divided than ever over a common approach to irregular 
migration, yet at the same time they are increasingly converging towards more 
restrictive migration policies.
Introduction: Contextualisation of the problem
The issue of irregular migration currently dominates the European political agenda. It 
has been at the heart of recent election campaigns across the continent and has spilled 
into broader debates concerning the future of Europe. According to the Standard 
Eurobarometer of Spring 2019 (European Commission, 2019a), the phenomenon is 
perceived as the most crucial issue facing the EU. It is the top concern in twenty-
one EU member states, reaching its highest scores in Malta (63 per cent), the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovenia (all 53 per cent). Irregular migration, however, has 
played out differently in the regions of Northwestern, Southern, and Central-Eastern 
Europe, resulting in different approaches across the EU member states.
231
Following the unprecedented influx of migrants in 2015, when over 1.8 million 
irregular migrants arrived in Europe (Frontex 2018, p. 8), the prevention of irregular 
migration has become one of the top EU policy priorities. Consequently, Europe 
experienced a ‘race to the bottom’, with most member states introducing a series of 
restrictive migration policy measures to deter irregular migration. At the same time, 
the question of how to deal with the phenomenon has become the most divisive 
issue within the EU, at both national and EU level.
The diverse policy approaches to the unparalleled influx of irregular migrants 
indeed created a divide among EU member states and institutions, drastically 
altering the landscape of European politics. In essence, the migration debate brought 
to the forefront questions concerning the resilience of the European integration 
project. Given the current situation, therefore, it is uncertain whether the EU will 
manage to rise to the challenge of irregular migration or risk fragmentation of the 
European project.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the difficulty in developing 
coherent migration policies, to deal with the challenge of irregular migration, due to 
the heterogeneous policy preferences of the EU member states and institutions. Then 
it examines the impact of the absence of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility 
among member states on the EU approach to irregular migration. The final section 
summarises the chapter, and questions whether the EU will succeed in achieving 
policy coherence in this domain in the future.
Incoherence in the EU approach to irregular migration
Since 1999, the EU has been working to develop a common EU migration policy (Peers 
et al., 2015). European cooperation in the area of irregular migration, however, has 
been neither unproblematic nor has it automatically translated into EU integration. 
This stems primarily from the fact that member states have jealously guarded their 
sole right to admit or exclude third country nationals from their respective territories.
EU member states’ reluctance to delegate decision-making in this sovereignty-
sensitive policy domain beyond the national level has resulted in an ongoing tension 
over what should be handled at the supranational level, and what should remain 
in the domain of national governments (Givens, 2010). In consequence, member 
states have not yet succeeded in agreeing on clear political objectives for a common 
migration policy. Migration policy in the EU, therefore, remains a largely national 
endeavour, where member states continue to develop their own migration policies 
(Calleja Ragonesi, 2014).
In addition to member states’ unwillingness to transfer competences in the field of 
migration to the supranational level, the EU’s failure to articulate a coherent approach 
to irregular migration can be attributed to heterogeneous national policy preferences 
over how to deal with the phenomenon. In practice, varying political cultures and 
migration traditions, together with the asymmetrical distribution of irregular 
232
migrants across EU member states, have shaped differing national preferences in 
the context of irregular migration (Ruhs, 2017). Hence, they explain the challenge in 
achieving policy coherence in this domain.
Initially a six-member bloc, by the mid-1990s the Union comprised fifteen member 
states, which, with the exception of the southern states, were prosperous and of a 
Northwestern European cultural trope. The accessions from 2004 onwards brought 
the number of member states to twenty-eight with most of the new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe with a post-communist past. This has made the Union 
much more heterogeneous, bringing new preferences and challenges, raising the 
question of whether it is possible to have a ‘one size fits all’ EU law (Chalmers et 
al., 2014). The date of EU accession is an important factor shaping member states’ 
approaches to irregular migration. In essence, while most of the ‘older’ members 
have had years of experience with irregular migration, those member states that 
joined from 2004 onwards were faced with a relatively recent phenomenon to which 
they have had to adapt very rapidly.
Some of these states also became entry points for irregular migration and 
consequently more dependent on EU support for border control, while concurrently 
facing the social and political complications that arise from the phenomenon, such 
as informal employment (Carmel, 2013). EU member states’ approaches to irregular 
migration also vary in the context of their geographical proximity to zones of 
instability and conflict. Indeed, one of the principal determinants influencing a 
member state’s approach to irregular migration concerns geographic location.
Since the different regions of the EU experience different migratory pressures, this 
has a significant impact on the approaches of individual member states. For instance, 
the focus of destination states, such as Germany and Sweden, has been on secondary 
movements of irregular migrants. In contrast, frontline states, such as Italy and 
Greece, have long called for the abolishment of Dublin’s ‘first country of entry’ rule, 
which places a burden on such states.39 This has resulted in a situation where some 
member states, particularly those staggering under the weight of irregular migration, 
strive for a common policy governed by solidarity, while others far removed from 
the issue have little incentive to standardise policy and thus are less interested in 
pursuing long-term durable solutions.
Another major challenge in achieving policy coherence in this domain concerns 
the issue of variable geometry, which formally limits the ability of the EU to 
establish a common policy. More specifically, this relates to those member states 
that joined in the first enlargement of 1973: Denmark, Ireland and the UK. With 
the aim of safeguarding national sovereignty, these states have obtained ‘opt-outs’ 
from the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) to avoid cooperation in the 
39 Another frontline state, Malta, faced migratory pressure following EU accession in 2004. 
See for example, Pace (2013) and Harwood (2014).
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adoption of measures relating to Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Adler-Nissen, 2008). 
The unequal application of the processes of supranationalisation in the field of JHA, 
therefore, reveals the difficulty in developing a coherent policy to deal with irregular 
migration.
An additional obstacle, in the above context, concerns the costs attached to the 
granting of asylum. The possibility that irregular migrants may claim asylum 
appears to constitute the main barrier to cooperation in this field. According to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2017) estimates, 
the average cost for processing and accommodating asylum seekers within the EU 
is around 10,000 euro per asylum seeker for the first year. Accordingly, the major 
challenge stems from the fact that most member states perceive no benefits in 
cooperating in matters of irregular migration, hence the tendency to ‘free-ride’ at the 
expense of the frontline states.
In the absence of a coherent policy to deal with irregular migration, member 
states are increasingly pursuing unilateral measures, such as concluding bilateral 
agreements with third states, and building walls and fences along their borders to 
prevent irregular migration. There has also been a visible shift towards the tightening 
up of national asylum and migration policies in most member states, in an attempt 
to decrease the attractiveness of the respective member state for irregular migrants 
(Zanker, 2019). Such measures, however, do not reflect the Union’s fundamental 
values, namely the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.
Apart from the diverse policy approaches of the EU member states, the objectives 
of the three main institutions involved in EU legislation also differ, which explains 
the differences in their respective approaches to irregular migration. Nonetheless, 
following the unprecedented influx of irregular migrants in 2015, the Commission’s 
stance changed significantly, from promoting the rights of asylum seekers to 
satisfying political interest in the Council. Likewise, the European Parliament (EP) 
appears to be ‘going backwards’ in terms of migrants’ rights (Lopatin, 2013). As co-
legislator, Parliament has often emphasised the need for a solidary approach to 
irregular migration; however, the rise of right-wing populist parties in the EP is 
influencing EU policy choices as support for mainstream political parties is on the 
wane (Lutz, 2019).
In recent years, the issue of irregular migration emerged at the centre of the debate 
in national elections across the EU, particularly since 2015, with right-wing populist 
parties gaining support in several member states. More importantly, the rise of right-
wing populism is transforming member states’ approaches to irregular migration. 
The case of Germany illustrates such a transformation. Known for its ‘open-door’ 
policy, enacted in August 2015, which allowed in over a million irregular migrants, it 
shifted course only the following month with Chancellor Merkel’s U-turn leading to 
the reinstatement of border controls at the German-Austrian border. Merkel’s change 
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in tone can be seen as a response to increasing public pressure against her ‘open-door’ 
policy (Dimitriadi et al., 2018).
Right-wing populist parties have made significant electoral gains across Europe, 
such as in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Italy. Some have taken office, 
while others have become the main opposition voice. In France, National Front40 
leader Marine Le Pen outpaced traditional centre-left and centre-right parties 
in the presidential elections of 2017, reaching the second and final election round, 
in which she received about a third of the votes cast. In the Netherlands, Geert 
Wilders’ Party of Freedom (PVV) came in second place in the national election of 
the same year. Meanwhile, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) shifted from being 
primarily neoliberal in focus to becoming an outspoken anti-immigrant populist 
party, receiving 12.6 per cent of the votes in the September 2017 federal elections, 
and becoming the first right-wing populist party to be represented in the German 
Bundestag since World War II. At the end of 2017, the coalition government formed 
by the centre-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party 
of Austria (FPÖ) resulted in the first western European state with a governing right-
wing populist party (Ehmsen and Scharenberg, 2018). This continental shift towards 
right-wing populism also includes Italy, where the Five Star Movement (Movimento 
5 Stelle) and the League (Lega) scored a major success in the March 2018 general 
elections, becoming coalition partners in the new government and the first populist 
government in Western Europe.41
The rise of the right-wing populist party, Sweden Democrats, in the 2018 elections 
in Sweden illustrates that this is Europe’s new normal. Since 2015, Sweden rapidly 
changed, from promoting one of the EU’s most open immigration policies to 
embracing one of its most restrictive, although it was thought to be immune from the 
trend to nationalistic politics (Ekman, 2018). Populist resentment towards irregular 
migration also played a crucial role in the victory of the pro-Brexit forces in the UK 
EU membership referendum, which took place on 23 June 2016 (Dinan et al., 2017).
In the aftermath of the mass influx of irregular migrants in 2015, most EU decisions 
taken to deal with the issue were approved at the meetings of the European Council, 
and taken in the Council, suggesting a shift towards intergovernmental policymaking 
as well as the bypassing of supranational institutions, exemplified by the 2016 EU-
Turkey Statement. The controversial deal, which in practice closed all borders along 
the Western Balkan route, was agreed upon by EU leaders without the involvement 
of Parliament. The EU approach to irregular migration thus shows clear signs of 
following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation, where the supranational 
40 Renamed ‘National Rally’ (Rassemblement National, RN) on 1 June 2018.
41 The government, however, collapsed at the end of August 2019. At the beginning of 
September 2019 the Five Star Movement formed a government with the centre-left 
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico). Porro (2019) discusses the impact of the new 
coalition on Italy’s approach to irregular migration.
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institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the (JHA) Council in the 
driving seat.
The manifold approaches within the EU to irregular migration reveal an inherent 
tension in the development of a common policy. Above all, they reveal the inability 
of EU member states to act cohesively, particularly in the face of migration pressures. 
Nevertheless, EU actors all seem to support the same pragmatic strategy; that is, 
offering benefits, notably money, to third countries, in exchange for a reduction of 
irregular migration. Indeed, EU member states and institutions, are increasingly 
converging in the ‘fight against illegal migration’, resulting in a paradigm shift 
characterised by more restrictive policy prescriptions across Europe, involving 
strengthening the bloc’s external borders, and the externalisation of migration 
controls. The words of European Council President Donald Tusk, following the 
informal meeting in Salzburg in 2018, encapsulate the prevailing focus of the EU vis-
à-vis irregular migration:
The migration debate showed that we may not agree on everything, but we agree 
on the main goal, which is stemming illegal migration to Europe.42
An apparent paradox thus emerges. Although the EU is more divided than ever 
over a common approach to irregular migration, it is united in preventing irregular 
arrivals. Indeed, Europe is more divided than ever over how to tackle the phenomenon, 
resulting in deadlocked inter-institutional negotiations on the reform of the Dublin 
Regulation (since 2016) and prolonged internal border controls (since 2015). However, 
when it is a question of the goal of preventing irregular migration, the EU tends 
to be surprisingly ‘united in diversity’.43 Still, despite convergence in the tightening 
up of migration policies, EU member states and institutions have not managed to 
overcome their differences on fundamental aspects of EU integration, in particular 
concerning the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.
42 Tusk quoted in European Council Press Release, 20 September 2018.
43 ‘In varietate concordia’ is the official motto of the EU, adopted in 2000.
Lack of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in the EU approach to 
irregular migration
An inherent flaw in the EU approach to irregular migration is that it lacks a long-
term comprehensive strategy involving sustainable, durable solutions, governed 
by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. In practice, the EU 
approach is characterised by short-term ad hoc initiatives and the absence of intra-
EU solidarity. A good example here is the Commission’s 2015 emergency relocation 
mechanism to assist Italy and Greece (Carrera and Guild, 2015), which even so resulted 
in most member states failing to fulfil their obligations and relocate the figures they 
had committed to, revealing a lack of solidarity even in times of crisis.
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Lack of solidarity in this policy domain has resulted in a political deadlock since 2016 
over reform of the Dublin Regulation, largely due to political controversy as regards 
the inclusion of a corrective allocation mechanism to fairly distribute migrants 
across EU member states and thus alleviate the pressure on frontline states (Di Filippo, 
2016). So far, the only form of solidarity that has been institutionalised concerns the 
financial aspect, specifically through the Asylum Migration and Integration Fund 
(AMIF) which consists of a fixed amount per member state, in addition to a variable 
amount, for those member states requiring emergency assistance in the event of a 
mass influx of irregular migrants (EP, 2018).
The failure of European solidarity calls into question the resilience of the 
European integration project. Schengen, one of the major achievements of European 
integration, has been under huge stress since 2015, following the decision of some 
member states to ‘temporarily’ reinstate border controls – with the aim to prevent 
secondary movements of irregular migrants from neighbouring member states. 
Previously, this measure was primarily used in connection with large sporting events 
or high-level political meetings and usually carried out for only a few days or weeks. 
Member states justified the reintroduction of border control at their internal borders 
on account of the unprecedented and uncontrolled influx of irregular migrants and 
the risk related to organised crime and terrorist threats (Guild et al., 2015).
Germany was the first member state to implement such border controls, in 
September 2015, which led to the reintroduction of internal border controls in 
other member states, such as Austria, Sweden, France and Denmark. Although 
these measures were authorised by the EU, they were prolonged several times, and 
thus amount to a major and long-term restriction of the earlier state of integration. 
Internal border checks are set to expire on 12 November 2019, even though since 2017 
the number of irregular arrivals dropped significantly owing to the implementation 
of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016 (European Commission, 2019b).
The reintroduction of border control, therefore, remains a prerogative of the member 
states. In addition, Schengen rules are strongly dominated by intergovernmental 
interests, reflected in the sustained unwillingness to lift internal border controls. This 
state of affairs raises questions concerning the absence of intra-EU solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility in the context of irregular migration, where precedence is 
given to national over common interests, and lack of mutual trust among member 
states is hindering progress towards a coherent policy. It also highlights that even 
those member states that were initially more liberal, namely Germany and Sweden, 
suspended Schengen rules in order to deter irregular migrants from entering their 
territory and encourage them to search for protection in other states. In addition to 
the reintroduction of ‘temporary’ border control at the internal borders within the 
Schengen area, other EU member states, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia, 
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erected walls and fences along their internal borders to prevent the arrival of irregular 
migrants from other member states, resulting in further disunity within the EU.44
If there is one conclusion to be drawn with a relatively high level of certainty, it is 
that the long-term challenge of irregular migration requires more than the present 
ad hoc solutions based on compensatory economic solidarity. Moreover, as long as 
the principle of solidarity is voluntary, it will not work and hence will continue to 
pose a serious challenge in developing a coherent, long-term and comprehensive 
strategy to tackle the challenge of irregular migration. In the latter’s absence, the risk 
is that the philosophy of each individual member state will prevail, resulting in the 
renationalisation of migration policies, permanent controls at the internal borders, 
and ultimately, the end of Schengen.
44 It is also important to point out that Spain erected fences in its enclaves Ceuta and Melilla 
on its borders with Morocco since 1993 to prevent irregular border crossings.
Conclusion: towards a coherent approach to irregular migration?
This chapter examined the challenges related to developing a coherent policy towards 
irregular migration; a goal that has not yet been achieved. The issue of irregular 
migration dominates the current political agenda in Europe. It has been at the heart 
of recent election campaigns across the continent, resulting in the rise of right-wing 
populist parties and a decline in traditional mainstream political parties. It has also 
become Europe’s most divisive issue due to discordant policy objectives with regard 
to how to deal with the phenomenon. Although at the time of writing irregular 
arrivals have dropped to pre-crisis levels, the issue remains highly controversial at 
both EU and national level. Given the circumstances, it is uncertain whether the EU 
will succeed in achieving policy coherence in this domain in the future.
The chapter illustrated that although the EU focus is increasingly on the prevention 
of irregular migration, the policy process in this sovereignty-sensitive field remains 
fragmented. In addition, it is marked by unilateral measures taken by individual 
member states to protect their domestic political interests against the perceived 
threats posed by irregular migration.
One of the major obstacles in formulating a coherent policy to deal with irregular 
migration concerns the variation in policy preferences across the EU. At the national 
level, policy approaches are deeply rooted in historical legacies as well as political, 
economic and social factors, including issues of religion and cultural identity. 
Moreover, the asymmetrical impact of irregular migration across EU member 
states, primarily the result of geographic location, has significantly influenced their 
respective approaches. At the EU level, discordance between the EU institutions’ 
approaches reflects their respective objectives, even though following the influx of 
irregular migrants in 2015, the Commission and EP’s stance changed significantly, 
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from promoting the rights of asylum seekers to satisfying political interest in the 
Council. These powerful cleavages thus make it harder to reach consensus in this 
policy domain.
Interestingly, since 2015, there has been some form of convergence in the 
EU approach to irregular migration, as EU member states and institutions are 
increasingly shifting their focus towards the ‘fight against illegal migration’ and the 
externalisation of migration controls. In other words, security-oriented measures 
have dominated, resulting in convergence towards more restrictive migration 
policies in order to prevent irregular migrants from reaching Europe. Nevertheless, 
it is important to point out that EU cooperation in this policy domain has not 
automatically translated into EU integration.
Indeed, despite visible convergence in restrictive migration policies, EU member 
states and institutions have not yet managed to overcome their differences on 
fundamental aspects of migration governance, in particular, the principle of 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. The key challenge lies in the fact that 
those member states not located on the EU’s external borders perceive no benefits in 
cooperating in matters of irregular migration. Hence, the tendency to ‘free-ride’ at 
the expense of the frontline states rather than cooperate in establishing a permanent 
burden-sharing mechanism to fairly distribute migrants across EU member states 
and alleviate the burden from such states. The absence of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility within the EU has become a major barrier to policy coherence. So 
long as this principle will remain voluntary, it is most unlikely that EU member 
states will pull together and agree on a long-term solution.
Furthermore, the long-term challenge of irregular migration requires more 
than the present ad hoc solutions based on compensatory economic solidarity. 
Policy development has so far proven to be reactive rather than forward-looking. 
Particularly, since 2015, EU member states and institutions are increasingly opting 
for ad hoc policy solutions which operate outside legislative frameworks including 
intergovernmental agreements and soft policy approaches, exemplified by the 
EU-Turkey Statement, agreed upon by the heads of state or government of the EU 
member states and their Turkish counterparts. EU policymaking in this field thus 
shows clear signs of following an intergovernmental logic of cooperation where 
the supranational institutions have a lesser role leaving member states in the JHA 
Council in the driving seat.
The direction in which EU policy towards irregular migration will develop hence 
remains uncertain. Will the EU split further and pursue a policy strategy aimed 
exclusively at preventing irregular arrivals, or will it manage to find a way out of the 
current impasse and reform the Dublin Regulation in accordance with the principle 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility? Taking into consideration the current 
political climate, the likelihood is that common positions will not be found in the 
near future. The development of a long-term comprehensive strategy will require 
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political will, mutual trust, and genuine solidarity. If undertaken successfully, 
however, these common efforts could re-energise European integration and have 
positive spillover effects in other policy areas.
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